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WHY RELIGIOUS PEOPLE BELIEVE WHAT THEY SHOULDN’T:
EXPLAINING THEOLOGICAL INCORRECTNESS
IN SOUTH ASIA AND AMERICA

D. Jason Slone, P hi).
Western Michigan University, 2002

Cross-cultural descriptions of religious thought and behavior in South Asia
and America show that people commonly hold ideas and perform actions that seem to
be not only conceptually incoherent but also “theologically incorrect” by the
standards of their own traditions. For example. South Asian Theravada Buddhists are
taught that the historical Buddha is unavailable because he attained enlightenment
and achieved parinirvana (“complete extinction”) and yet conceptually and ritually
represent him as if he is present and available for petition. Similarly, American
Protestants represent the Christian God as having absolute divine sovereignty and yet
reveal confidence in an inner locus of control.
Furthermore, despite their theological commitments, people in both cultures
commonly attribute event-outcomes to the forces of luck and perform actions that try
to influence luck, even though luck implies that events are beyond human control.
Even more perplexing, people might in turn attribute luck to the wills of superhuman
agents, which would mean that luck is not actually luck at all.
The widespread existence of such theological incorrectness cries out for
explanation because it challenges both scholarly theories and conventional wisdom
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about how religion works. Religion, it seems, is not simply learned from culture in

toto. nor does it determine worldviews. Rather, the actual thoughts and behaviors that
religious people have are constrained by how the human mind-brain processes
information as much as they are by the contents of cultural systems that people
happen to be taught.
This dissertation synthesizes research from the cognitive sciences and
employs it to explain theological incorrectness. Research findings demonstrate that
human beings, regardless of their religious commitments or cultural environments,
employ inductive reasoning for most cognitive tasks and therefore infer
representations about the world and its working from both culturally learned ideas
and from cognitively constrained tacit knowledge, even though, deductively,
information from those domains might not cohere systematically. This explains why
religious people commonly think and do things they “shouldn’t,” as well as why
religious systems undergo constant transformation.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films
the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and
dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of
computer printer.
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the
copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations
and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper
alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted.

Also, if unauthorized

copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing
from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

ProQuest Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA
800-521-0600

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

UMI Number. 3065410

UMI*
UMI Microform 3065410
Copyright 2002 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company.
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

ProQuest Information and Learning Company
300 North Zeeb Road
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

© 2002 D. Jason Slone

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to begin by acknowledging the influence of my teachers. I’ve had
many over the years, but three stand out in higher education: Ah-Seng Choo, the sage;
Thomas P. Kasulis, the swordsman; and E. Thomas Lawson, the scientist The first
taught me to think seriously, the second taught me to think differently, and the third
taught me to think properly. In the end, it was Tom Lawson’s mentorship and work,
which pioneered the most important advance in the study of religion to date, that
inspired me to pursue and complete a dissertation on the cognitive science o f religion.
In addition, I would like to thank Brian C. Wilson and Justin L. Barrett for
serving on my committee, for their collegial candor, and for their helpful suggestions
on this project In particular, I would like to thank Dr. Wilson for forcing me to think
about what is needed to convince socio-culturalists and theologians o f the fruits o f
this approach, and I would like to thank Dr. Barrett for giving me powerful tools to do
just that
I must also thank those people outside o f academia (where one still manages
to live some of life during the completion o f a Ph.D ), namely my family and friends.
To Larry and Irene Appleby, Ed, Kim, and Amber Hensley, Dick and Pauline
Schiffer, and the many others, I thank you dearly for your support It meant more to
me than you will most likely ever know. I also want to thank Scott and Marj Johnson

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS—CONTINUED
for their support o f my pursuit of advanced education, especially but not only, the
“Johnson Family Scholarship," which kept us afloat
Finally, I must thank my wife, Brooke. First, thank you for having the
patience to put up with my many highs and lows during die last two years. Somehow
you knew when to pat me on the back, when to kick me in the rear, and when to just
sit by quietly and let me vent or pound away on the keyboard. Second, thank you for
your invaluable help, especially typing and commenting on important parts o f the
dissertation. And, finally, thank you for being willing to put off a normal life (if we'll
ever have that) until I finished. I hope it's all worth it in the end.

D. Jason Slone

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.................................................................................

ii

CHAPTER
1. INTRODUCTION................................................................................

1

2. THE PROBLEM AND ITS BACKGROUND......................................

5

The Early Scientific Study of Religion...........................................

11

Social Science and The Enlightenment Paradigm..........................

15

The Naturalist Theories..................................................................

22

The Anthropological Naturalists - Tylor and Frazer..............

23

The Psychoanalytical Naturalist - Freud...............................

24

Non-Naturalistic Social Scientific Theories...................................

25

The Ideological Non-Naturalist - Marx.................................

25

The Socio-Culturalists - Durkheim and Weber.....................

26

Explanation is Reduction - The Transcendentalist Response
To Reduce or Romanticize?...................................................
3. POSTMODERNISM AND STANDARD SOCIAL SCIENCE

28
32
37

The Standard Social Science Model...............................................

39

Postmodernism and Its Discontents................................................

48

The Method in the Madness...................................................

51

Deconstructing Postmodernism and the SSM.................................

54

iv

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table of Contents—continued

CHAPTER
4. COGNITION AND RELIGION...........................................................

62

The Cognitive Revolution...............................................................

64

Cognition, Culture, and the Study o f Religion...............................

70

Action-Representation-System and Ritual Form............................

71

Hyperactive Agency Detection Device (H.A.D.D.)........................

75

Intuitive Ontology...........................................................................

77

Theological Correctness: What People Really Think.....................

82

5. BUDDHIST GODS AND THINGS......................................................

85

Metatheory and the Category of Religion........................................

86

Buddhism by the Books..................................................................

90

Essences and Traces........................................................................

101

Where are the Nuns?.......................................................................

105

Where Rituals Start and the Buck Stops.......................................... 106
Keeping the Buddha in Mind..........................................................

109

6. THE AMBIGUITY OF AGENCY........................................................

Ill

Mental Tricks..................................................................................

113

Intuitive Metaphysics......................................................................

116

Inferential Potential.........................................................................

121

Christianity in Colonial America....................................................

124

Cognition and Free Will..................................................................

128

v

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table of Contents—continued
CHAPTER
Thoughts and Actions.....................................................................

130

Ritual Predictions............................................................................ 132
The Big Picture............................................................................... 134
7. LIKELIHOODS AND LUCK...............................................................

136

Analyzing Luck............................................................................... 140
Theology......................................................................................... 141
Cognitive Efficiency....................................................................... 143
Events.............................................................................................. 148
Probability....................................................................................... 150
Heuristics and Biases...................................................................... 156
The Illusion o f Control.................................................................... 158
Summary......................................................................................... 160
8. CONCLUSION..................................................................................... 162
BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................ 168

vi

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation explores something that we commonly encounter in our
everyday lives. I happen to see it as a problem, which is why I’ve devoted a large
project to explaining i t The problem that this dissertation explores is simply, “Why
do people believe what they shouldn’t?” I don’t mean, o f course, why do people
believe things with which I don’t agree. I mean why do people believe things they
shouldn’t according to the tenets of their own beliefs? This is the phenomenon (taking
as my point o f departure Justin Barrett’s [1999] notion o f “theological correctness”) I
wish to call “theological incorrectness” - when people think and do what is in direct
conflict with the established theologies of the religious traditions to which they
ascribe.
Why is this important? It is important because, for one, it teaches us the lesson
that religion doesn’t really cause much. That’s right, religion doesn’t do anything to
people. Religions don’t cause people to think whatever it is they think. Religions
don’t cause people to do whatever it is they do. This dissertation offers a cognitive
explanation for how and why. As we shall see, religious ideas inform actions, but
“religions” are abstract technical concept with no physical properties, which,

1
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therefore, cannot cause anything. This should instruct us to be weary o f any culturally
deterministic claims akin to “people’s actions are a result o f their environment”
The project itself is divided into eight chapters. Chapters Two and Three
explore the ways in which professional scholars o f religion have thought about
religion in the past such as die causes o f its existence, the role o f its functions, and
the consequences o f it power (an assumption that shall be challenged). We shall
peruse the history o f the academic study of religion for the purpose o f identifying its
common assumptions and its mistakes (in thinking about religion, that is). Chapter
Four reviews the cognitive science o f religion and offers, for my money, the best way
(thus a remedy) o f explaining religion - as a natural product o f human cognition.
Chapters Five through Seven employ discoveries about human behavior from
the cognitive sciences to explain some recurring and enigmatic case studies from the
world religious traditions o f South Asian Buddhism and Protestant Christianity in
America. Specifically, Chapter Five explains one o f the oldest problems in the book
(pun intended) for scholars of religion, that of “the Buddhist question.” Religion has
something to do with superhuman agents, yet Theravada Buddhism is purportedly
atheistic. Thus, scholars familiar with Buddhism plead, religion cannot be defined as
the belief in deities. As we shall see, (1) this is a specious account of Theravada
Buddhism, (2) like all humans, Buddhists sometimes say one thing at one time, and
another at a different time, and (3) Buddhist are capable o f “theological
incorrectness” (or “Buddhalogical incorrectness” to be more accurate), which means

2
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that they might say that they don’t worship the Buddha, but they most certainly treat
him (and others) as superhuman agents.
Chapter Six explores the tension in Protestant Christianity between divine
sovereignty and free will. Specifically, Chapter Six explores this tension as it has
been played out in history, namely the transformation o f the English colonies (later
the United States o f America) from a Puritanical Calvinist society (preaching
predestination - the logical conclusion of divine sovereignty) to an Arminianist one
(preaching divine sovereignty and free will). We shall provide an epidemiological
framework for understanding the spread o f Arminianist ideas during the period of
time in the 1730s and 40s known as “The Great Awakening,” and we shall
supplement that historical epidemiology with recent work in cognitive psychology to
show that though theologically correct, absolute divine sovereignty is an inherently
unstable (i.e. it is maximally counterintuitive and therefore cognitively burdensome)
representation that is incapable of being employed in “on-line” judgments, (see
Barrett 1999)
Chapter Seven then explores the widespread belief in luck. When I say
widespread, I mean just that We have yet to find a culture whose members don’t
represent life’s events as lucky or unlucky, fortunate or unfortunate. Luck is truly a
cross-culturally recurring representation. Y et luck is in direct violation o f learned
theology (all theologies as far as I can tell). Luck implies that events are beyond our
control, and such a notion directly contradicts the very heart o f religion, that
something or someone like a culturally postulated superhuman agent of some sort is
3
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in control (and available for human engagement). So it should follow that religious
people ought never attribute life’s events to hick.. .yet evidence disconfinns this. If
that were not perplexing enough, people often perform rituals that are designed
precisely to bring about good hick (or bad luck for an enemy), despite die tacit
conclusion that in luck, all of life’s events are beyond human control.
Chapter Eight concludes the dissertation by providing some brief reflections
on how we ought to respond to the ubiquity - and tenacity - of theological
incorrectness. Some feel that it is an impediment to progress, either to personal
progress (living a superstitious life can be disastrous, given our propensities to
gamble with money, for adultery, racism, sexism, and so forth) or social progress that
must be removed, for example, through science education (e.g. Nancy Reagan’s
appeals to astrology might have influenced her husband to drop the bomb on some
unsuspecting Third-World non-rogue nation; Al-Qaeda’s mass murder of innocent
civilians is believed, by them, to be divinely sanctioned, etc.). Others suggest that
because it is natural, it is inevitable. Moreover, if it is natural, we cannot control it
whether we would want to or not A third option, which I find myself supporting on
Mondays and Wednesdays (but not always on Fridays.. .and surely not on Sundays) is
that while theological incorrectness (TI) is natural, common, and cross-cultural, it is
certainly not immutable. Regardless, the comparative study of religion must be
informed by discoveries from the cognitive sciences so that it can become (and stay) a
legitimate scientific enterprise that is suitable to the modem university.

4
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CHAPTER TWO

THE PROBLEM AND ITS BACKGROUND

There is an old joke about religion that never bombs, regardless o f audience.
It goes like this: “If you ask two people of the same religion one question, you’ll get
three answers.” You can tell this joke to Jews, to Buddhists, to Muslims, to Wiccans,
and to Christians, and chances are that they’ll all respond, with a slight smile...
“that’s true.”
But why is that true? And why is it true for seemingly everyone? If religions
teach people what to think about the world, and what they teach is supposed to be
true, then why don’t their adherents listen very well (a fact that is known all too well
by clergy)? To be blunt, why do people invent their own versions o f religion in
whatever ways that seem to suit their fancies? If religion is about “Absolute Truth,”
then why are there so many different, competing, contradictory versions o f it.. .even
within one single group?
The above joke about religion is funny because it does what all jokes do. It
pokes fun at “the ridiculous element in something.” (Mish 1991) Two people
belonging to the same religion yet having different beliefs is, in a sense, ridiculous,
especially when one considers the truth-claims made by the theological contents o f
religious systems. But though its occurrence at all is ridiculous, what is most
5

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

interesting is that it occurs everywhere. This phenomenon, which we shall call
“theological incorrectness,” (TI) recurs across cultures.
Most o f us are well aware o f the existence o f TI, but dismiss it as an
unfortunate but harmless bit o f folk religion. In fact, because it is so common most
people don’t consider it to be weird at all. At second glance, however, TI challenges
every bit of conventional wisdom we have about what religion is and how it works.
As the above joke suggests, and plenty o f other evidence confirms, we do not simply
team religion from our culture or society. Rather, we actively generate and transform
it. We might even say, with fashionable spin, that religion is performative.
Religion is performative in two ways: (1) we generate religious
representations in our minds (an internal performance), and (2) we communicate (in
stories, rituals, etc.) those representations to others. The latter results in a
transformation of religious ideas - sometimes slight, other times considerable because when others see and hear (i.e. “experience”) our representations, they
internalize them. And the internalization o f public representations starts the whole
process over again. (Sperber 1996)
Though common, the generation and transformation of religious
representations by individuals is not always harmless. Consider religious violence.
The terrorists who hijacked several je t planes and crashed them into large U.S.
buildings on September 11,2001 and killed thousands o f innocent global citizens
professed to be Muslims, apparently shouting "Alla ’u ’akbhar” (“God is great!”) at the
moment o f impact Afterward, many asked (1) how could it be that the religion o f
6
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Islam, justified (read: “caused”) such violence? Or, (2) if Islam was, as other Muslims
and Muslim-sympathizers pleaded, “a religion o f peace,” how could these particular
individuals twist their religion's teachings to such horrific ends? Religion, we
assume, isn’t supposed to work that way. So why does it?
These questions, which millions asked instinctively after September 11, are
the right kinds o f questions we should be asking about the role o f religion in our
world. But these questions require more than stock-in-trade answers. Ironically, the
best answers come from neither the religions themselves nor from simple folk
psychology (the natural way humans “theorize” about agents). The former is not a
sound method o f investigation for obvious reasons.. .it leads us back to square one
where the answer would depend on whom you ask. Yet, folk psychology won’t get us
very far either because we cannot simply presume that we know instinctively why
people do what they do (no matter how emotionally satisfying that may be), for most
people simply aren’t explicitly aware o f the reasons for their thoughts and actions in
the first place (this point was made poignantly by comedian Bill Cosby whose
children, he claimed, had “brain-damage” because whenever he caught them
misbehaving and asked them why they did what they did, they would invariably
respond, with genuine sincerity, “I don’t know!”). In most cases, our thoughts and
actions simply make sense at the time.
Furthermore, there are other limitations in using folk psychology to
understand why (religious) people think what they think and do what they do that
create real problems for students of human behavior because ideas that make sense to
7
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some can be nonsense to others. As the old saying goes, one person’s garbage is
another’s treasure. This is commonly the case with studying someone else's religion.
What other people think and do often seems to be nonsense to us while our own
behavior seems to be perfectly reasonable (but to others...?!).
To account for why people do what they do and think what they think, we will
have to employ a more scientific method because neither the insider’s view(s) nor
folk psychology will work. Science proves to be much more useful because it reaches
“below the surface,” so to speak. It does not settle for appearances. Little if anything,
for scientists, is obvious. One grand (sometimes painful) lesson we have learned over
the years is that the world isn’t necessarily the way it appears to be. Human
perceptions are prone to false beliefs. For example, the sun does not move around the
earth, despite our seeing it do just that day after day. Or, despite our seeing obvious
in-group human differences like skin color, hair type, languages spoken, etc. genetics
is revealing that we have much more in common than those appearances suggest And
so it shall prove that a scientific study of religious behavior reveals the proximate
causes o f behavior that can explain some o f the most puzzling aspects o f religion in
our world (including the very existence of religion itself).
One thing that becomes clear when we begin to apply the science o f human
behavior to religion is that religious behavior is constrained by the cognitive
mechanisms involved in everyday non-religious behavior. We often think o f religion
as special, as different, as whatever is set aside as distinct In fact it is actually
dependent upon very basic, not-so-special (in the religious sense) mechanisms 8
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namely the cognitive organs in the human brain. Let me provide an example, one that
addresses the problem o f TI described above. When people make what Justin Barrett
has called “on-line” (i.e. rapid, tacitly informed, and cognitively constrained)
representations, they often employ an inductive, not deductive, process o f reasoning.
Deductive reasoning involves starting with a general principle or set o f principles and
deducing a conclusion logically from those principles. Theological creeds and
dogmas are often deduced. For example, John Calvin deduced that if God is allknowing and all-powerful, then he knows and controls the past, the present, and the
future.. .and therefore (deduction)...our fates are pre-detennined. If, as we tend to
assume, religious people are (or at least should be) deductive thinkers then every idea
they hold, or every question they answer, should be restricted to logically deduced
conclusions. Are they?
There are scores of members o f Calvin’s Reformed Church tradition in
Protestant Christianity today that constitute an excellent pool of experimental
subjects. And, not surprisingly, data regarding what they believe reveals that they
don’t believe this dogma very much at all (more accurately, they seem to believe it at
some times, but not others) even though when asked, they will say that they do.
Justin Barrett has termed this phenomenon “theological correctness” because he
found that Christians answer with “appropriate” answers when required, but infer
otherwise when asked different kinds o f questions (in task-specific experiments).
(Barrett 1999) So, even orthodox Calvinists have beliefs they’re not supposed to
have. Why? As we shall see, it is quite natural to do so.
9
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TI comes naturally to our brains because we spend much o f our time thinking
inductively. Inductive reasoning involves constructing general principles as
explanations for particular events, such that if the principles are true, the event or
phenomenon in question is explained. For example, imagine that person A, a
Calvinist Protestant, is late for work and so speeds down the highway at a rate much
faster than the legal limit allows for but then is suddenly forced to slow down because
person B in front o f her is driving very cautiously. Just as they approach an oncoming
intersection, for which they have a green light, a drunken driver speeds through the
red light from the adjacent street and kills person B. Truly saddened by the event,
person A says that person B’s untimely death was a tragic bit o f bad luck. By
contrast, though, God (or one o f God’s servants, a minor superhuman agent like an
angel, perhaps) was “watching out” for her. In this hypothetical example, person A
has reasoned (inductively) to conclusions that seem to contradict her otherwise held
religious belief that God’s divine sovereignty pre-determines all fates.
This kind o f thinking seems irrational to an outsider. However, it is actually
quite natural. We spend the majority of our time thinking inductively because
inductive reasoning is efficient—it does the most work with the least effort in the
shortest time. It explains everything that needs to be explained at the moment without
forcing the person to go through all of the logical steps of deduction to produce an
answer. As a result of its efficiency it is very useful for most of the everyday
situations we encounter. So, it should come as no surprise that when we are forced to
think religiously we employ the same means o f “explanation.”
10
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The scientific study o f human behavior will take us a long way toward a
sound and thorough understanding of religious behavior. Since religion, TI included,
is natural, we can employ a “naturalistic’*approach to our study. In other words, TI is
susceptible to analysis by means of the methods employed by the natural sciences.
Before we dig in, though, we should first traverse through the treacherous terrain of
theories about religion that are already floating out there so that we can overcome
many of their shortcomings. Students are often told that we study history to avoid its
mistakes. The same principle applies here. In fact, that principle might be even more
pertinent in the case o f religion - for the reality o f religion’s role in our global world
demands that we figure it out sooner rather than later. The events o f September 11,
2001 reveal that our very lives might depend on it

The Earlv Scientific Study o f Religion
Historical perspective cautions us to proceed with humility. A scientific study
of religion has been attempted before, and with considerable problems. Furthermore,
using science to study religion is not uncontroversial, just like the scientific study of
sexuality, virtue, violence, literature, art, or any other seemingly organic aspect of
human life. Science and religion are thought to be, according to conventional
wisdom, separate domains.. .arguably even antagonistic to one another. While science
is descriptive - it limits itself to what we (can) know about the world, religion is
prescriptive - it tells us what we should believe about the world. Religion deals with
the “ought** (e.g. what we ought to think, what we ought to do, etc.). Science deals
11
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with the “is” (e.g. what a human’s reproductive organ is, what racism is, what the
process of photosynthesis is, etc.). Often the two are incompatible, for you can neither
deduce an "ought" from an "is," nor an "is" from an "ought" (Ridley 1997)
O f course there are some scientists who are religious and some religious
people who champion science, but these people seem to be in the minority. Many
scientists (not to mention philosophers and, ironically, theologians) dismiss religion
as nothing but superstition that results from not thinking about things properly. On
the other hand, religious people often dismiss science as “meaningless”.. .a cold,
heartless, and ultimately futile attempt to explain why things really happen. For
religious insiders seek explanations o f the “big” questions like “where did we come
from?” and “what happens to us when we die?” Scientists, in contrast, seek the
“small” questions like “how do cells divide?” and “what happens when two elements
are forcibly combined in a finite space?” Some people even go so far as to say that
science offers nothing o f important value to humanity because it cannot, in the minds
of its critics, provide an ultimate cause. It is stuck in the world o f proximate causes.
In other ways, however, religion and science are quite alike. Both require
cognitive mechanisms to process data into representations o f what the world seems to
be like. And we see in both domains a difference between folk representations and
reflective theories. Theology is to religion as actual science is to folk science.
Furthermore, some people believe that just as science itself is susceptible to
scientific analysis, so is religious behavior. The scientific study o f religion makes
religious behavior, including ideas and actions, the object of inquiry for the purposes

12
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o f understanding the causal origins and functions o f religion in our world. Keeping in
line with the larger goals o f science, such scholars believe that religion can be
explained.
This is not the first and surely not the last attempt to use the scientific method
in the study of religion. In fact, people have been studying religion scientifically for
over a century, although mostly in universities (which is why the general public is
mostly unaware of the means and ends o f this discipline). Scholars in the 19* century
generated many theories about religion that they believed identified the origin, in
terms o f history and of the causes o f religion, as well as its behavior functions).
These scholars were able to generate broad theories o f religion as a cross-culturally
recurring feature of human behavior because travelers had gathered data—through
archeology, historical recovery o f texts, personal observation, and so forth—that
revealed religions as having many similarities and o f course many differences (mostly
in content). In response to the growth o f science in Europe and the expansion of the
human world to include non-European peoples in the New World, the comparative
scientific study of religion was bom. This tradition provides inspiration and
justification for the continued use o f “methodological atheism” to study religion.
(Berger 1969)
O f course, like all sciences, much o f what those scholars thought has been
discarded over the years. In fact, most o f what we once thought about religion is now
considered obsolete. Nonetheless, the failures of these early scholars were of product,
not o f process. In other words, they turned out to be mostly wrong in their
13
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conclusions but quite right in their general approach. To borrow a distinction from
Noam Chomsky, religion has been elevated from a mystery to a problem. (Boyer
1994,2001) This is good news because mysteries are insoluble but problems are
tractable.
It’s taken decades o f serious scholarship to generate that confidence, and a
perusal o f the debates that got us to where we are today is illuminating. The scientific
study o f religion has accomplished three goals since its inception: (I) it has vastly
improved our substantive knowledge o f the contents o f the world’s religious systems;
(2) it has generated theories about religious behavior at large that have given us a rich
sense o f why people all over the world seem prone to believe religious ideas, to
perform religious actions, and to join religious communities, and (3) it has allowed us
to reflect upon what the consequences o f religion has on other aspects o f our lives.
Gained slowly but surely, these accomplishments have given us a better sense for
why religious people commit violence despite what their theological traditions teach,
for how religion affects race, class, gender, ethnicity, etc., for how religious ideas
shape cultural attitudes and norms, and so forth.
The history of the study o f religion reveals that early on (late 18th - early 20th
centuries) scholars were divided into two camps over their differing views of what
religion was and therefore how we could account for i t These early “modernists”
(labeled as such by “post-modernists” who came to the fore o f the field in the 1970s)
were either

14
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(1) naturalists - those who believed that religion was a by-product of natural
causes, o r...
(2) non-naturalists - those who believed that religion had non-natural origins.
The non-naturalists can be further divided into two sub-groups:
(2a) socio-culturalists - those who believed that religion involved
meaning, was generated at the level o f “society” or “culture,” and
therefore was in a domain distinguishable from nature, and...
(2b) transcendalists (sometimes called “super-naturalists”) those who believed that religion was a product of the human
interaction with a supernatural reality, which was labeled
variously as as the “Holy,” the “Numinous,” or the “Sacred.”
In the remainder o f the chapter, we shall review the different approaches of
paradigmatic scholars in each camp. The theories and methods they employed are
diverse and interesting, but most importantly, instructive - we will be in a better
position to understand the problems with folk psychological and with insider accounts
o f religion.

Social Science and The Enlightenment Paradigm
Scholars have only begun to scratch the surface o f the very complex world of
religious behavior, and yet what we do know is quite astonishing. In order to fully
understand how we know what we know, we must go back beyond the creation of a
formalized scientific study o f religion to the roots o f science itself.
15
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Although science began to mature in the last century or so, its conceptual
foundations are much older. Scholars have argued that the conceptual foundations of
the scientific method were laid by Greek philosophers who believed, at least as early
.L

as the 6 century B.C.E. (but probably even earlier), that human beings were capable
of formally figuring out on their own and for themselves what their worlds were like.
(Pine 1989) Many o f us take this confidence for granted today (a sign of its impact on
our world and, according to pragmatist philosophers, o f its truth), but it was a
revolution for its time. In that era, the leaders of religious guilds provided most
people with explicit concepts o f the world, though certainly not free of charge. Priests
held, often with state support, a monopoly on cosmology (theories o f the nature of the
universe) by claiming to have a pipeline to the gods. Generally speaking, therefore,
all answers had to come from them (technically from the gods through them, but the
effect was the same nonetheless). (Boyer 2001)
However, people like Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, just to name a few of the
most famous philosophers, began to argue that human beings should doubt all
unverifiable truth-claims (those that are either illogical or that contradict evidence).
That is to say that people ought not to accept on blind faith everything that their
religious priests told them. Instead, they argued, humans should use their own
abilities, which they called “reason,” to figure out the world for themselves. This
daring move changed the world in innumerable ways because doubt forced people to
prove the truth or validity o f beliefs, and making truth-claims susceptible to rigorous
examination sewed the seeds o f science. (Solomon & Higgins 1996)
16
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Fast-forward to the 17th century. Philosophy, which had by then become an
actual discipline of men (yes...usually only men) who contemplated, among other
things, truth, value, and the nature o f the world, had been weakened by the growing
disbelief in the human ability actually to know anything for certain about the world (it
is, admittedly, a difficult task). One very important philosopher, however, dedicated
his time to settling the matter of whether or not human minds could really know
anything at all. In a flash o f brilliance, the Frenchman Rene Descartes realized

“cogito ergo sum " ... “ I think, therefore I am.” (Descartes 1931) Descartes seemed
to have proved that it is at least possible to know one thing for certain.. .that “F
exist.. .because something or someone (the “I”) has to be asking the question, “do I
exist?” In other words, knowledge of the act of thinking itself presumes that a thinker
exists and with that Descartes proved that we can know something absolutely for
sure. We can know this because humans have the ability to reason.
This little phrase, which has become famous throughout die Western world
(but not necessarily very well understood), had far reaching implications. It launched
an epistemological revolution (and soon after, several socio-political revolutions, in
France and in the English colonies). As more and more Europeans began to have
great, arguably exuberant, confidence that humans have what it takes to (1) figure out
what the world we live in is like, and (2) to perfect that world. The movement called
the “Enlightenment,” and its way o f thinking about the world the “Enlightenment
Paradigm,” was bom.

17
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It didn’t take long for scholars, inspired by the confidence in science, to begin
developing instruments that could aid them in their pursuit o f knowledge about the
world. Once a few sound discoveries about the world were made people began to
develop technologies that exploited that knowledge for Human use (though some
debate whether this has been good or bad for humanity). Thus, the creation o f the
“modem” world has a narrative... philosophy begat science, and with science we’ve
changed the world.
The scientific method matured in the 20th century when scientists began to
fine-tune their methods o f investigation and analysis, (see Kourany 1998). Ideally, the
scientific method demanded the generation o f hypotheses about the cause(s) of some
data (e.g. The stars follow the same path year after year because.. Humans stop
bleeding after some time because ...; the United States of America is stratified
because ...; etc.), the gathering o f empirical evidence about the phenomenon (often
with the aid of instruments like the telescope, the microscope, and later in the social
sciences, questionnaires and surveys), the creation of tests for the original hypotheses
(e.g. if X is caused by Y, if we remove Y, then X will cease to exist) and finally the
publication o f the tests’ results to be scrutinized by professional peers (who often
recreated experiments with different data or tested the same theory by a different
method). O f course, in practice, science is not that clean or pretty. Mistakes are made;
numbers are altered; scientific discoveries are rejected from publication because of
personal animosity or political philosophy (like race or gender politics), and biased
inferences generate false hypotheses that nevertheless become accepted theories, and
18
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so forth. Yet, the general method was established to the point that as the 20th century
unfolded, we were poised to make truly significant discoveries about our world.
In this milieu, some scholars became interested in trying to apply die methods
o f the natural sciences to explain the human world. They established disciplines of
what came to be called the “social sciences” (geisteswissenschaft or “science o f the
spirit” in German) for this purpose. Social scientists applied the scientific method to
human behavior in the hopes o f not only understanding why we do the sorts o f things
we do, but more prescriptively in the hopes o f changing, where they felt necessary,
inappropriate behavior. (Rosenberg 1997) To this end psychologists studied the
“psyche,” or the mental processes that produced individual behavior in order to
eradicate mental illness (e.g. Freud 1946,1961a, 1961b, 1967) or to cultivate selfactualization (e.g. Jung 1938,1953-1976). Sociologists studied group behavior to
remedy social ills. (e.g. Durkheim 1938,1951,1995; Weber 1958,1976,1993)
Economists studied systems of exchange in hopes of eradicating class oppression,
poverty, etc. (e.g. Marx & Engels 1964) Anthropologists studied other cultures to
induce the evolution and “civilization” of “primitive” cultures. These scholars hoped
to discover the rules (i.e. laws) o f human behavior worldwide to engineer utopian
societies (although they often disagreed vehemently over what kinds of societies
ought to be created).
Importantly, the social sciences emerged within the context o f colonialism,
which was the extension o f European empires by converting the lands of the “New
World” that had been discovered by explorers and traders from the 16thto 19th
19
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centuries into colonies. Europeans used military force, politics, economics, and even
cultural imposition as weapons in their efforts to subdue the natives. The large scale
ventures into places like Asia, Africa, and the Americas, presented new challenges for
social scientists in Europe because when the discovery o f other people with other
religions, languages, skin colors, and so forth became widely known in Europe there
emerged great pressure to make sense of it all. The human world expanded
dramatically. Europeans were forced by these experience in “contact zones” (Pratt
1992) to confront and explain the existence o f other social worlds. The reality o f the
existence of many cultures still challenges social scientists to this day, and that
challenge has had an enormous influence on the academic study o f religion.
Two paradoxical problems emerged in the cross-cultural study of human
behavior (1) to make sense o f other people’s profound dissimilarities, and (2) to
make sense of other people’s profound similarities. Observant Europeans were struck
by questions such as why don’t other people believe in our gods? Why don’t they
live in the same kinds o f dwellings as we? Why do they eat different kinds o f food?
(We can safely bet that the natives being “discovered” by colonialists were asking
quite similar questions about “the white men”).
Others were struck by the numerous similarities shared by all people in all
cultures. After all, the new discoveries of the colonial period suggested that people
everywhere spoke some kind o f language, practiced some kind of religion, and had
some kind of self-governance. How could the existence o f disparate but similar
cultural systems be explained?
20
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The scientific study o f religion emerged in this context and therefore inherited
many of the debates from the social sciences about human behavior at large. The
scientific study o f religion was important to die larger project o f “the science o f man”
because (1) since science seemed to falsify religions’ claims, and so having a world
full o f false-thinkers was, to say the least, troublesome; (2) despite religion’s
archaism, it seemed to be ubiquitously tenacious; and (3) because of its falsity but
ubiquity, it was at its best an impediment to progress, and at its worst quite
dangerous.
One of the first efforts o f the early social sciences was to explain the
underlying unity o f all world religions. Most proceeded to do this by identifying its
origins (in terms o f its historical starting point and/or the causes that produce it) and
its functions. Although scholars o f religion disagreed over whether the underlying
unity of religion was positive or negative for humanity, nearly all assumed it
nonetheless. While later scholars (see Chapter 2) would question the notion that all
religion is essentially the same everywhere, all camps listed above simply assumed
that it was. In part, this was because they were committed to the general ideal o f
objectivity (that an “objective” world exists independent o f our “subjective”
imagination of it). Unlike theologians, who insist that religion is best grasped from
within a religious system (i.e. by accepting a few bracketed assumptions), the
modernist scholars of religion insisted that one could study religion from the outside
(as a non-member o f the religion one studied). In fret, some believed that an
outsider’s perspective elucidated religion more clearly than an insider’s position
21
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because the view from the inside is biased by the commitments o f a culturallyspecific faith (in other words, insider views are often colored by the believer’s
motivation for securing the authenticity of one particular religion). The scientific
study of religion began with these basic frameworks and assumptions.

The Naturalist Theories

The social scientific study o f religion emerged within the social scientific
study of human behavior in general. As mentioned above, there is some difference in
orientation between the naturalists and the socio-culturalist non-naturalists, though
both are considered social scientific in approach. In time, we will review some of the
most famous (or infamous, depending on your view) social scientific theories o f
religion, those of the anthropologists E.B. Tylor and James Frazer, the economic
critic Karl Marx, the sociologists Emile Durkheim and Max Weber, and the
psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud. Although these scholars were involved in disciplines
with much broader concerns than just religion, they felt that any study of human
behavior demanded attention to religion because it is such a widespread phenomenon,
the participation in which has serious implications for humanity. Each of the social
scientific approaches to religion in turn established sub-disciplines within the
academic study o f religion, such as the anthropology o f religion, the Marxist
(ideological) theory o f religion, the sociology of religion, and the psychology of
religion.

22
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Identifying the internal properties of any given datum is an important step in
the classification process o f science (e.g. a penguin is a [1] a bird, [2] that doesn’t fly,
[3] lives in a cold climate, [4] eats fish, etc.), and consequently the search for a
universal human nature and a corresponding definition o f religion ran throughout the
early scientific study o f religion. Though the social scientists agreed that religion was
a human invention that held a powerful sway over human beings because it served
important functions for humans, each put forth a different theory about what exactly
that function was. Thus, social scientists are considered to be “functionalists” because
religion, for them, was defined by its function. In the following sections, we will
review the naturalists Tylor, Frazer, and Freud.

The Anthropological Naturalists - Tvlor and Frazer
E. B. Tylor (1871) and James Frazer (1935) are generally credited with
establishing the anthropology of religion around the turn o f the 20th century. Most
anthropologists at that time were adherents to some version o f evolution put forth by
post-Darwinian evolutionists and from Darwin’s theory o f natural selection they
theorized that cultures also evolved from primitive/simple to modem/complex. This
assumption, which later was shown to be quite simplistic, if not racist, (though MJI.
Barnes [2001] has offered a slightly revised contemporary version o f this approach)
drove much of the early anthropological studies o f religion.
Tylor and Frazer both assumed that religion had indeed evolved from simple
to complex in form and substance. They theorized that it must have originated as
23
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“animism" or “magic” and then morphed into polytheism, monotheism, and then
agnosticism (the spirit of their Enlightenment world), which itself would eventually
give way to pure scientific atheism. Using data about primitive religions gathered
from travel writings, folk tales, oral stories, and so forth, these scholars argued that
religion was something like a “folk science” in which primitive men and women
appealed to religious agents as a way to explain why otherwise unexplainable things
happened in the world. For example, people stop moving, breathing, etc. when they
die. Why this happens was perplexing (to say the least) to pre-scientific thinkers. So,
according to Tylor and Frazer, primitive humans must have theorized that some kind
of a spirit (i.e. soul) animates each body for the duration o f one’s life and then departs
at death. This primitive attempt to explain death constituted an intellectual attempt to
make sense of the world, and so their theory o f religion is referred to as the
“intellectualist” theory because it foregrounds the notion that religion is about “belief
as explanation.”

The Psychoanalytical Naturalist - Freud
Sigmund Freud, the founder o f modem psychoanalysis, theorized that religion
was widespread because it served psychotherapeutic functions such as neurotic outlet
and wish-fulfillment. (Freud 1946,1961a, 1961b, 1967) For Freud, religion was
nothing but the by-product of deeply rooted psychological conflicts between
individual desires (what we want to do) and social rules (what w e are allowed to do).
Using data gathered from clinical psychotherapy, Freud hypothesized that religion
24
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soothes psychological discomforts such as the dissonance one feels about human
mortality, about our powerlessness over the forces o f nature, o f repressed sexual
desires, and so forth. Religion, he claimed, fulfills psychological needs such as the
desire for a permanent father figure to protect us from bad things, the desire to be
relieved of guilt, and so forth. Freud noted that religion often involves the
“projection” of a father-figure up in the sky somewhere who loves us, protects us, and
rewards us if we behave but punishes us if we misbehave. Believing that there is a
“big guy in the sky” to take care o f us makes us feel better about our otherwise
difficult and meaningless lives, but, warned Freud, believing in such illusions is
nothing but immature, child-like “wish-fulfillment” that impedes healthy
psychological growth. Religion is the illusion that all o f our deepest wishes will be
fulfilled if we just believe in the gods and perform the proper rituals.

Non-Naturalistic Social Scientific Theories
The Ideological Non-Naturalist - Marx
Karl Marx (though he worked alongside Freidrich Engels, Marx has gotten
most o f the credit for this approach - we shall refer to their approach as “Marxist”)
argued that religion fulfilled the function of maintaining the socio-economic status
quo for the bourgeoisie (the wealthy and powerful people, such as the owners of
businesses, land, money, and other forms of capital) by naturalizing economic
differences in cosmological myths. Religion was, according to Marx, an important
pillar o f the cultural “superstructure” (the non-economic aspects o f society) because it
25
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helped to maintain the unjust base of capitalism itself. Religion is very popular, he
theorized, because it made oppressed people feel better about their harsh lives by
promising them rewards in an “afterlife” for good behavior on earth. “Religious
distress,” Marx wrote famously, “is at the same time the expression of real distress
and the protest against real distress. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the
heart o f a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of a spiritless situation. It is the opium
of the people.” (Marx & Engels 1964, p. 42) In other words, Marx argued, the
masses turn to religion because it makes them feel good, for example, to think that
their evil bosses will spend eternity in hell while they spend eternity in heaven. And
above all poor people are comforted by the thought that life has some purpose to it that it’s all part of “God’s plan.”
In turn, according to Marx, the bourgeoisie benefit from religion because it
makes the working class passive. Religious laws like “Thou Shall Not Kill” prevent
people from taking the law into their own hands (e.g. overthrowing their bosses and
taking over the industrial plant for themselves). In this way, religion maintains the
status quo. People are kept in line by fear., .of eternal damnation, for example, for
breaking “God’s” (i.e. the Bourgeoisie’s) laws. Religion, in this sense, functions as a
very powerful tool of oppression. (Marx & Engels 1964)

The Socio-Culturalists - Durkheim and Weber
By gathering data via macro-social observation and statistical analysis, Emile
Durkheim, the father of modem sociology, explained religion in terms of its social
26
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function: group cohesion (Durkheim 1938,1951,1995) Durkheim studied religious
primitives, like the Australian Aborigines and the American Indians, because he
believed they offered scholars a clear example o f the earliest and therefore most basic
form o f religion, which he called “totemism.” According to Durkheim’s theory,
human beings are forced to live in social groups from birth that are constantly under
the threat of disintegration (a la Freud’s internal conflict). In prevention, the groups
invent something to “cohere” them. One o f the ways in which humans achieve group
cohesion, he hypothesized, was to establish a group identity marker, such as a
“totem,” which represented the clan itself (e.g. the “coyote” clan, or the “fox” clan,
or, to use a more recent example, Russia is represented by the bear and America by
the eagle). Then, they set apart the totem as something “sacred” by elevating it to the
level of a god, deifying it in icons and rituals, and constructing “taboos” (prohibitive
rules) against its desecration. The group then worships the totem (hence “totemism”),
which for all practical purposes means that the group worships itself.
Durkheim further theorized that rituals perform the important function of
social indoctrination. When individuals participate in social rituals, they are
transformed into social beings. They are educated about, invigorated by (via a
mysterious process of “effervescence”), and eventually fully inducted into the group
through uniformly established rites of passage. Thus, religion, according to
Durkheim, had nothing to do with supernatural gods and everything to do with
society.
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A slightly different sociological theory came from Max Weber. (Weber 1958,
1976, 1993) Weber theorized, among other things, that religious ideas function as
“ideal types,” and ideal types motivate human action in the world (toward the
achievement o f the ideal). For example, Jesus established an ethical ideal type in the
“Sermon on the Mount” (Matthew 5:1 - 127) Today, ideally, Christians strive to
live up to this idea (note die popularity o f the “What Would Jesus Do?”
paraphernalia). In this way, religion motivates social action and therefore historical
change over time and place. Weber’s most famous example o f this was outlined in

The Protestant Work Ethic and the Spirit o f Capitalism (Weber 1976), in which he
argued that the Western world (including the United States) progressed economically
much faster than other cultures because the people in those societies were motivated
by Calvinistic Protestant ideology. More specifically, according to Weber, Calvin’s
notion of “predestination” and the doctrine o f the elect inspired hard work (i.e. “the
Protestant Work Ethic”) because material success was considered a sign o f divine
favor and thus a sign o f being a member of the elect In other words, people worked
hand, saved money, and excelled in capitalism because they were motivated by die
theological doctrine of predestination. In short, according to this view, what people
do is caused by what they think, which is in turn caused by religious ideas.

F.rplanation is Reduction - The Transcendentalist Response

What’s important about the social science approach for our purposes is the
assumption that is held—that, despite its internal claims to the contrary, religion has
28
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nothing to do with anything supernatural. It is rather entirely produced by human
beings (“man makes God in his image”). In this sense, the social scientific study of
religion has been important not for what it proved (as stated above, most consider
these early theories to be flawed), but rather for what it started. It not only got the ball
rolling in the study o f religion in university departments, it also spawned an important
reactionary approach that was sympathetic to the idea that something supernatural
actually exists. These non-naturalistic reactionaries, whom we shall call
“transcendentalists,” believed that there was much more to religion than just falsebeliefs or wish-fulfillment Driven by this assumption, the transcendentalists
established a separate discipline entirely devoted to the objective but sympathetic and
comparative study o f world religions. The transcendentalist approach eventually
came to be called the “history o f religions” in America (it is also sometimes referred
to as the “Chicago school” approach because it started at the University of Chicago),
which was responsible for generating the first wave o f scholarship about religion by
professionally trained religionists (Tylor, Frazer, Freud, Marx, Durkheim, and Weber
were trained in other disciplines) and for establishing a discipline in which students
could study all of the world’s religions comparatively.
The pillar o f the transcendentalist approach was that the naturalist theories
were reductionist because they stripped religion o f all its inherent religiousness.
Religion, scholars like Rudolf Otto (e.g Otto 19S8), Joachim Wach (e.g. Wach 1944,
1951, 1958), and Mircea Eliade (e.g. Eliade, 1954a, 1959,1963a, 1963b, 1969,1974),
argued, was not only “holy” but also sui generis, or “o f its own category.” They
29
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argued that religion could not be explained entirely in the terms of anthropology,
psychology, or any other social scientific discipline because religion was said to be
‘irreducible.” Mircea Eliade expressed this sentiment eloquently:
A religious phenomenon will only be recognized as such if it is
grasped at its own level, that is to say, if it is studied as something
religious. To try to grasp the essence o f such a phenomenon by
means o f physiology, psychology, sociology, economics,
linguistics, art or any other study is false; it misses the one unique
and irreducible element in it - the element o f the sacred. (Eliade
1963b, p. xiii)
Although they disagreed with the naturalists’ anti-religious biases, the
transcendentalists maintained the same modernist methods—gather data empirically,
objectively classify and compare it, generate theories for the phenomenon, and then
publish claims for peer critique. Like the social scientists before them, the
transcendentalists also championed the study o f non-Western religions, which Eliade
called (more respectfully) “archaic,” not because they were the most simple but rather
the most “pure” (i.e. uneomipted by modem secularism).
Moreover, instead o f focusing on religion’s functions, they self-consciously
focused on the experience of religion, as expressed in the world’s numerous sacred
texts. They strove to gather primary data from the world’s collective scriptures
because these works were thought to capture religion’s true character - the multitude
o f experiences o f the Sacred. Once enough textual data was gathered, they were able
to compare the canonical doctrines of the world’s religions for the purposes of
identifying an underlying unity of religious experience o f what Rudolf Otto called das

Heilige or... “the Holy.” (Otto 1958). By practicing epoche, which was a
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methodological strategy o f “bracketing off” one’s personal beliefs for the sake o f
looking at something from another person’s point o f view, the historian o f religion
hoped to come to a certain level of understanding and appreciation all o f the world’s
religious traditions, and ultimately (ideally) to synthesize and draw out the “Religion”
behind the religions. This, they hoped, would lead to an appreciation o f the world
religious traditions and possibly even to an awakening o f the homo-religiosus
(“human beings, the religious”) within every person. More ethically concerned
students of world religions even argued that the comparative study of the history o f
religion could lead to tolerance and respect for diverse peoples and cultures all over
the world.
If religious traditions were the expressions o f some basic sacred experience,
and these expressions were to be gathered, compared and interpreted (a method called
“hermeneutics”), then scholars had to be trained in the original languages o f the
different world religions so that they could recover and translate the sacred texts in
which these universal experiences were preserved. Thus, the history of religions
approach was “textualist” in so far as it saw theology as being the most significant
source of data to be unearthed and interpreted. The hermeneutic approach drove the
transcendentalist study o f religion for several decades, and even to this day most
textbooks on world religions contain surveys o f the contents of religious texts
presented from the insider’s point of view (e.g. Smith 1995; Fisher 1991; Earhart
1993).

31

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

From the textualist perspective, religions appear in history when special
people have religious experiences and then communicate those experiences to other
people in the forms o f myths. Mircea Eliade, the most prolific transcendentalist in the
Chicago school, called such sacred experiences “hierophanies”—instances when the
Sacred manifests itself on earth. O f course, due to the nature of these experiences,
they are nearly ineffable, which is why religious texts employ “symbolic” language
(hence the need for professionally trained hermeneuts to make sense o f them). The
expressions o f people’s experiences are then communicated among groups o f people
and culminate in the kinds of religious systems we recognize now—Buddhism,
Christianity, Shinto, Wicca, etc. Over time, the expressions of these religious
experiences become the centers of debate, discussion, reflection, and so forth and so
religious systems develop high theological traditions that fine-tune the conceptual
worldviews and supplement the more basic myths that recount the great hierophanies
o f history. According to the transcendentalists, these sorts o f texts, when studied
comparatively, provide us with a glimpse o f the Sacred and therefore provide us with
an “orientation” toward religiosity.

To Reduce or Romanticise?
Over the years those in different camps have resorted to labeling each other in
an effort to signify them as doing something other than what they claim. The
naturalists have dubbed the non-naturalistic socio-culturalists “mystery-monguers”
and the transcendentalists “romanticists.” (Rosenberg 1997; Nielsen 1997) In retort,
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the naturalists have been accused o f “reductionism,” that is o f unjustifiably explaining
an autonomous phenomenon at a lower level of analysis. Nevertheless, whether
mysterian, romantic, or reductionist, the early scholars o f religion all established
methods o f investigation and analysis based squarely on the principles o f the
Enlightenment At the time, this paradigm was viewed as the noblest approach to the
study o f religion because it was objective. Social scientists felt confident in the
objective methods of science to explain religion away. They considered the insider’s
approach to religion simply absurd (a la psychological self-diagnosis).
Transcendentalists, on the other hand, while agreeing that the faith commitments of a
theological approach restricted one’s ability to study other religions objectively, felt
that the social scientific approach reduced religion to something not Sacred. They
argued in turn for the creation o f an entirely new, but nevertheless modern, discipline
dedicated solely to the sympathetic treatment of world religions. Both agreed,
however, that the comparison o f religions was not just possible, but also necessary for
a full and accurate assessment o f the phenomenon (whether viewed romantically or
reductionistically). In this vein, “To know one is to know none” became the mantra
for the comparative study o f religion. (Muller 1873, 1878)
Confidence in the Enlightenment paradigm, however, earned these early
scholars scorn in the years to come. All three camps came to be lumped together as
being “modernists” (not a good thing) sometime around the 1970s when the “cultural
turn” in the study of religion was accompanied by the ascension o f postmodernism in
the social sciences, especially anthropology. Historians o f religion had begun to
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realize that the textual approach to religion produced a narrow, idealized, and
therefore inaccurate image o f the world’s religions and many scholars, especially
those interested in the religious lives o f people left out of sacred texts like women,
minorities, “sub-altems,” (Spivak 1994) and so forth, sought new methods for
accessing the experiences o f those people. Most o f them turned to cultural
anthropology where field-work studies o f non-elites had been the focus o f study for
some time. Anthropological studies o f culture had, by then, followed in the tradition
o f Durkheim and Weber more so than Tylor or Frazer in the sense that they came to
see “culture” as being a dimension o f reality that was distinct from the individual
agents that collectively composed i t Conscious o f it or not, the assumptions of the
early sociology o f religion (to be explored in the next chapter) were carried out to
their logical ends by post-modernist socio-culturalists.
Significantly, however, as scholars o f religion made the cultural turn, cultural
anthropology itself was in the midst o f a revolution in theory and method the
consequences o f which had an enormous impact on the comparative study o f religion.
Cultural anthropologists were greeted in the 1960s with “post-modernism,” which
was an intellectual movement that challenged the foundational assumptions of the
Enlightenment paradigm itself. (Ortner 1994) Like the Sophists o f early Greek
philosophy, these post-modernists questioned the now age-old assumption taken for
granted by modernists that the world was systematic and knowable by means of
human reason. In large measure, due to their leftist sympathies with “sub-altems” and
their inherited (from the transcendentalists) disdain for science altogether,
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comparative religionists became excited by the postmodernists’ criticisms, and many,
like their cultural anthropologist colleagues, began to abandon “explanation”
altogether opting instead for “interpretations” o f culture. Most famously, Clifford
Geertz argued that culture could (and should) be “read” like a text, an approach that
fit rather well with the historians o f religion’s hermeneutic tradition. (1973) This
paradigm shift (Kuhn 1970), if we are willing to grant that the Chicago school
approach in fact constituted a paradigm, came at a critical juncture in the discipline.
The discipline o f comparative religion was growing rapidly because many o f the postWWH teaching colleges were becoming full-fledged universities and so were hiring
the growing number o f scholars o f comparative religion being trained at the
University o f Chicago—precisely where Geertz was beginning to have an impact As
the students o f religion at Chicago (and elsewhere soon after) were making the
cultural turn in the study of religion, they were also starting programs at other
colleges and universities throughout America. They took with them a combination of
the traditional disdain for “scientific reductionism” from the transcendentalist
approach as well as their newly formed disdain for “textualist” studies o f religion that
were said to “totalize,” “essentialize,” “idealize,” and “obscure” “local” forms of
religion that existed “on the ground.” Their socio-culturalist approach to religion has
dominated the field for the past 40 years, and therefore constitutes the second wave of
the “academic” study o f religion (no longer able to called “scientific” because o f the
separation from explanatory endeavors).
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The next chapter reviews the postmodernist, non-naturalist, socio-culturalist,
theories and methods o f the study o f religion, and assesses their strengths and
weaknesses. As we will see, the work o f second wave scholars has shed important
new light on religion as it is actually practiced in the daily lives o f living people (in
addition to how religion is represented by sacred texts) and therefore given us new
grist for our theoretical mills. However, this approach has been as much o f a curse as
a blessing because the assumptions about human behavior that accompany non
naturalism have limited its ability to explain the very behavior that its adherents have
discovered.
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CHAPTER THREE

POSTMODERNISM AND STANDARD SOCIAL SCIENCE

My wife teaches the third grade. She, like most educators, champions the
values o f multiculturalism. She begins most o f her social studies units with an “usthem-them” distinction that typifies those values. She might say something like,
“while we believe V, people F believe X, and people H believe Z.” Her students,
who range between the ages of 7 and 9, have very little difficulty grasping this notion.
Even for third-graders, difference seems naturally to be self-evident
Contemporary scholars o f religion also tend to value multiculturalism. For
them, it seems to go without saying that religion is cultural (where else do we get
religion but by learning it from our parents, friends, and others in society?). There are
many different religions because (the logic goes) there are many different cultures.
Consider the titles o f typical undergraduate religion courses: Religion in America;
Religions o f India; Japanese Religions, etc. The multicultural approach to religion
posits, simply, that religion is determined by the culture in which it is located. Simple
enough, right? Let's see.
Testing my wife's patience is always one confused or unruly child who defies
this conventional wisdom by saying something like, “People H actually like to use
chopsticks? I have tried those things at the Chinese buffet where my dad takes us. But
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they are so hard to use, especially for rice and noodles. Forks are much better. I don’t
understand why people H still use those dumb things. Why are they so different from
us?” The multicultural response, which can be characterized as “relativism,” is, o f
course, “well, chopsticks are hard for you because you didn’t grow up using them.
People H have. So, they prefer chopsticks to forks, which - by the way - they
probably think are hard to use, too. What you have to remember is that people H are
just different from us - not better or worse, just different They use chopsticks and we
use folks. It just depends on what you learn growing up.”
This answer is “heuristically efficacious.” In other words, it works, at least
well enough to allow my wife to continue on in her lesson plan (and I suspect that it
sounded correct to you). However, one time, while I was in a rather sassy mood, I
challenged my wife on the answer. After some debate, she admitted, begrudgingly,
that the response doesn’t really answer the question. It actually dodges i t O f course,
question-dodging is, understandably, sometimes necessary.. .as every parent (and
teacher) knows. Young children are often insatiably curious, possibly even in infancy,
as developmental psychologists Gopnik, Meltzoff, & Kuhl point out in their book,

The Scientist in the Crib. (Gopnik, M eltzoff & Kuhl 1999)
The answer, “because that’s just what they do in their culture,” sounds right
because it fits well with the way we view the world. When we look around, proof for
the theoretical notion that cultural properties are autonomous seems to be in the
pudding. That is to say that the sorts o f values, preferences, attitudes, beliefs, etc. (e.g.
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preference for forks over chopsticks) that any given human being possesses seem to
have been “picked up” over the years from the given traits o f a particular culture.
This common sense notion has sophisticated scholarly kin - an approach to
the study o f culture that Tooby and Cosmides have called “The Standard Social
Science Model.” (Tooby & Cosmides 1992) As we have seen, the idea that societies
shape individuals is an old one dating back to Marx, Durkheim, and Weber. Its
assumptions about human behavior are so powerful that the idea is simply accepted
(arguably uncritically) as true beyond a reasonable doubt Cultures cause
behavior.. .and that’s that
However, we ought not settle for “that’s that” answers. On such matters I
agree with Confucius who said that extraordinary frets impress the commoner, but
the extraordinary person is impressed by what is common. L et's approach this selfevident “truth” critically. If it is true, it will withstand the scrutiny. If it is not, we’ll
have to scrap it and begin anew.

Thft Standard Social Science Model
How do cultures cause individual behaviors, exactly? Most Americans leam
in elementary school that a noun has to be a thing - you have to be able to touch it,
feel it, smell, taste it, etc. In other words, “things” have physical properties. Yet,
“culture” seems to be non-physical. So, how can “culture” exist if we cannot touch it,
feel it, smell it, or taste it? Socio-culturalists, like Clifford Geertz, say that culture has
a “semiotic” existence. Geertz writes,
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Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in
webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those
webs... (Geertz 1973, p. 5)
In this sense, socio-culturalists are “dualists” - they argue that certain “things” can
(and do) exist outside o f (or “transcend”) the physical world.. .for example beliefs,
desires, attitudes, preferences, meanings, values, intentions, consciousness, etc.
“Stuff without material existence” makes, admittedly, for a fuzzy theory. And
socio-culturalists know this. The following admission by leading socio-culturalist
Bruce Lincoln in Guide to the Study o fReligion is telling:
Let me begin by observing that although the term “culture” is a
seemingly indispensable part o f my professional and everyday
vocabulary, whenever I have tried to think through just what it
means or how and why we all use it, the exercise has proved both
bewildering and frustrating. As a result, I am always on the
lookout for serviceable alternatives and my list now includes such
items as discourse, practice, ethos, habitus, ideology, hegemony,
master narrative, canon, tradition, knowledge/power system,
pattern of consumption and distinction, society, community,
ethnicity, nation and race, all o f which manage to specify some
part of what is encompassed within the broader, but infinitely
fuzzier category of “culture.” (2000, p. 409)
As Lincoln’s candor (and his laundry list o f alternatives to “culture”) suggests,
“culture” is a term that’s as clear as mud. Though we might use the term uncritically
in our everyday conversations, it has quite a checkered history as a professional
scholarly term. (For more on the term’s multivalence see Geertz 1973; Sahlins 1976;
Nelson & Grossberg [Eds.] 1988; Lincoln 1989,2000; Bourdieu 1993; Dirks, Eley &
Ortner [Eds.] 1994; and, de Certeau 1997a)
Understanding how culture is conceptualized and employed requires some
unpacking. Maybe an example will help. As a child, my family belonged to a small
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evangelical Protestant church in the “Church o f God” denomination that originated in
Cleveland, TN. In our brand o f Christianity, women were discouraged from wearing
slacks o f any kind, from wearing make-up, from cutting their hair, from sitting in the
front pews (where men sat), and from taking leadership roles in the church (other than
bringing meals for out-of-work church members, which unfortunately was common
in that church). These discouragements constituted a set o f rules that provided the
church members with meaningful webs o f significance. The rules not only governed
gender roles, they shaped attitudes, values, beliefs, etc. about human relationships,
about God’s will, about social mores, and so forth. These rules were not just known,
they were “felt” (I still recall the emotional discomfort people felt in the church when
a female guest with short hair would come to a service wearing slacks and make-up,
and proceed to sit unknowingly in a pew in the men’s section).
Our church certainly had a “culture” o f some sort One surefire way of
recognizing one’s own culture is to leave it and to enter into a different culture (an
experience many religion professors try to engender in the classroom). I became
aware o f our peculiar culture (relatively speaking, of course - it wasn’t peculiar to us)
when in high school I attended a service at my girlfriend’s United Methodist church,
which according to scholars of American religion constitutes a “mainline”
denomination. (Roof & McKinney 1987; Williams 2001) Women in her church broke
all the rules o f my church. They cut their hair; they wore make-up; they wore slacks;
and they were not separated by gender.
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The cultures of our respective churches were “symbolic” in the sense that the
known but unwritten rules o f conduct, behavior-preferences, gender attitudes, values
o f segregation, and so forth had a powerful influence on the way people thought, felt,
and acted. To use philosophical language, these church cultures “conditioned
intentions.” Unlike most nouns, then, culture is not defined by its essence, but rather
by its function. Culture is an important piece o f the puzzle o f understanding religion
because o f what it does to (or for) people.
Let us now supplement the above example with Tooby and Cosmides’ (1992)
outline o f the tenets of the SSSM. It is so insightful that it is worth listing in its
entirety, all ten steps, here:
(1) Culturalists assume a minimalist “psychic unity o f mankind.” In other
words, “infants everywhere are bom the same and have the same
developmental potential, evolved psychology, or biological endowment”
(p. 25)
(2) “Although infants everywhere are the same, adults everywhere differ
profoundly in their behavioral and mental organization.” Culturalists
deduce from this that “human nature (the evolved structure o f the human
mind) cannot be the cause o f the mental organization o f adult humans,
their social systems, their culture, historical change, and so on.” (pp. 25-6)
(3) “[Because] these complexly organized adult behaviors are absent from
infants.. .they must ‘acquire’ it (i.e. mental organization) from some
source outside themselves in the course of development” (p. 26)
(4) “This mental organization is manifestly present in the social world in the
form o f the behavior and the public representations o f other members of
the local group...[a fact which] establishes] that the social world is the
cause o f the mental organization o f adults.” (p. 26)
(5) “The cultural and social elements that mold the individual precede the
individual and are external to the individual. The mind did not create
them; they created the mind.” (p. 26)
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(6) “Accordingly, what complexly organizes and richly shapes the substance
o f human life—what is interesting and distinctive and, therefore, worth
studying—is the variable pool o f stuff that is usually referred to as
‘culture’...variously described as behavior, traditions, knowledge,
significant symbols, social facts, control programs, semiotic systems,
information, social organization, social relations, economic relations,
intentional worlds, or socially constructed realities.” (p. 27)
Yet, they ask, “’if culture creates the individual, what creates culture?”’ (p.
27) The collective answer given by SSSM socio-culturalists constitutes the final four
tenets o f the model.
(7) “The advocates o f the Standard Social Science Model are united on what
the artificer is not and where it is not: It is not in ‘the individual’—in
human nature or evolved psychology—which, they assume, consists of
nothing more than what the infant comes equipped with.” (p. 27)
(8) “The SSSM maintains that the generator of complex and meaningful
organization in human life is some set of emergent processes whose
determinants are realized at the group level.. .The socio-cultural level is a
distinct, autonomous, and self-caused realm.” (p. 28)
(9) “Correspondingly, the SSSM denies that ‘human nature’—the evolved
architecture of the human mind—can play any notable role as a generator
of significant organization in human life. In so doing, it.. .relegates the
architecture o f the human mind to the delimited role o f embodying the
‘capacity for culture.’ [The human mind] is.. .[like] a general-purpose
computer. Such a computer doesn’t come pre-equipped with its own
programs, but instead—and this is the essential point—it obtains the
programs that tell it what to do from the outside, from ‘culture.’” (p. 29)
(10) Finally, “In SSSM, the role o f psychology is clear. Psychology is the
discipline that studies the process of socialization and the set of
mechanisms that comprise what anthropologists call ‘the capacity for
culture.’ The central concept...is learning.” (p. 29)

The insight for the student of religion is that if you want to know what
religion is all about - if you want to know why individuals believe what they believe
and do what they do - break it down according to culture. Find out where people
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learned their religion. My high-school girlfriend’s religion was significantly different
from mine despite the fact that we were both young white Protestant Christians from
the same small town in the rural Midwestern United States (a fact that implicates us
in the joke stated at the outset of Chapter One). Protestant Christianity is different in
Biloxi, Mississippi than it is in Boston, Massachusetts. Buddhism in Nepal is
different from Buddhism in Boulder, Colorado (despite efforts and claims to
authenticity by Boulderites). That is to say nothing about religion in Bangkok,
Thailand versus religion in Zagreb, Croatia
For socio-culturalists, religion is a symbolic system o f ideas governed by
cultural rules specific to a particular group. It has a dual-function, then, (1) it provides
a view about what the world is like, i.e. a “worldview,” and (2) it in turn prescribes an
“ethos” that motivates behavior in the world. It is a model o f and for reality. (Geertz
1973, pp. 126-7)
Thus, for Geertz and other socio-culturalists, the study o f religion should be
interpretative because its regional variance requires that we “get inside” the culture in
question for the purposes o f deciphering the rules o f the system that determine how
people think and act The best way to do this, o f course, is by immersing ourselves in
another culture, learning it as well as possible, and then reconstructing it in “thickdescription” synthetically for other people’s understanding - a task that involves a
kind o f cultural translation.
This model has its roots in the sociological frameworks o f Marx, Durkheim,
and Weber. (Pals 1995) But, as we have seen, it was at one time merely one among
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three (along with naturalism and transcendentalism). It is now, however - at least in
terms o f the sheer number of scholars employing it - die dominant approach in the
field. Why did this triumph occur? A clue is that it is no coincidence that its
ascendancy occurred in the 1960s.
To use the SSSM to analyze the popularity o f the SSSM.. .just think of what
American culture was like in that decade. Anyone who is even patently familiar with
recent U.S. history knows all about “the Sixties.” It was truly a decade that changed
America. Record numbers of American baby-boomers, supported by Federal
programs like the G J. Bill, flocked to U.S. colleges and universities as a means of
upward social mobility or to avoid service in the war in Vietnam. Concurrendy,
college campuses throughout the country became hotbeds for the counterculture, and
students (and professors alike) began to challenge many o f the established
mainstream ideas, values, and policies. The Sixties were synonymous with the hippies
and their ad-hoc mixture o f free love, rock-n-roli, mind-altering drugs, and. ..of
course, socio-political liberalism. It was revolution by day, bacchanalia by night
For many scholars, the Sixties also marked the end o f the confidence in
naturalistic and the transcendentalists’ textual approaches. As improved
transportation made world travel more reliable and affordable, exposure to other
cultures began to reveal that textual studies of religion not only did not capture
religion as lived “on the ground,” in many cases it obscured or misrepresented i t In
particular, the lives o f non-elites (women, minorities, etc.) were simply absent Thus,
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“subaltemist” scholars turned to the study of “living” religion in search of the
religious experiences o f those sorts o f people, (e.g. Fisher 1991)
On the other hand, the socio-culturalists maintained die transcendentalists’
disdain for a naturalistic approach to religion on the grounds that science and religion
were incompatible. Religion was “warm.” It had to do with experience, meaning,
worldview, and ethos. Science was “cold.” It was about matter, objectivity,
technology, and skepticism. Many humanistic scholars even began to fault science for
the world’s ills. The problems o f war, racism, poverty, environmental destruction, and
just about every other social ill could be laid at the doorsteps o f science because o f its
apparent alliance with the mainstream. Science was too much a part o f “the System.”
In this milieu, scholars o f religion threw caution to the wind and made the
“cultural turn” away from the frameworks of study established by their predecessors.
They turned from texts and minds to culture, for the purposes o f putting together the
missing pieces of the puzzle o f world religions. They turned from science in favor of
a kind o f quasi-mystical attraction to culture, especially cultures that were not
mainstream (like I said, “the farther away the better”). 1965 was a pivotal year in this
development, for the Hart-Celler Immigration Law opened the floodgates to
thousands o f Asians who came to America in search o f jobs, freedom, or security. In
turn, Americans were exposed to spiritual alternatives to the established mainline
denominational traditions. (Roof & McKinney 1987; Wutfanow 1998)
Scholars of religion gradually embraced the theories and methods of cultural
anthropology, which just so happened to be undergoing a revolution o f its own.
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Geertzian non-naturalistic “cultural hermeneutics” was replacing the last remaining
naturalist paradigm around, the structuralism of Claude Levi-Strauss, (Levi-Strauss
1962; 1966; 1969) as the most popular way to study culture. Since one o f the central
pillars of socio-culturalism is to have a healthy respect for cultural autonomy, it is
tempting to make the connection between this academic development and the “Me”
generation’s sympathies for any group marginalized by the mainstream (e.g.
minorities, women, revolutionaries, subalterns [Spivak 1994], and so forth). Those
personally caught up in the Sixties’ counterculture revolution were becoming very
liberal, and those professionally involved in academia, including students o f religion,
were becoming postmodernists. Postmodernist socio-culturalists criticized the
naturalistic approach to anything social on the grounds that human behavior is
motivated by intentions, which being about “mental” phenomena rather than material
phenomena, cannot be susceptible to the methods o f the natural sciences and their
laws of natural causes. (Rosenberg 1997) As we shall see, it was in this sense a
logical conclusion to the operative assumptions of the SSSM (not to mention in-line
with behavioral psychologists’ assumptions about tabula rasa and the role of
“learning” in behavior).
Let us now explore the postmodernist version o f the SSSM. In order to
capture its spirit, we shall employ its own language and style o f argument One can
best understand its complexity by engaging its “discourse” (a term that is quite
favored by postmodernists).

47

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Postmodernism anH Its Discontents

Postmodernism is a loosely organized movement that emerged around the
criticisms o f what leftists pejoratively dubbed “modernism.” Postmodernists sought
(and still seek) to problematize the assumptions of the modernist paradigm, including
deconstructing the idea o f objectivity and therefore all of science by extension. As
one scholar quipped, postmodernism involves “an incredulity toward grand
narratives.” (Lyotard 1984) What modernists believed to be discovered truths, which
they often confidently showcased as part o f an ongoing Hegelian evolutionary history
of knowledge, were deconstructed by postmodernists as nothing but subjective,
constructed, grand meta-narrative theories or discourses (plural) that were to be
analyzed as sociologies o f knowledge. In postmodernism, all knowledge is assumed
to be local, and so modernist theories are criticized for being hegemonic. In fact,
postmodernists hurl the label “scientism” at the efforts of those who (claim to) reduce
the complexity of life to parsimonious laws.
In contrast, postmodernists seek to construct a pluralized image o f the world
that captures all of the ambiguities o f the competing narratives o f life. According to
postmodernist conventional wisdom, human life is too complex to be studied
scientifically (“humans are not atoms”), and so the underlying unity o f anything
human is highly suspect As such the lines between social scientific disciplines that
were created by modernistic university departments ought to be blurred if not
replaced altogether by non-reductionistic humanities departments. Scientific theories
do not reflect reality per se, postmodernists argue, but rather reflect the kinds of
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categories of thought that privileged scholars generate to signify, a stay of political
power, the world. Science, in this view, is essentially no different than any other
discourse that seeks to do the same and so the search for causes (explanations) should
be replaced with the search for meanings (interpretations). (Lincoln 1989)
Eventually, the general postmodernist criticisms o f modernism led to more
specific socially-concerned critical discourses about the consequences of modernism.
The construction of discourses by modernists could be implicated in the many
political and economic power struggles that were at the heart o f European colonialism
and industrialization. Modernistic comparisons o f people and cultures by privileged
European male elites had led, they argued, to the “signification” o f non-Europeans.
(Long 1986) At its best, these discourses resulted in inaccurate images o f other people
that served the purpose o f constructing a self-identity vis-a-vis an imagined “Other.”
At its worst, this production o f knowledge was used to maintain the status quo or to
subdue subalterns as part o f Western patriarchal, ethnocentric, imperialist projects.
(Said 1979)
Postmodernist critics o f the modernist approach to the study o f religion apply
these general criticisms o f modernism to the specific study o f religion. According to
postmodernist scholars o f religion, the methods and assumptions o f the modernist
study of religion constitute a rightful object of study themselves, because we need to
problematize and deconstruct all modernist assertions. For example, the category of
religion itself has been called into question as nothing but an abstraction that reflects
not reality but merely the biases and assumptions o f Western scholars operating in the
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modernist paradigm (McCutcheon 1997; Asad 1993; 12. Smith 1978,1982,1987,
1990). Other categories, like “ritual” for example, have been called into question and
replaced with other terms, like “ritualization,” which postmodernist scholars feel are
more fruitful. (Bell 1992)
Since all knowledge is local and political, postmodernists like to pluralize
(Religion becomes religions; Culture becomes cultures, etc.), a move that has
important methodological consequences. Weary o f all grand narrative theories that
oversimplify the complexities o f life as lived on the ground, postmodernists
encourage the acquisition o f data by highly specialized studies o f particular historical
events. Assuming that all cultures are unique and autonomous, local area studies, in
which students are encouraged to “go native,” are favored over comparative studies,
(e.g. Ortner 1978) The goal o f this kind o f scholarship is arguably quite noble—to
recover the voices o f those left out of or misrepresented in texts and other repositories
o f modernist data for the purposes of creating a more “accurate and usable history.”
(Gross 1996) The greatest object o f scorn today is the armchair anthropologist or the
canonical textolatrist, and to combat suchfaux pas, graduate training now typically
involves preparation for highly specialized studies o f a particular group, a text (often
non-canonical or popular), or a culture. Cultural immersion is championed as the
method for generating a “thick description” o f religion on the ground, and
comparison is seen as abstract and superficial. (Geertz 1973)
Postmodernist scholars o f religion also tend to blur the lines o f analysis.
Explanations of any kind have been problematized and replaced with subjective
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interpretations o f cultural meanings, which themselves are viewed as multi
dimensional and shifting. Where detachment once reigned, subjectivity is now openly
admitted, and so it is not uncommon to see books with confessional introductory
chapters about the author’s perspective^) and bias(es). (e.g. Gross 1993)
Overall, the postmodernist study of religion has sought in its more moderate
forms to correct, and in its more extreme forms to deconstruct, the modernist study of
religion by calling into question the Enlightenment paradigm itself especially its
foundational principle o f objectivity. Since knowledge is constructed, postmodernists
believe, all knowledge must be seen as local, particularized, perspectival, political,
and so forth. Furthermore, being mindful of the legacy o f modernism—millions o f
people have suffered tragedies at the hands of Europeans—we must be diligently
reflexive about what we say. In fact, we might do more good undoing the
wrongdoings o f modernism than trying to make any constructive claims at all. Simply
put, because we are incapable o f being truly objective, subjectivity renders all
comparison superficial and unacceptable. All events, including religious ones, are
unique.

The Method in the Madness
Having studied postmodernism for several years, I have tried my best - by
employing actual postmodernist terms and styles of argument - to stay true to its
spirit in the above section. If it gave you a headache, don’t worry.. .the problem is not
necessarily yours. Postmodernist jargon is often vague and unclear (though to be fair,
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postmodernists will retort that vagueness is much more representative of the
messiness of life than simplistic scientific theories, which mask complexity). Its
infamous unintelligibility inspired Ernest Gellner to call it “metatwaddle.” (Gellner
1992, p. 41) But there is method to its madness. In fact, it turns out to be quite
intelligible., .even quite simple. Perhaps a translation into “common” English will
help.
While postmodernism in Europe began primarily among literary critics and
philosophers (with complicated roots in various disciplines such as post-structuralism,
phenomenology, and critical theory), it began its ascendancy in America with the
cultural turn made by Clifford Geertz, who popularized interpretive symbolic
anthropology as the most promising method for the study of religion because of its
holism. (Pals 199S) According to Geertz, to understand why people do what they do,
one has to identify the intentions behind their actions and in turn decipher the internal
coherency of the cultural rules that condition intentions. (Rosenberg 1997; Geertz
1973) For example, right now I am typing on my keyboard with the intention of
creating a coherent story about the logic o f postmodernism. Now, were someone to
study me right now (which is highly unlikely, for anthropologists generally like to
study exotic folk. ..the farther away the better), they might look beyond that surface
level intention I just offered and infer instead that what I really am doing is inventing
a story from my personal experiences for the purposes o f getting this work published
as a book to get a cushy job in the Ivory Towers of academia. To accomplish this, I
construct a “discourse,” which sets me apart from other people and thus increases my
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value as a writer (the more I confuse you, the smarter I appear!). Why do I do this?
Because I am a self-interested white heterosexual privileged Protestant male who uses
knowledge for power (a strategy not o f savvy, but of manipulation and exploitation).
That sums up the postmodernist critique o f modernism. For postmodernists, that
which gets presented as truth (e.g. this dissertation) is an invention, or merely my
“take” on reality. Regardless, both mask what people are actually doing - they are
tricking everyone (sometimes even tricking themselves) to get and/or maintain power.
You might have noticed, by now, that postmodernism is a sophisticated form
of neo- or cultural Marxism. And, keeping in-line with Marxist analysis,
postmodernists propose two levels o f scholarship: thick-description and discourse
criticism. In other words, the study o f culture should involve (1) finding out how a
culture works by identifying its webs o f significance (e.g. college professors in the
U.S. are chosen among a pool o f graduate students who must play by the rules of the
game and write a dissertation that claims to know something very important that no
one else knows), and then (2) criticize its power structures for the oppression of
subalterns (e.g. this is why minorities are under-represented in academia because the
discourse is controlled by the intellectual bourgeoisie). (e.g. Lincoln 1989) One
should be able to see how religion is implicated in this system - not only is religion a
discourse o f power, so is the study o f it! (e.g. Asad 1993)
Does postmodernism unveil the true motives of scholars who, like Enron
executives, don’t want others to know? Does it explain culture? The answer is.. .no.
O f course, I have little doubt that scholars are self-interested. What I do doubt,
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however, is that culture causes them to be this way (or that way, assuming the
postmodernists, as critics o f “the system,” imagine their liberal ideology to be
superior [but are they masking masking?!]). Philosophically speaking, postmodernists
have not explained anything. They have merely re-stated the question and affirmed
the consequences. Thinking back to my wife’s unruly student.. .why do some people
like rice and others like pizza? To say it’s because their cultures are different begs the
question o f why their culture is different in the first place.
There are serious flaws with the postmodernist socio-cultural approach to
religion. So, we have to be very critical of the critics. We have to deconstruct, to steal
one of their terms, this approach.

Deconstructing Postmodernism and the SSSM
As we shall see in Chapter 3, a more recent approach to the study of religion
than postmodernism (we might call it “neo-modernism”) revives and modifies the
basic principles of early modernism, and critiques the postmodernist critique of
modernism as well as the postmodernist approach itself. The modifications to
modernism by neo-modernists are few, but significant The criticisms of
postmodernism are also significant, but are not few. Let us address each in turn and
then sum up the criticism of both within the new model, which is an outgrowth of the
“cognitive revolution.” (Thagard 1995)
The primary criticism o f early modernism by neo-modemists is that while it
was on the right track, it failed to adhere to its own standards. That is, unlike the
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postmodernist criticisms o f modernism, neo-modemists argue that the early
modernists were simply not scientific enough. Either because o f their personal
political philosophies or because they were an accident in time (they simply didn’t
know what we know now), the early modernists operated on fundamentally flawed
assumptions about human behavior. Furthermore, by maintaining that religion was sui

generis, the transcendentalists cut themselves off from science and implicitly
forwarded a theological agenda (albeit a liberal one, which they imply is acceptable).
Among the reductionists, Durkheim - the “founder” o f the SSSM - has
received the most criticism from neo-modemists. (see Tooby and Cosmides 1992)
Durkheimian sociology assumed that group behavior constituted “social facts” and
therefore should be studied independently of biology or psychology. (Durkheim
1938) Operating under the illusion o f cultural autonomy, he (and many others who
followed) cut himself off from fruitful discussions with scientists operating at lower
levels of analysis. To this day, “culture” tends to be viewed as existing on some kind
o f astral plane independent o f the human agents that produce and cany it (Sperber
1996a) This restricts the ability o f the sociologist to provide grounded explanations
for human behavior and to make powerful predictions about group behavior.
On the other hand, anthropology has always been troubled by its early misuse
o f Darwinian anthropology. While the intellectualists assumed that religion had
something to do with thinking, they were biased by “social Darwinism,” and so
concluded unscientifically that religions evolve from simple to complex.
Furthermore, they were hampered by limited cross-cultural data (much of which was
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obtained from travel writings, which were unreliable and often sensationalized—see
Pratt 1992) and so lacked a thorough selection from which to theorize comparatively.
In large measure, postmodernists have sought to correct the early racisms o f
anthropology but unfortunately they have gone too far in emphasizing that all
knowledge is to be respected as equally valid.
Freud was partially correct to assume that cultural behavior is the collective
output of mental processes, which in turn are constrained by evolution. However, his
tripartite theory of mind has proven to be wrong (or at least intractable). Like all of
the early modernists, Freud was doing little more than arguing for what seemed to
him to be true.
Furthermore, the anti-religion bias o f these early reductionists led them to
abandon the principles o f objectivity. Their reductionists was motivated by a desire to
explain religion away rather than just to explain it at a lower level of analysis (e.g.
from culture to cognition). By analogy, instead o f merely studying how the eye
works to understand how a person can come to appreciate a beautiful painting, these
early scholars wanted to get rid of the experience o f beauty altogether. (Damasio
1994) They wanted to make the painting go away. Unfortunately as a result,
reductionism is still a dirty word in many circles.
On the other hand, the transcendentalists were correct in wanting to compare
religions for the purposes o f identifying the underlying unity or structure o f religious
behavior. However, by losing touch with discoveries in other important related fields
(because they demanded to be a su/ generis discipline), they severely limited their
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ability to do so. Eliade and his colleagues left students with only one option—either
you see religion romantically (as an orientation toward the Sacred) or you don’t
Such a position not only violates Ockham’s razor, which stipulates that we should
posit the minimum amount of entities that are necessary for explaining a
phenomenon, (Solomon & Higgins 19%) it also commits one to a theological agenda,
(in fact as it turns o u t scholars of religion do not need to know whether or not God
exists to study religion). Thus, while our descriptive knowledge of the world’s
religions has been expanded by the work of historians o f religion, our fundamental
knowledge o f religion as a ubiquitous human behavior has not
In addition to the criticisms of early modernism, there are at least six (by my
count) neo-modernist criticisms o f postmodernism. F irst while postmodernism
should be appreciated for its corrective criticisms o f the early modernist weaknesses,
its claims o f deconstructing objectivity and science are specious and arguably
fraudulent Postmodernists have drawn a straw man in “scientism.’*The
overwhelming successes o f the natural sciences, especially the recent advances in
biology, cannot be ignored or dismissed as coincidences or lucky guesses. As it turns
out, science is a kind o f knowledge fundamentally different from, for example,
theological knowledge (for one, scientific theories are falsifiable). Science has proven
over and over again that it can construct powerful and predictive theories about the
world and its workings (including human behavior). The primary reason why the
human sciences have not enjoyed the same success is because they have cut
themselves off from the wealth o f knowledge that can be generated by the methods o f
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the natural sciences. Furthermore, postmodernists misunderstand what science does.
It is not a panacea, which seeks the certainty of explaining everything. Rather, the
scientific method allows scholars to reduce complexity down one level at a time,
thereby enabling scholars to unify claims. Importantly, methodological doubt
remains the hallmark o f science. Knowledge advances “one funeral at a time.”
(Wilson 1998)
Second, because o f the bio-phobia in the humanities and other related social
sciences (explaining anything in terms of psychology or biology is “reductionist’*),
socio-culturalist scholars o f religion produce scholarship that turns out to be little
more than journalism. They see their job as being to “get the story.” Mere description
is ultimately intellectually unsatisfying, however, and it offers little to academia and
to students. The result has been the widespread institutionalization of the “zoo”
approach in religion departments, in which each religious story is told in individual
offices and classes. While this approach might be convenient, and it might serve the
particular curiosities o f individual scholars, how much can we really leam at the zoo?
Third, post-modernists assume wrongly a minimalist theory of mind (some
early modernists, like Durkheim, are guilty o f this as well—again, see Tooby and
Cosmides 1992). Assuming cultural autonomy demands one maintain the (wrong)
belief that human minds are little more than culture-sponges (or “black boxes” in B.F.
Skinner’s (1953) famous stimulus-response model o f behaviorism), just sophisticated
enough to pick up what our senses experience. For example, to understand Buddhism
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one is taught to understand it in “historical contexts” because, as the theory assumes,
human behavior is the product o f environment and historical antecedents.
This assumption is logically flawed. If humans are such “cultural” beings,
then culture is never generated. So, whence came culture? Why/how do cultures
change? The philosopher Immanuel Kant pointed out years ago that something
(which he called “a priori categories”) must undergird our perceptions, or else
knowledge and communication o f any kind would be impossible. (Kant 1929)
Cognitive scientists have argued persuasively that our minds are not content-free

tabula rasas. (Chomsky 1957,1972,1986; Tooby and Cosmides 1992; Thagard
1995,1998; Pinker 1997) Rather, they are content-rich information processors that
are pre-disposed to bias reality in certain ways. As a result, cultures have recurring
features—such as religion, art, music, language, etc. The focus on upper-level
analysis alone (culture) obscures the underlying unity o f behavior that is susceptible
to analysis at lower levels (cognition and biology). Thus, we can compare religions
by starting with the assumption that human beings are universally quite similar.
Fourth, postmodernism’s claim that all knowledge is local is illogical. If all
knowledge is local and thus subjective, then we can’t take seriously the claim that all
knowledge is local and thus subjective...because that claim itself is merely local and
subjective. It’s like the paradox from the philosophy o f language.. .the sentence, “I
am lying.” If true, it’s false. If false, it’s true.
Fifth, because they have distanced themselves from science, postmodernists
often work in the humanities and so enjoy a lack of constraining principles on their
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claims. Almost anything goes because the plausibility o f claims made can only be
evaluated subjectively. The unfortunate by-product o f this is that authority is
manufactured by pedigree. Without any constraining theoretical or methodological
principles, the field is subject to faddish trends in which the most popular ideology or
political philosophy reigns (e.g. feminism). What is true, and this is another
postmodernist paradox, is whatever is in fashion (e.g. postmodernism).
Finally, the reigning ethical philosophy in postmodernism has been cultural
relativism (what we started off calling “multiculturalism”). According to this position,
no ideology is inherently any better than any other. As stated above, this might be an
attractive plea for tolerance, but it is ultimately untenable. Again, if it is true, then it
disproves itself. How is any scholar’s claim evaluated? Moreover, how do we decide
whether, for example, capitalism is better or worse than socialism? By what criteria
would slavery be wrong? How do we determine whether Egyptian youth
cliterectomies are wrong or just part o f their culture? This untenable position has
been exposed as fundamentally problematic in the wake o f the tragic attacks on the
World Trade Center on September 11. Some ideas and actions are worse than others.
To conclude we should be balanced in our assessment o f the SSSM and of
postmodernism. The consequences o f the early modernists’ mistakes, which led to the
reactionary celebration o f postmodernism, have been a double-edged sword for
scholars of human behavior. Its approach has been a blessing in the sense that
culturalists have gathered rich data that has improved our substantive knowledge o f
religion in our world. We know a lot more about the actual contents o f religious
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systems, and how those contents vary from person to person, group to group, culture
to culture.
But, new data is not new knowledge. The theoretical inadequacies of the
SSSM have limited its explanatory power. We simply have not done a very good job
of making sense of the data. We know what, but we haven’t done much to explain
why. So, rather than abandon modernism altogether, we should have corrected its
flaws. Instead, nearsighted scholars (uncritically) accepted deeply problematic
assumptions about knowledge, scholarship, cultures, religion, and human behavior
from postmodernism that have prohibited progress in the field.
Fortunately, a new model has emerged that has been remarkably successful in
explaining much of what the data reveals. The interdisciplinary field o f research
known collectively as the “cognitive sciences” seeks to explain human behavior by
appealing to the processes o f thinking, “cognition,” that generates behavior. And
since thinking is a function o f the organs of the brain, it is clear that we can apply
naturalistic models o f explanation. For, brain-matter matters a great deal.
Chapter Four reviews the final, and as I said before, the best method we have
for studying lived religion. It truly represents a revolution in the human sciences, and
as such deserves its own chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR

COGNITION AND RELIGION

Gods aren’t very good conversation partners. They’re aloof. They ignore you.
They’re unreliable (at least by human standards). Gods seem to have minds o f their
own.
For this reason (well, sort of...) scholars classify religion as a “selfreferential’*system. In other words, the objects to which the system refers, i.e. the
gods, aren’t present in any normal sense o f the term. This poses a unique problem for
the study o f religion that scholars o f say economic class, gender, or politics, don’t
face. When human beings pray to a god, make offerings to a goddess, paint pictures
of angels, cast out demons, run from the ghosts o f a haunted house, and so forth, the
object of the action is imagined.. .it is, to use a technical term from the cognitive
sciences, a “representation.’’
O f course this is not to say that the objects about which the representations
refer do not exist (who knows?!). Imagine for a moment that your best friend is sitting
at a local cafe and sipping on a strong cup o f coffee. There, you just imagined
something that could be very much real, but your imagination of it was nonetheless
just a representation. Now, imagine that your friend is a dinosaur, say a
Tyrannosaurus-Rex, hanging upside-down from the ceiling of a rainbow-striped
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dumpster. Now, you’ve just imagined something that could not exist, but you
imagined it nonetheless. And, both representations came to you quite naturally. You
didn’t have to strain a bit - your brain represented both just fine. In this sense, your
representations are very “real.” They have tractable mental properties.
Though counter-intuitive, the cognitive science o f religion finds the contentclaims o f religious systems to be orthogonal to the actual object of study. In other
words we are more interested in the operations o f the cognitive mechanisms that
produce, constrain, and transmit religious representations than in whether those
representations refer to external realities. Whether or not each of the above examples
exists or doesn’t makes little or no difference at all to the study of the brain
mechanisms that are involved in their production. Cognition, which E. Thomas
Lawson has defined succinctly as “the set of processes by which we come to know
the world,” is the object o f study. Thus cognitive science, again to use Lawson's
concise language, “is the set of disciplines which investigate these processes and
propose explanatory theories about them.” (Lawson 2000, p. 75)
This approach constitutes the “naturalness o f religion” thesis (not to be
confused with naturalism) because cognitivists believe that, for better or worse, our
mind-brains seem to be “hard-wired,” to borrow a metaphor from computer science,
in such a manner that religious representations emerge quite naturally as an aspect of
ordinary cognition. So, religious thinking, like the thought experiments we performed
at the outset of this chapter, is quite natural. (Boyer 1994; Barrett 2000) This further
suggests, and experimental evidence has confirmed, that religious thinking is merely
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a certain type of regular thinking...that is, the brain that balances your checkbook,
that paints pictures, that cheers for football teams, and everything else, is the same
brain that prays to the gods, makes offerings to goddesses, paints pictures o f angels,
casts out demons, and runs from the ghosts o f a haunted house. The cognitive science
of religion is a sub-field o f cognitive science. The latter explores thinking in general;
the former explores religious thinking in particular.

The Cognitive Revolution
It is hard to pinpoint exactly when and where the cognitive sciences
originated. Owen Flanagan (1991) has argued that there are many predecessors Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, James, Freud, Piaget, Kohlberg, etc. - who contributed to
its development Among the many, one sure bet is to start with Noam Chomsky. His
1957 publication, Syntactic Structures, and later many other subsequent publications
(e.g. Chomsky 1965,1972, 1975,1980,1986,1993), put forth the radical theory that
human beings leam language from culture because o f the way the brain works...not
because o f the way culture works (in fact later scholars [Sperber 1975,1996; Lawson
and McCauley 1990; Boyer 1994,2001] will point out that culture works the way it
works because of the brain, not the other way around). The prevailing theory o f
Chomsky’s day was that children leam to speak and comprehend, and later read and
write, language by memorizing and imitating the thousands o f sounds, words,
sentences, and so forth heard from birth. For example, mommy points at the poodle
and says, “dog.” Child points at the poodle and says, “dod.” Close enough. The
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child’s mimicry reveals that she or he’s gotten i t Simply continue to add more and
more words to the little child’s sponge-like receptor called a brain - die black box,
according to B J \ Skinner - and you’ve got die makings o f an active language.
(Skinner 1953) This process seems, like other socio-cultural theories, to be selfevident Why else do children raised in the United States say “hello, friend!” but
those in Bangkok, Thailand say “sawasdee, khrap/khaal” and those in Tokyo, Japan
say “konnichi-wal”
Chomsky did not fully accept this “self-evident” process, though. He was
uncomfortable with some of the puzzles that this model o f language acquisition
presented. For example, say the following sentence to yourself (yes, out loud): “My
invisible blue water-bug eats backwards.” You just learned a new sentence, which
most likely has never been spoken before I coerced you into saying i t But, there’s a
problem. I made it up. Yes, that’s right I completely invented i t So what? Well, if
language is “picked up” from speakers around us, then how are novel sentences ever
generated? How is it that I can produce sentences that I’ve never “experienced”?
Well, you might say, all you have to do is memorize new words and put them
together into a certain grammatical structure and you get die new sentence. If you are
thinking that.. .then you have intuitively grasped Chomsky’s notion o f “syntactic
structures.” (Chomsky 1957) For, Chomsky pointed out, how does the speaker of the
novel sentence know where to put the words in a novel sentence? The only way it can
be done...and this is how it is actually done in real life...is that every word is
something like a “symbol” (the word waterbug “stands for” a waterbug) that has to
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either be a thing or an action. Once it is “catalogued” by your brain as one or the
other, the brain automatically puts it in its proper place (hence syntax). Even though I
had never heard the sentence above, I knew instinctively if you will, how to say i t
And, it sounded perfectly “normal” to you (at least syntactically).
Here’s a second puzzle o f the socio-cultural acquisition o f language thesis.
Five minutes or so after the child in the example above, let’s call her Betsy, points at
the poodle and says, “dod,” she points to the chair and says “dod.” Then she points to
the cat and says “dod.” And then she points to mommy and says “dod.” In fact, to the
dismay o f her hopeful teacher-parents, little Betsy seems to think that everything is a
dog! What’s the problem? Clearly, little Betsy is actually thinking (though, by adult
standards, not very accurately). She is not simply regurgitating a referential term. She
has internalized a word that has some reference in the world, but she seems intent to
choose object(s) to refer to that are not in-line with what the parent “teaches” her is a
dog. If humans were merely language-sponges (or culture sponges, for that matter),
then why would little ldds the world over make the mistake o f confusing “dog” with
“cat” or “road” or anything else?
Still not convinced? Here is another puzzle. Eventually, Betsy will grow to the
age in which parents will cease to “baby talk” to her, which, by the way, strangely
seems to be a cross-cultural phenomenon. (Gopnik, M eltzoff & Kuhl 1999) At that
point, they will begin to talk to her like she is a mature individual. This means,
strangely, that they will stop finishing their sentences. That’s right. They’ll only say
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half or so of what they mean to say. Let me give you an example. See if you can
finish these thoughts:
(1) If you even think for one moment that....
(2) Get inside this house or I’ll.....
(3) Oh no! Don’t .....
(4) What did you....
(5) Life is like a box o f .....
No matter who you are, I suspect that you came up with some words that
finished my fragments. How in the world did you do that? We are not even in the
same room together, and yet you quite naturally inferred what I was intending to say!
What a miracle. And yet, I’ll bet your answers differed slightly from other people’s
answers (except for #5, which is a special case). If language acquisition is word to
word, then fragments could not be completed by a listener.. .at least not as easily and
accurately as we perform in our everyday lives. Obviously, something is going on in
the brain that is much more complicated that merely “picking up” language from
culture.
Finally, consider this. Anyone who has studied Thai or Japanese knows that
“sawasdee, khrap/khaa ” and “koniichiwaa ”mean the roughly the same thing as
“hello, friend.” Anyone who has studied French would know that "bonjour**means
the same thing as well. In Spanish it’s uholan; Italian, “bonjiom o Mandarin, “jing-

h a o Cantonese, “ni-hao-ma"; Malayalam, “sukhamanno”; Hindi, “namaste,” and in
German, “wiegehts.” How is it that these languages all share the same concepts? And
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how is it possible to translate languages into another? If all languages are different,
then translation should not be possible at all. Yet, we do it all the time (some o f us
better than others.. .though effort might play some role in that).
All o f these puzzling facts point to one conclusion...that human brains are
very active in the language process. We can utter and understand novel sentences. We
can make referential mistakes with words. We can complete others* incomplete
thoughts. And we can translate from one language into another.
These sorts o f clues (among many others, in fact quite complicated linguistic
research with which we needn’t concern ourselves here) forced Chomsky to re
evaluate what linguists had long thought about the processes o f language-acquisition.
Eventually, Chomsky postulated that the brain must come pre-wired for language
with a Language Acquisition Device or LAD. There could be no other explanation, he
reasoned, for the striking fact that there is complete (as far as anyone can tell)
universality o f these, and other, recurrent features o f language.
Chomsky’s theory of the LAD, like many theories in a budding science, was
later proven to be problematic. Yet, the (positive) damage bad been done. He had
ignited the cognitive revolution by showing conclusively that human behavior is not
simply a product o f culture. Human brains are much more active than that. O f course
cultural products play a very important role, but products are only one-side o f a twoway street
In turn this meant that naturalism was back because Chomsky proved that the
brain actually generated and transformed cultural products (e.g. “howdy, friend”), and
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it did so in patterned ways. Thus, culture was structured along the lines o f human
cognition. For example, every single sentence in the world, regardless of what actual
language it was spoken/written in, consisted o f a noun phrase (a doer) and a verb
phrase (a doing). This is a universal rule o f grammar and such universal rules are
what make translation possible. In this sense, Chomsky changed the notion o f “rules”
from how the non-naturalistic socio-culturalists had understood i t He argued that
behavior is not only rule-governed, but the rules are in the brain before they are in
culture.
Chomsky’s theories were a watershed for the human sciences because they
showed that through careful reasoning and clever experiments, we could study how
the human mind (the “mind” is a shortcut term for all the jobs the brain organs
perform) actually works. As I said before, naturalism was also back because it was
now clear that intentions, the pillar of the non-naturalists’ criticisms o f naturalistic
approaches to human behavior, actually had material properties. The brain produced
them.
I am, of course, greatly simplifying Chomsky’s very complex arguments and
evidence for the cognitive basis of language (and all behavior). But, my reasons were
noble. The point has been to show you the key feature of cognitive science.. .that the
brain is chock full o f structures that constrain the way humans can and do behave.
And, to the chagrin of socio-culturalists, this means we can use science to study
humans after all, because humans are physical things that function according to
causal laws.
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Cognition. Culture, and the Study o f Religion
As I said above, few cognitivists still believe Chomsky’s theory o f LAD.
Nonetheless, nearly all believe his general approach was the best method we’ve
generated thus far for explaining human behavior. We have great confidence in this
fact because many other theories, and much more evidence, followed Chomsky from
a variety o f otherwise disparate fields. Cognitive science is necessarily
interdisciplinary because cognition is responsible for how we think (philosophy and
psychology) in all cultures (anthropology) according to mathematically tractable
information-processing rules (artificial intelligence) that cover all aspects o f human
life, including not just language but most symbolic-cultural systems we find recurrent
in human societies. This includes religion.
One o f the first attempts to apply the cognitive approach to other culturalsymbolic systems was Dan Sperber’s Rethinking Symbolism. (1975) Sperber’s
groundbreaking work offered an insight that would later be crucial to the cognitive
science o f religion: cultural symbols are so inherently multivalent (by socioculturalists’ own account) that the proper object o f the study o f culture should be the
mechanisms that produce and transmit those symbols. For, what is “culture” other
than the collective outputs of human mental representations that spread and stick, to
use amateurish terms, in a given population? As Sperber has written:
Just as one can say that a human population is inhabited by a much
larger population of viruses, so one can say that it is inhabited by a
much larger population o f mental representations. Most o f these
representations are found in only one individual. Some, however,
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get communicated: that is, first transformed by the communicator
into public representations, and then re-transformed by the
audience into mental representations. A very small proportion o f
these communicated representations get communicated repeatedly.
Through communication (or, in other cases, imitation), some
representations spread out in a human population, and may end up
being instantiated in every member o f the population for several
generations. Such widespread and enduring representations are
paradigmatic cases of cultural representations. (1996, p. 25)
Sperber is merely pointing out that what we call “culture” includes the collective
kinds of thoughts, values, beliefs, attitudes, and other things (CDs, blue-jeans, etc.)
that are generated by people and spread (successfully) to other people.
What follows from this insight for students o f religion is remarkable. It shows
us that religious systems, being cultural-symbolic systems, are susceptible to
cognitive analysis. In 1990, based in large measure on the work o f Chomsky and of
Sperber, Lawson and McCauley did just th at They put forth a cognitive theory of
religion that connected cognition and culture in the effort to explain certain crossculturally recurrent features of ritual formation. Besides Stewart Guthrie’s 1980
article, “A Cognitive Theory of Religion,” Lawson and McCauley’s work truly
pioneered the discipline.

Action-Representation-Svstem and Ritual Form
Lawson and McCauley’s Rethinking Religion: Connecting Cognition and

Culture set out, according to its own account, to “make trouble.” (1990, p. 1) They
argued that certain features of religious behavior could be explained by appeals to the
processes and products o f human cognition. While Sperber’s work(s) focused on
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symbolic mechanisms, Lawson and McCauley focused on religious ritual formation.
They theorized, a la Chomsky, that because human beings are bom with an “actionrepresentation-system” that informs judgments about actions, events, happenings, etc.
in our world, the ARS constrains how rituals can be formed. In other words, built-in
to every brain is a kind of a tacit “theory” about what constitutes an action. An action
is, we all know despite having never learned it from anyone, an event in which a thing
does something to a thing (or, passively, something is done to a thing). Thus, our
cognitive general ARS is constrained by the following components:
DOER

ACTION -» RECIPIENT

Examples o f this ARS are not hard to find. You drank wine. John washed the car.
Brenda washed her hair.
However, what is important is what is tacitly understood. Notice in the above
examples what sorts o f things are capable o f being the doer.. .only “agents.” That is,
only things that have “intentionality.” I did not say, because it is quite weird, wine
drank you. The car washed John. The hair washed Brenda. All o f these action
representations are weird because in each an object is represented as an agent, which
breaks the rules o f cognition.
Now, what would be even weirder would be “washed the car John”; “washed
her hair Brenda”; “drank wine you”; and the weirdest yet, “washed John car the”, or,
“washed Brenda hair her”. You can probably just sense that something is very wrong
with them. That is an important feeling because it reveals that humans have ingrained
in their brains a sense o f “well-formedness” o f actions.
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Now, what does this have to do with religious rituals? Well, let’s take one
example: The priest baptizes the baby. First, notice that the action itself has to follow
certain rules. Second, notice that it is a “well-formed” action. Third, notice that, in
terms of the ARS, the action “The priest baptized the baby” is exactly the same as
“The man poured water on the baby.” So, what makes a religious ritual different from
an ordinary action? What makes baptism different from just pouring water.. .since
they are the same action?
The answer that Lawson and McCauley give is quite ingenious. What is
different about a religious ritual is that people represent it differently. We might say
that there is another layer of representation - a symbolic layer - that rides atop, for
lack o f a better way to say it, on the general ARS. Said structurally, “The man, who is
a priest, pours water on the baby.” Now we are in a whole new ballgame, so to speak.
By virtue o f the fact that the man doing the action is a priest, and he is performing the
action in the context of a religious ceremony, the action being performed becomes
“religious.”
Of course, this leads to another question. What makes a representation (e.g.
“man”) a religious representation (e.g. “priest”)? Now it gets complicated. A
religious representation is a representation that postulates the existence of
superhuman agents. These things/beings are superhuman in so far as they are like us
in many ways (they think, have emotions, etc.) but not like us in many other ways
(they’re invisible, have extraordinary powers, etc.). And, they are postulated as
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agents. This means that, by the rales o f the ARS, they can do things. They can act on
us and on the world around us.
So, let’s get back to the priest What makes a priest special, or different, from
an ordinary man? The priest is special because a superhuman agent made him special
(notice, through a ritual). Clergy members get their “specialness,” their power if you
will, from the superhuman agents who “blessed” them with i t
Consider what makes a priest a priest A priest is an ordinary man who
undergoes ordination, that is initiation into a religious system. Who ordains priests?
Other priests, of course. Who ordains those priests? Other priests, o f course. Who
ordained them? Other priests.. .you know where this is going. Through a process that
Catholic theologians, for instance, call “apostolic succession,” a clergy member is
endowed with special power through a system o f ordination that goes all the way
back to.. .the very first superhuman agent (God in the Catholic system). If you know
Christian history, you will note that Jesus, who is really God according to the Nicene
Creed, ordained Peter as the first bishop. This got the ball rolling, so to speak. And
now every Catholic priest is more than just an ordinary man because o f his
ordination, which gives him the special powers endowed by the postulated
superhuman agent o f the given religious system. As we shall see in Chapter Four, this
same general principle applies in Buddhism. We can go so far as to say, given the
universality of the ARS, the principle applies in most if not all religious traditions.
There is, of course, much more to Lawson and McCauley’s theory. But, you
should have by now gotten the general thesis...that cognition constrains culture. That
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which we see as cultural acts, such as baptism rituals, is actually generated according
to the rules o f cognition. Those rules, the ARS, are not learned from culture. We are
bom with them (hence the naturalness o f religious thesis).
Though powerfully robust, Lawson and McCauley’s work does not exhaust
the research into the cognitive foundations of religion. While they have focused on
religious actions, i.e. ritual performance, others have explored the cognitive
foundations o f religious ideas. Stewart Guthrie and Pascal Boyer have supplemented
Lawson and McCauley’s book with Guthrie’s 1993 publication o f Faces in the

Clouds: A New Theory o fReligion and Boyer’s 1994 publication o f The Naturalness
o f Religious Ideas: A Cognitive Theory ofReligion and 2001 publication o f Religion
Explained: The Evolutionary Origins o fReligious Thought. Let’s explore each of
their theories in turn.

Hyperactive Agency Detection Device fH.A.D.D.l
Just by chance, as Lawson and McCauley were working on their cognitive
theory of religion, Stewart Guthrie and Pascal Boyer were generating, independently
o f one another, additional cognitive theories of religion. Guthrie’s research explores
the phenomenon that he calls “anthropomorphism,” in which humans attribute human
characteristics (e.g. agency) to non-human things. According to Guthrie,
anthropomorphism, “from voices in the wind, to Mickey Mouse, to Earth as Gaia,” is
an involuntary universal feature o f perception...and a primary cause of religion.
(1993, p. vii-viii)
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How does this work, exactly? Think of this. You wake up in the middle of the
night and feel thirsty. So, you venture cautiously down the stairs toward the kitchen.
Your eyes have yet to adjust to the darkness, and just as you reach the bottom and
begin to turn the comer, you catch out o f the comer o f your eye something that
moves. Your heart begins to race. Your senses are on high alert You slowly, quietly,
squint hard to make sense o f the figure. Finally, it comes into focus as.. .the coat tree
in the comer.
These kinds o f experiences happen to us all the time. We are prone to
attributing agency to non-agents. In fact argues Guthrie, we are overly sensitive to
the existence o f agency in our world, so much so that we often misattribute agency
where it is not B ut importantly, we rarely do the opposite (attribute non-agency to an
agent). Can this be true?
W elt imagine yourself in the forest You notice something move just to your
left You immediately peer over to detect what’s there. After a lt it could be out to get
you. But, to your relief it was just a tree limb moving in the wind.
Now, imagine you see a bear just ahead and to your right According to
Guthrie, and anecdotal evidence seems to confirm this, not one single person in the
entire world would mistake the bear for a rock. Rocks are mistaken for animals all the
time, but we never mistake anim als for rocks!
This is more than just an interesting anecdote, according to Guthrie. He
theorizes that it is proof for the evolutionarily designed features o f human cognition.
The reason why we over-attribute agency in our world is because it is a competitively
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advantageous strategy to do so. In other words, to mistake a rock for a bear is a little
scary (and later a little embarrassing, maybe), but to mistake a bear for a rock could
be deadly. Thus, through evolution, the human brain was selected to have what has
come to be called a Hyper-Active Agency Detection Device or HADD. Simply put,
we anthropomorphize because it helps us survive. O f course the not-so-subtle
implication here is that anthropomorphism is a cognitive error. However, don’t feel
bad about making lots o f mistakes. To do so is natural.
How does this relate to religion? Anthropomorphism is a universal feature o f
perception. This means that people everywhere do it all the time. Anthropomorphism
is the attribution o f agency onto the world (where, often, none actually exists).
Religion involves the attribution o f agents in the world (where, often, none are

actually seen to exist). Thus, anthropomorphism causes religion. Religion, for
Guthrie, is the natural attribution o f agency onto the world. Gods caused her to win
the lottery. Demons made me do i t Ghosts haunt the house. Angels saved my life.
The devil is wearing a blue dress. The goddess killed the animal.

Intuitive Ontology
You might be thinking to yourself by now, “Okay. I can see that we do all
these things naturally. And I admit, with some hesitation, that these things all
influence religion in some way or another. What I can’t figure out, though, is where
does all of this come from?” Enter Pascal Boyer.
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Boyer has added meat to the bones of the cognitive science o f religion.
Lawson and McCauley, and Guthrie, had put forth very powerful theories o f religious
behavior. Boyer’s work supplemented those theories with a catalogue o f ideas that are
central to human cognition and directly influence religious thinking. Boyer has shown
that all religious ontologies, or theories of the way the world is (according to different
religious traditions), are constrained by cognitive functions involving a kind of
’intuitive ontology” that humans have from birth.
Let’s perform a thought experiment Close your eyes. Think of walking along
a beautiful sandy beach. Think o f the soft white sand underneath your feet Think o f
the ocean’s waves rolling gently over your toes. Think o f a sleek dolphin jumping out
o f the water just off the shore. Think of a young child building a castle in the sand.
Think of the sun setting at the end o f the day.
That was pretty easy. Right? We might say that not only was it intuitively
plausible, it was even pleasant Yet, had I provided another representation to imagine,
the feeling would have been quite different Try this.
Think of yourself on a beach with laughing sand. Think of the dolphin
building a castle on the beach. Think o f the setting sun saying, “Good night See you
tomorrow at sunrise.”
How do these representations make you feel? Not “right” I suspect because
they violate our intuitions about what the world is like and how it is supposed to
work. Dolphins are supposed to jump out of water, not build sand castles. The beach
not supposed to laugh, and o f course the sun is not supposed to talk.
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But how do you know all of this? Did you leam it from your culture? It is
possible that someone sat you down at some point in your life and explicitly told you
all of those things? That’s possible, but unlikely because, posits Boyer, we come into
the world (thanks to our genetic package) with an intuitive ontology that gives us a
sense of what the world is supposed to be like.
Our intuitive ontology is rule-governed. What does this mean? It means that,
despite what critics say, humans are not genetically pre-determined to think only
some thoughts and not others. Nothing in your genetic package pre-determined that
you would think about talking suns and castle-building dolphins. But, your intuitive
ontology did enable you to have that thought, for it to make (some) sense, and for you
to know that it was weird.
The above examples, as I said, constitute violations o f expectations about the
workings of the world that are present in our intuitive ontology. Expectationviolations are the cause o f the emotion o f surprise. And they are the roots of religious
representations. How is it possible to get religious ideas from natural ontology?
Religious representations are violations o f the expectations of the intuitive
ontology. Religious agents are “superhuman” in the sense that they many o f the same
postulated qualities as humans, but with violations. For example, gods are most often
thought of as beings that live somewhere, that have minds, that can hear you, see you,
talk to you (if they choose), that can do stuff (to you, if they choose), that get mad,
jealous, happy, and on and on and on. But, don’t be fooled. They’re also quite
different from us in other important ways. Gods often don’t die. They are invisible.
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They might be able to know the future before it happens. They can see everywhere all
at once. They don’t eat food, but they don’t get hungry.
According to Boyer, our intuitive ontology is packed with five main things
that are found in the world:
(1)

natural objects (e.g. rocks)

(2)

artificial/human-made objects (e.g. chairs)

(3)

plants (e.g. flowers)

(4)

animals (e.g. birds)

(5)

humans (e.g. Bill Clinton)

As we travel along the ontological hierarchy (from one to five), the “things’*
become more complex and therefore have more, or at least different, expectations
associated with them. Natural and artificial objects are non-living things. They don’t
move of their own volition (i.e. they have to be “pushed” by something). They don’t
grow. They don’t need food. They aren’t bom. They don’t die.
Plants are “living” things. They can move (slightly) on their own volition.
They grow. They need sustenance to live. They die.
Animals are living things that have volition. They grow, die, need food and
water, are born, can think (however primitively), etc.
Humans are animals with sophisticated minds. In our dealings with other
people (even from birth), humans just seem to know how to interact with them. We
read their facial signals. We infer their feelings. We manipulate their emotions. We
show our disgust or pleasure. We just know, by a very complicated but fairly reliable
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method, what other people are thinking Human to human interaction involves folk
psychology.
Now, think again about the objects o f religious representations: gods that
don't die; goddesses that are jealous; demons that don't have to eat; ghosts that are
invisible; spirits that can foretell the future. What do they all share in common? They
are all counter-intuitive representations that are non-natural, but leamable. (Boyer
1994) They are not completely different from our intuitive ontology, but neither do
they exactly fit in i t
Interestingly, too, representations that violate expectations - those that are
surprising - are also memorable. We tend to recall surprising facts much more
reliably that non-surprising facts. Consider the following story.

Tim Smith is fourteen years old. He has just begun his walk home
from school in a suburb just outside o f a large city. Tim’s walk
takes a bit longer than most teenagers because he has no legs. The
walk itself is approximately one mile long, and it takes Tim about
four days to complete. Hopefully he will make this journey safe
this time, because last week a pink dragon bit him. His mother
didn’t like that much at all because Tim was late for dinner that
night
By my count there are seventeen facts stated in this story. Yet were I to ask you to
recall them, you would likely remember three parts o f the story best
(1) Tim has no legs.
(2) One mile takes four days to complete.
(3) A pink dragon bit Tim (and made him late for dinner)
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After these facts, the others are less reliably recalled. You might not even remember
some facts at all (e.g. that the suburb is outside a large city).
So what does this have to do with religion? If you think back to Sperber’s
account of what constitutes a public representation (see above), it should become
clear. One o f the reasons why religious ideas have such a widespread recurrent
existence is that they are very memorable. We can safely include them as part of
“[that] very small proportion of.. .communicated representations [that] get
communicated repeatedly.” (Sperber 1996, p. 25) Were you to take the above story to
be true, you more than likely would repeat it to a friend or acquaintance. Such stories,
those that include surprising facts, are the stuff o f gossip. And, as Boyer later points
out, human beings are insufferable gossip-hounds. We are gluttons for interesting
information. (Boyer 2001)
So, when someone says to you that little Rover, the family puppy, has been
taken to heaven by angels after being hit by a car.. .the idea has power over you. It is
an idea that is minimally counter-intuitive, and one that has certain emotional
benefits. It is cognitively optimal.

Theological Correctness: What People Re«Hv Think
The works o f Sperber, Lawson and McCauley, Guthrie, and Boyer have been
so impressive that they constitute what Thomas Kuhn called a “paradigm.” (Kuhn
1970) Paradigms are frameworks for thinking about an object o f study that seem to

be so sound that other scholars accept them as being facts...and then work within the
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system to fine-tune its theories and data. The collective theories o f these scholars
have explained much about the workings o f religion in our world, but they’ve not
explained everything. Instead, they point to new avenues of research. Developmental
psychologist Justin Barrett has taken one o f the most interesting research paths in the
field. Though he writes broadly on neo-Piagerian child development, his research on
“theological correctness” merits our attention here. As we shall see, this work is
fundamental to the case studies that are taken up in the next three chapters.
If we think about all of the cognitivists’ claims together, something interesting
emerges. Sperber pointed out that because ideas spread in a given population, they are
always being slightly transformed, first when people speak them publicly, and then
second when the recipient of the representation hears and processes i t By this
account no two ideas are ever exactly the same. In other words, you can’t step into
the same river twice. Representations are always changing.
Y et Boyer claims (and Sperber agrees) that some ideas, those that achieve a
cognitive optimum, do become transmitted successfully. Just think o f some such
representations: nursery rhymes, songs, stories, poems, etc. While these stories do
change slightly over time, their main “gist” is highly transmittable. Generation after
generation learns, memorizes, and later recalls and re-tells representations. They
become “classics.”
Certain religious stories, poems, ideas, etc. seem to spread in the same way. I
can still sing, “Jesus Loves Me...this I know...for the Bible tells me so ...” I can also
remember certain passages from the Bible, certain Psalms, certain prayers (“Now I
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lay me down to sleep..

etc. Religion, just like popular culture, relies on devices

like mnemonics, rhyme and meter, songs (harmony, melody, etc.), and so forth, for
the transmission o f religious representations. Furthermore, religions also form certain
ideas into theological doctrines, which are passed on from leader to follower in
religious guilds, sometimes through oral memorization and other times in texts.
Theological doctrines, then, begin to formulate a religious system when adherents
commit their teachings to memory. Now, which is it? Do ideas stay the same (i.e.
become “traditional”) or do they constantly change? Well, the answer, according to
Justin Barrett is.. .both.
Barrett noticed that people sometimes make comments that suggest that they
have views that are in direct contradiction with what they profess to believe. When
asked traditional theological questions, something like “Do you believe God is allknowing and all-powerful?” they would provide theologically correct answers
(probably those they had learned). Yet, when asked different kinds o f questions, or
asked to perform certain kinds of cognitive tasks that were designed to reveal tacit
presumptions, they revealed (unknowingly) that their on-line religious notions were
quite different than, even in contradiction with, what they professed to believe. So,
Barrett’s research suggests that both Sperber and Boyer are correct. Humans have the
capacity - and tendency - to both memorize and transform religious representations.
Sorry clergy, but according to Barrett’s research, it appears as if theological
correctness and its counterpart, theological incorrectness, are not only natural but also
most likely inevitable.
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CHAPTER FIVE

BUDDHIST GODS AND THINGS

Deities (or what we have called superhuman agents, or SHA) exist and do
things to us. At least that’s what religion seems to be all about Religious people
simply presume so. Of course religion also involves doing rituals and other sorts of
activities, as well as group involvement in a church, temple, synagogue, or
equivalent but all of this business is predicated on presumptions about SHA in the
first place. In other words, what we do tends to follow from what we think (or what
someone in our religious system tells us what to think). Religious behavior, then,
turns on presumptions about SHA exist - and so we ought to do what they want us to
do (or not do, as the case may be) or else suffer the consequences.
If religious thought involves the presumption that SHA exist, then it must be
the case that theologies involve postulations about such agents. Furthermore, this
categorical property ought to apply in all cases. All religious systems must have
theological postulations, and on-line presumptions, that SHA exist and are to be
engaged for practical benefits. Yet, anyone who is familiar with the various religions
o f the world is aware that one religious system, Theravada Buddhism o f South and
Southeast Asia, seems to challenge this theory and therefore our understanding of
what religion is all about Theravada Buddhism is a very widespread and purportedly
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non-tfaeistic religion that has been around for some 2500 years. (Gombrich 1988;
Robinson & Johnson 1982) Therefore, we have a problem. If Theravada Buddhism
constitutes a successfully transmitted non-theistic religion, then religion cannot be
simply about the postulation and presumption about SHA. Or, more seriously, if there
is a religion that is significantly unlike all the rest, then we might not be able to
compare religions at all. Thus, before we can proceed to any other discussions about
religion (in general) in our world we have to settle the problem, or else our discussion
will be imprecise and incoherent - two problems which scientists deplore.

Metatheorv and the Category o f Religion
Fortunately, enough work has been done on issues related to this problem that
we can offer solutions. One approach is “metatheoretical” because it involves
addressing theories of theory. Metatheory requires that we ask, “what theory supports
what counts as a category?” In this particular case, the category in question happens
to be “religion,” but the same question could apply to any other category, like
“umbrella” or “zebra.” Without much reflection, what things like umbrellas and
zebras (and religions) are seems to be self-evident An umbrella is something that
shields us from the rain or sun. To be even more precise, an umbrella is “a collapsible
shade for protection against weather consisting of fabric stretched over hinged ribs
radiating from a central pole.” On the other hand, a zebra is a striped horse. Or,
technically, it is “any o f several fleet African mammals (genus Eqtats) related to the
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horse but distinctively and conspicuously patterned in die stripes o f black or dark
brown and white or buff.” At least that’s what my dictionary says. (Mish 1991)
However, what if the umbrella material that is stretched over die hinged ribs
radiating from a central pole is thin rubber and not fabric? Would it still be an
umbrella? What if the zebra had red and green strips, instead o f black or dark brown
and white or buff? Would it still be a zebra?
What if the umbrella had no fabric (or thin rubber) at all to protect you from
the elements, but instead was just a metal pole with some hinged ribs attached to it?
Would it still be an umbrella? What if the zebra had no stripes at all? Would it still
be a zebra?
Your instinctive answers to these questions are probably “yes” to the first two,
but “no” to the last two. Why? The classical definition o f what makes a thing a thing
is that it has to fulfill “necessary and sufficient conditions.” In other words, a thing is
a thing if and only if it has certain properties, like protective fabric in the case of the
umbrella and stripes in the case o f zebras.
This way of defining a thing can be quite useful. For one, it allows for a thing
to be defined either by its function (e.g. umbrella = protection from the elements) or
its defining features (e.g. zebra = stripes). Also, this way of defining a thing allows us
to differentiate between the types o f things that are in our world, which is an
important skill we need to survive. Thus, classical definitions allow us to say, with
some sense o f certainty, that a collection o f thin metal poles does not constitute an
umbrella and a horse without stripes does not constitute a zebra.
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However, this classical way o f defining objects has a serious limitation that
affects our study o f religion. Although it works fairly well with specific examples like
zebras and umbrellas (and very well with mathematical concepts), it is not quite as
useful for other things like “birds” and “persons,” (and “religion”) for example. What
makes a bird a bird? The instinctive answer is that it is an animal that it has a beak
and wings, and can fly. Yet a penguin, which is certainly a bird, cannot fly.
Furthermore, consider what makes a person a person, an American an American, an
African-American an African-American, and so on and so forth. We would be hard
pressed to come up with necessary and sufficient conditions for what makes each of
these things what they are.
A common - and very useful - way that humans cognitively represent “on
line” (i.e. instinctually, or “on the go”) is through the use o f prototypes. For reasons
most likely related to the processes o f natural selection, human beings are bom into
the world with an “intuitive ontology.” (Boyer 1994) In other words, we have from
birth the capacity to differentiate, presumptively, the objects o f their world into types.
Babies know very early on, possibly as early as one-hour old, that a person is a
different (actually more “attention-grabbing”) kind o f object from a non-person
object. (Gopnik, Meltzoff, and Kuhl 1999) Later in childhood, we become even more
sophisticated in our mapping o f the world. We know that dogs are different from both
persons and plants (though for a short time we might call all animals “doggy”), and
that plants are different kinds o f things than rocks. (Boyer 1994)
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As it turns out, we do not necessarily, in our daily lives, employ the classical
way of defining things that philosophers and scientists tend to revere. Rather, we use
(among other strategies) prototypical thinking, which is much more useful because it
is more efficient; it does not require the laborious (and often limiting) task of
identifying the conditional properties that define an object Rather, we infer, or
“theorize” if you will, from a prototypical image o f one thing whether or not and in
what sorts o f ways another thing is like that prototypical thing. Thus, prototypical
thinking leads us away from the “either-or” distinction o f classical definitions in favor
o f a “more-or-less” kind o f thinking, (see Medin 1998)
Consider an example that is illustrative o f this process, the case of “bird.”
Penguins, which you will recall don’t fly, prohibit us from making a classical
definition of a bird, or they at least make such a definition useless, because such a
definition would not capture the essence or function o f what we typically think of as a
bird. If we had to define a bird in such a way as to exclude “flies” as a necessary
property, then the definition would seem not to capture what we tend to think o f as
what a bird is. A prototypical definition, however, captures a rich “feel” for what a
thing is. A robin, for example, is a good prototype o f a bird, and so in our everyday
thinking we might compare all birds against this prototype (in one socio-cultural
context, remember) and thus to be “more or less” like robins...and therefore “more or
less” a bird. A penguin is a bird, but “less so” than say a parakeet or a jay.
In this sense, religion might be more fruitfully defined prototypically than
classically because the latter is a seemingly impossible task. A religion involves
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postulations and presumptions that SHA exist, and any religious system that includes
such features counts, in most people’s minds, as more like a religion than one that
does not (note that definitions follow from theories). Thus, if Buddhism does not
include such features, it could still be considered a religion (like a penguin can be
considered a bird), though a peculiar one by comparison. This is a very useful way o f
thinking about religion, or any object for that matter, because it is much more in line
with human beings’ actual cognition than classical definitions are.
Furthermore, when it comes to Theravada Buddhism, we find that Buddhism
does involve both postulations and, most importantly for our purposes, presumptions
about SHA. It is, therefore, very much a prototypical religious system. Despite what
many books written for a Western audience say about Buddhism, Buddhists in most
parts o f the world are in fact quite “religious.”

Buddhism bv the Books

In the image that has been circulating in the Western world for some time,
Buddhism is presented as an austere, highly philosophical, wisdom tradition that
relies not upon gods and superstitions but rather on keen mental and ethical skills that
can be honed by any spiritually self-reliant individual, (e.g. Rahula 1959) In this
view, the Buddha is represented as “just a man” and Buddhism therefore as not a
religion per se, but rather as something like a “way o f life.” As a result, Buddhism has
served over the years as a test case for scholarly definitions o f religion, or as an
exception to the rule, (see B.C. Wilson 1999b)
90

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Unfortunately, this image does not represent Buddhism as it is actually
practiced in most parts o f the world. In reality, Buddhists are not very different at all
from practitioners o f other religions. They too conceptualize their central figure (i.e.
the Buddha) as an SHA, and they worship him (and other SHA) in hopes o f achieving
practical benefits. Yet, the counter-image persists in the W est Why is this so? There
are historical reasons.
The form o f Buddhism that most Westerners know is actually a form o f what
one scholar has called “Buddhist modernism'’ and is based nearly entirely on a
fti

canonical view o f the religion that began sometime during the 19 century in South
Asia, primarily in Sri l-anka, in large measure as a response to colonialism. This
movement has been dubbed “modernism” because, having begun among urban,
Western-educated, middle-class reformers, it mirrored the kinds of modernist
movements found throughout Europe at that time. (Bechert 1966,1967,1973)
These revivalist-reformers felt that the best way to battle the Christians and
therefore colonialism by extension was to revive and reassert their Buddhist heritage
throughout Ceylon. Like reformers in Europe, they used modem methods to do so.
The revival and reforms were enacted by means o f mass-educadon, public preaching,
and the use o f the printing press for the publication and widespread distribution o f
Buddhist materials. Since Christians had established missionary schools throughout
Ceylon (Sri Lanka) throughout the latter stages o f the colonial period, and an Englishbased education was a popular strategy for upward mobility among middle-class
Singhalese, Buddhist reformers sought to counter the “Anglicization” of their society
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by providing Buddhist alternatives. They decided to create their own Buddhist
schools for the teaching o f both modem subjects and o f (modernist) Buddhism to die
masses (who were, the reformers believed, too ignorant and superstitious to combat
Christianity and overthrow British colonialism). Interestingly, an American, Henry
Steele Olcott, and a host o f other “anti-missionary” Westerners who had become
interested in Buddhism and native resistance to the British Christians, assisted them
in their endeavors. Olcott created a Buddhist catechism to ensure a “proper” Buddhist
education for the masses o f Singhalese Buddhists. Lay groups like the “Young Men’s
Buddhist Association,” were also formed to rival their Christian counterparts’
organizations and to provide Buddhist-based social activities and for networking.
(Prothero 1995; Gombrich & Obeyesekere 1988; Bond 1988; Malalgoda 1976)
These revivalists also began to preach publicly their modernist version of
Buddhism. They often challenged—and defeated in the eyes o f many natives—the
Christian missionaries in public debates through the use of reasoned and rational
arguments supported by textual evidence from the Buddhist canon, the Tripitika.
Their arguments were often grounded in the assumption that Buddhism was superior
to Christianity because the Buddha was a noble philosopher who taught an
empirically verifiable (and unsurpassable) modem philosophy. The Buddhist
reformers dubbed Christianity, by contrast, as superstitious and not in-line with
science and the modem world.
The education o f the masses via Buddhist schools, lay organizations, and in
public debates was augmented by the widespread distribution o f “the word.” Having
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purchased several printing presses from Christian publishers, Buddhist modernists
distributed vernacular versions o f the Buddhist teachings to a general audience. In
addition to the Pali scriptures, they wrote Buddhist tracts that served a reformist
agenda—to awaken the masses out of their superstitious and empty rituals (i.e.
traditional devotional practices).
The result o f this effort was the creation o f “Protestant Buddhism modernism”
that reflected not the values o f indigenous, pre-modem Buddhism but rather that o f
post-enlightenment Protestant Christianity, including ties to nationalism (Gombrich
and Obeyesekere 1988; Tambiah 1992). Buddhist modernism emphasized individual
choice, explicitly criticized popular practices, and in turn rejected the traditional
authority o f the sangha (community of monks) as preservers o f the dharma (Buddhist
doctrine). The “laicization” o f Buddhism was legitimated by the argument that the
truth of the dharma could be realized individually, through personal investigation o f
the teachings (thus demanding studies o f the canon for oneself—ideally in Pali, if
possible) and in personal experiences achieved via meditation. Buddhism was further
Protestantized when modernists insisted that true Buddhism should bring about both
worldly achievement and spiritual achievement The most famous Protestant
Buddhists o f this time were Anagarika Dharmapala, a Singhalese layman who lived
like a monk and worked for social change by putting into action modernist principles,
and, of course, Colonel Henry Steele Olcott in whose memory contemporary
Singhalese celebrate a national holiday. (Gombrich and Obeyesekere 1988; Prothero
1995)
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Thus, 19* century intellectuals, both Asian and Western, crafted this version
o f Buddhism to serve anti-colonial political agendas. These intellectuals presented
Buddhism as a religion for the modem world because it was seen to be admirably
philosophical and in-line with modem science. According to this view, the Buddha
merely taught metaphysical and ethical laws o f the universe that were empirically
available to all through reasonable and rational study o f and reflection on the dharma,
or through personal insights achieved in meditation (this view o f Buddhism might
sound familiar). O f course devotional practices centered on the Buddha and other
superhuman agents (including other Buddhas, bodhisattvas, arhants, relics, stupas,
caityas, icons, and texts) could be found throughout South and Southeast Asia, (see
Swearer 199S; Lopez 1995a; Spiro 1970) They were simply dismissed as
superstitious, non-Buddhist, and in the cases o f the northern schools o f Buddhism Mahayana, Vajrayana, and Tantra - Hinduized corruptions of the true dharma
(believed to be preserved in the Pali canon like Christian truth was preserved in the
Bible).
Contemporary scholars have pointed out that not only did this image
misrepresent the tradition as it was practiced historically, it was actually perpetuated
by “Orientalist” (Said 1979) intellectuals in colonialist contexts, and was sustained by
narrow readings o f a small number o f selectively edited texts found in the Tripitika
(texts which Schopen [1997] has pointed out w o e themselves the edited products of
ideal-minded monks). Beginning in the 1960s, anthropologists and historians o f
religion alike, such as Melford Spiro, Stanley Tambiah, Richard Gombrich, Gananath
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Obeyesekere, and others began to problematize this interpretation o f Buddhism by
focusing on Buddhism as practiced “on the ground.** These scholars began to show
that Buddhism had a rich religious dimension to it, that is, an orientation toward the
worship o f SHA. They showed that Buddhist modernism had foregrounded the
“ought** of Buddhism (a common result o f any study o f religion based on canons) at
the expense o f the “is.** Buddhism on the ground consists of copious merit-making
rituals like puja (rituals o f devotion performed to the Buddha and other SHA), darta
(sacrificial giving to monks and other members o f the Buddhism community),
pilgrimage, and so forth, all o f which were typically institutionalized in cults o f

stupas (burial mound that houses relics), icons, saints, and so forth.
Nancy Falk, in her 1972 unpublished dissertation on the cult o f relics in
Buddhism, also made a very important point concerning the nature of the Buddha for
Buddhists. According to modernist textual readings, the Buddha was not only just a
man during his life, but was now unavailable because at his death he achieved
“parinirvana,” or complete extinction from rebirth. Yet, Falk argued, the supposedly
absent Buddha was actually not absent, and thus unavailable, at all—at least from the
perspective o f Buddhists on the ground. Nor was he just a man. Rather, he was seen
as a SHA and was felt to be present in what she called “sacred traces,** such as the
relics housed in stupas.
More recent scholarship has confirmed Falk’s hypothesis. Scholars have
collected numerous popular stories that depict the Buddha as having many o f the
characteristics o f deities in other religions. He is variously depicted as having perfect
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golden-skin, as having perfect knowledge and vision (of the past, present, and future),
as being vengeful at times and forgiving at other times, as commanding loyalty, as
performing miracles, and so on and so forth, (e.g. Dhannasena 1991; Premchit and
Swearer 1998; Schober 1997) Furthermore, using archeological inscriptions and
other epigraphical texts from early north Indian Buddhism, Gregory Schopen has
shown that monks and nuns - the supposed upholders o f “pure” (i.e. modernist)
Buddhism - commonly performed the very same kinds of rituals as the laity, such as
donating gifts, building stupas, caring for deceased relatives, and burying the dead at
sacred locations, all to accumulate merit and therefore acquire powers like the ability
to perform miracles and healings, to be reborn as a deity, to cheat death altogether,
and so forth. (Schopen 1997) As it turns out, Buddhists are very “religious” and
therefore much concerned with the same kinds o f practical benefits that persons of
other religions are.
The separation between what scholars o f Buddhism for long called the
“Great” tradition (Buddhist modernism) and the “Little” tradition (i.e. Buddhism as
practiced on the ground) creates another problem to solve. (Day 1988) Namely, how
are we to explain this gap at all? If religion is the internalization o f theology, we
ought not to find any gap at all. If religion is not the internalization o f theology, then
from where do we get it?
Let’s take but one case study. How can Buddhists simultaneously hold that the
Buddha has achieved parinirvana and yet is still “present” to be worshipped, prayed
to, etc.? There are two answers to this problem, because the problem is actually
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based on two puzzles. The first puzzle is how a person can still be “alive” after death.
The second puzzle is how a person can be represented as being “present” in objects
(e.g. relics) that are physically separate from one’s body. Let’s take each o f these
puzzles in turn.
An answer to the first question requires that we understand how human beings
conceptualize death in general because how human beings represent dead persons has
much to do with the belief in the continuation o f the Buddha despite his death and

parinirvana (and all beliefs in after-life). The belief in the continuation o f life after
death is made possible by the cognitive capacity to represent objects as existing
despite their apparent non-existence (as indicated by their absence from our
immediate perceptual field). One o f the first psychologists to study this phenomenon
scientifically was Jean Piaget, who called it the capacity for “object permanency ”
(see Piaget 1926,1954,1969) Representing objects as existing permanently is so
basic to our cognitive abilities that we often don’t even notice that we do it, even
though it is a quite remarkable feat Consider this. You are sitting in the living room
watching a movie with your spouse. In the middle o f the movie, say during a boring
scene, your spouse hits the pause button on the remote control and goes to the kitchen
to make some popcorn. As she (or he) turns the comer of the doorway, she goes out
o f your sights. Yet, you know that she still exists. She is, according to your mind,
simply somewhere else. Furthermore, you know that popcorn, a popcorn popper,
bowls, salt, butter, etc. also exist, even though you have no direct perceptual evidence
for this knowledge at your immediate disposal. So, how do you know these things
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exist? Well, you don’t, really. You presume that these things exist because you’ve
“encoded” them, we’ll say, in your memory. And, once an object is represented as
existing, you represent it as always existing...at least somewhere in the world (e.g. in
the kitchen cupboard). Thus, you can represent objects as existing because you have
the capacity for “object permanency.”
Now, might this capacity for object permanency have something to do with
our belief in the after life? Well, sort of. Piaget’s theories have been fine-tuned
greatly in the past few years, and one o f the most interesting neo-Piagetian
discoveries is that our supposed object permanency is actually even more
sophisticated than Piaget proposed. Our capacity for object permanency is actually
domain-specific. We can conceptualize some kinds o f things as existing outside of
our perceptual domain, possibly forever, while we can postulate other things as
actually ceasing to exist Some things last forever. Others do n o t
Think of this. Your wife re-enters the room with a big bowl o f salty, buttery,
popcorn. Your presumptions were correct! All o f those things did exist! Now, you
restart the movie and dig in to the snack. After twenty minutes or so, you reach down
and finish off the very last kernel o f the popcorn. To your appetite’s dismay, the
popcorn is gone.
Now, in some very peculiar sense the popcorn is not gone at all. Some
philosophers, Buddhist philosophers for example, would postulate that the popcorn is
not gone at all. It simply exists in “another form” in your digestive system. Yet, it is
highly unlikely, that any layperson would represent the popcorn as “existing” as
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something or somewhere else. O f course, the popcorn is in your stomach. But, in your
stomach, it is being broken down by your digestive system, and when it exits your
body, it will look (and smell) nothing like it did going in your mouth. According to
our everyday cognition, the popcorn has ceased to exist
This view of the non-existence o f consumed popcorn should be rather
uncontroversial. But, what about when a living thing, like a pet or a person, dies? Do
we have the same ease in representing the living agent as ceasing to exist?
The psychologist Jesse Bering recently put this question to the test In a very
clever experiment he presented elementary school children with a puppet show in
which a mouse was eaten alive by an alligator (the experiment was performed in
Florida, so the students had some familiarity with alligators). Before the alligator ate
the mouse, the students were told that the mouse was having a very bad day.
According to the story, the mouse had gotten lost and so had spent all day searching
for its home. As such, the mouse was thirsty, hungry, and tired. Then, to make
matters worse, the mouse happened upon an alligator, which ate it for dinner. As a
result, the mouse was “no longer alive.” (Bering 2001a)
Bering then asked a series o f questions designed to reveal the children’s
intuitions about what was happening, if anything, to the dead mouse. The questions
were divided along domain-specific lines. The first questions dealt with the domain of
biology. The students were asked whether the mouse would, after having been killed
by the alligator, eat dinner that night Nearly all said, “no.” Then, they were asked if
the mouse would sleep that night Again, nearly all said, “no.” Thus, according to the
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experiment, biological functions such as eating and sleeping seem, in the minds of
these children, to cease upon death.
The next set of questions Bering posed to the children dealt with the domain
o f psychology, or with what the mouse was thinking or feeling. The students were
asked if the mouse would feel hunger that night, would feel tired that night, and if the
mouse was mad at the alligator for eating (and thus killing) him. Astonishingly, many
o f the respondents, especially among the younger group (ages 4-7) responded, “yes.”
Thus, though the mouse’s biological functions ceased upon death, its psychological
functions did not
Based on these results, along with other research, Bering concluded that
children could represent the cessation o f physicality and biological functions of an
agent quite easily, but have difficulty representing the cessation o f psychological
functions upon death. This is quite important because in prototypical thinking, what
makes a living agent, like a human, a living agent is in fact that it has psychological
abilities. In other words, a human is a human because it has a mind. The “essence” of
human being, is its fully functioning mind.
Now consider that the etymology o f the word “psyche,” which although today
means “mind,” was originally the word for “soul.” In nearly all cultures, after-life is
represented as being the place where “souls” (or some culturally specific equivalent)
go. This ethnographic fact seems to be explained by Bering’s cognitive experiments.
Humans believe in the continuation o f a person’s “essence,” “spirit,” or “soul” after
death because our basic cognitive equipment, which has been designed to allow us to
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interact with the people and objects in our world that exist outside of our immediate
perceptual field, has great difficulty in representing the cessation o f the psychological
dimension of an agent. This means that humans presume that an “afterlife” exists
because it is natural to do so. (H.C. Barrett 2001,1998; H.C. Barrett and Behne 2001;
Boyer 2001)
Now, let’s return to the belief in the continued existence o f the Buddha. As I
said before, Buddhists are often taught that he is no longer around because he
achieved parinirvana. If our theory is correct, then this idea would be, to quote Pascal
Boyer, “nonnatural but leamable.” (Boyer 1994,2001) In other words, Buddhists
could learn the idea that the Buddha does not exist any longer, but, because it is so
unnatural, it would be a very difficult idea to entertain. We could predict that
Buddhists would say in situations that require them to be theologically correct that the
Buddha is in parinirvana, and yet in most other situations treat him as if that were not
the case. And this is precisely what we find in ethnographic accounts of Buddhist
cultures. Buddhists appear to have a “split-brain” because they simultaneously claim
to believe in the Buddha’s parinirvana and yet presume that their prayers and
offerings to him are efficacious. (e.g. Spiro 1970; Tambiah 1970,1976,1984;
Gombrich and Obeyesekere 1988; Swearer 1995; Southwold 1983)

Essences and Traces
As mentioned above, the Buddha is also represented as being present in sacred
traces. These include relics (housed in stupas), icons, Bodhi trees, amulets, and other
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such objects. While our inability to represent the cessation o f psychological functions
might explain the recurring belief in continuation o f life after death in the form o f
spiritual essences, it does not explain why Buddhists (and many other religious
people for that matter) presume that objects can be imbued with traces of the Buddha.
For this, we will need a different, though overlapping, cognitive capacity.
The capacity that explains the phenomenon o f sacred traces is related to what
Boyer, drawing on the previous work of Rozin (1976) and Rozin, Haidt, and
McCauley (1993), calls the cognitive “contagion system.” (Boyer 2001) In this view,
human beings have the cognitive ability to represent the transference of the “essence”
o f one object completely into another.
Consider this. You walk into your bedroom to go to sleep. You pull back the
blankets to find, both to your surprise and to your disgust, that your bed is infested
with bugs. There are little creatures crawling everywhere.. .all over your sleeping
area, your pillow, your sheets, and so forth. What do you do? Most likely, you will
disinfect your bed and covers thoroughly. You might even throw away your bed’s
dressings altogether (possibly the mattress, too).
Why would you go to such lengths? Wouldn’t it be enough to simply remove
the bugs? Probably not, because you would have a deep sense that the bed had
become “infested” with the “essence” of the bugs (which is, to say the least, bad).
Though the bugs can be removed, they have already done their damage because their
essence has been, at least in our minds, transferred into the sheets, the blankets, the
pillows, and the mattress. In reality, removing the bugs would suffice for proper
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hygiene. Yet, most humans would want to go further. This is because human beings
have a built-in contagion detection device that represents the transference o f an
object’s essence into another object upon contact Spiders, snakes, and other “creepy
crawlies” are bad enough to see, but if one touches you, it is much, much worse (go
ahead and image a spider crawling on your leg right now...).
Studies in which subjects were presented with objects that had come into
contact with other defiled objects and thus had become infected with the essence of
the previous object reveal this tendency. One o f the most telling experiments along
these lines involved asking subjects to drink out o f a glass that had once had feces as
its contents. Despite the fact that the glass had been thoroughly disinfected, most
subjects balked at the experimenters’ requests to drink out o f i t Would you?
This contagion system seems to work both ways, however. Not only can
objects be infected with bad essences, but evidence from cultures worldwide suggests
that objects can be imbued with positive essences as well. Religious systems
seemingly everywhere are populated with the notion that the essence of a holy person
can be transferred into an object, which can in turn be tapped for efficacious power.
In the case o f Buddhism, much of daily religious life consists o f attending to objects
that are believed to have special powers, often because they are associated with holy
men who themselves are considered to have special powers. The anthropologist
Stanley Tambiah has noted a widespread cult o f amulets in Thailand (but which exists
in all Buddhist cultures), where even those individuals with little or no discretionary
income willingly pay top-dollar for amulets that have been blessed by legendary
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monks who are believed to have extraordinary powers. Once purchased, Thais keep
the amulets physically near their bodies for protection against evil and misfortune.
(Tambiah 1984) Similar phenomena have been documented in China, Japan, Africa,
Europe, and the United States, (see Earhart 1993) Most likely, this kind o f behavior
recurs worldwide.
Similarly, stupas and other sacred spaces where relics are housed are common
sites where pilgrims trek to obtain spiritual (and by extension practical) benefits. The
most famous site in Sri Lanka houses that which is believed to be an actual tooth o f
the Buddha. Not only do individuals seek to get close to this extraordinarily powerful
object, the government o f Sri Lanka treats it as a national treasure. An unfortunate,
but no less fascinating, consequence of this is that Tamil rebels have repeatedly tried
to capture it for political gain. (Tambiah 1992)
Cults o f amulets, stupas, and other objects are not, as some might contend, a
later corruption o f true Buddhist practice. Recent archaeological interpretations by
Gregory Schopen suggest that the worship o f such sacred traces dates back to the time
o f the early Buddhist sangha. (Schopen 1997) Epigraphical inscriptions in caves and
other places where Buddhist clergy lived reveal that monks and nuns used to worship
Buddhist books and other repositories of power that were associated in some way
with the Buddha himself. They believed that such behavior could grant them eternal
life or rebirth as a god. Thus, it seems that all Buddhists, including the clergy, are
quite religious.. .just like people everywhere.
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W here are the Nuns?

A cognitive approach to Buddhism also allows us to explain one more
problem documented by die contemporary study o f Buddhism.. .the absence o f
officially ordained Theravada nuns. Today, Buddhist monks, modernist and
traditional alike, have rejected pleas to ordain nuns into die sangha on technical
grounds related to the vinaya. According to vinaya law, both a nun and a monk have
to be present for an ordination o f a nun to take place. According to tradition, the
Buddha himself established this law. Unfortunately, at some point in history, the
Theravada nun lineage died out, and so there are no longer any nuns around to
perform new ordinations o f other nuns. (Bartholomeusz 1994; Kabilsingh 1991; Falk
1989) On these grounds, contemporary monks are refusing to ordain a new lineage o f
nuns. ‘The Buddha said so,” is their authoritative defense.
There are, as you might imagine, critics o f this stance. Aspiring nuns in
Thailand, for example, have all but ignored the ruling and proceeded to live like nuns
(called maejii ) regardless. Feminists, both in the West and in Asia, have spoken out
against this policy, which they see as “androcentric” and patriarchal, (e.g. Gross
1993; Kabilsingh 1991) And scholars of Buddhism have questioned the authority o f
the vinaya itself. Yet, the monks refuse to budge. Why?
The most popular reason cited by critics is that either (or both) the tradition o f
Buddhism itself or its current administrators are sexist (e.g. Bartholomeusz 1994;
Gross 1993; Kabilsingh 1991) However, this will not do. This answer does not, in
fact, explain much at all. It merely restates the question, or shifts the problem, such
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that the widespread existence o f sexism in Buddhist cultures merely becomes the new
problem to be explained. A different, and I believe better, explanation can be made by
appeals to human cognition.

Where Rituals Start and the Buck Stops
Lawson and McCauley (1990), and McCauley and Lawson (2002), have
described in great detail how religious ritual systems tend to be structured. For
reasons related to human cognition, religious rituals generally come in two types.
Special Agent Rituals (SAR) are those in which SHA, via an ordained ritual officiate,
do things to people (e.g. baptisms, or weddings). Special Patient Rituals (SPR) are
those in which people do things to SHA (e.g. puja, or sacrificial offerings). Each
ritual has, in turn, very specific rules that serve as guidelines for their performance.
For example, SAR are only performed once because, since the agents o f the ritual
action are SHA, their effects are “super-permanent.” By contrast, SPR are repeated.
As such, SAR are often accompanied by what these authors call “high-sensory
pageantry,” which induce high levels of emotion, making the events very memorable.
SPR are rather un-emotional because they are accompanied by relatively (to the
system itself) low levels o f sensory pageantry. In other words, rituals that involve you
doing the action to an SHA are done often and so are boring, at least compared to
those rituals in which are performed only once and so are quite exciting. Think of
giving an offering to a statue versus getting married. The former is rather mundane
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compared to the financial, emotional, psychological, and social investments
surrounding the latter.
What does all o f this have to do with Buddhist nuns? Well, one o f the central
SAR o f the Buddhist system is the ordination o f lay Buddhists into the sangha. The
performance o f an ordination is one o f the most important events in the life o f a
Buddhist, and so these occasions are often celebrated community-wide with highly
festive activities such as singing, dancing, feasting, and gift giving. Furthermore, the
rules by which ordinations follow are ages old. They date all the way back to the
Buddha, who it is believed performed the very first ordination ritual. Lawson and
McCauley have termed such first rituals, o f any given system, “theoretical rituals”
because such rituals only have to exist theoretically for members o f the system to
follow its rules. This means that whether or not the Buddha actually performed the
very first SAR is irrelevant Because the system postulates that he did, the rules must
be followed. In the case of Buddhism, they most certainly are.
The structures of ritual systems thus determine how rituals are to be
performed. In general, SAR follow from the rules established by the SHA, who is
often the founder o f the religion (e.g. Christ, Buddha). As such, SHA not only start
rituals, but the buck stops, so to speak, with them as well. Any time questions arise
about what can and cannot be done to change a ritual, leaders o f religious groups tend
to appeal to the guidelines, whether real or imagined, established long ago by the
SHA him se lf or herself in the original theoretical ritual. As such, no matter what
conscious claims participants make about the nature o f the founder o f a religion, in
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terms o f ritual structure, they serve as SHA. The Buddha, by means o f his authority in
establishing die very first (theoretical) rituals is a central SHA.
This feet helps to account for the rigid refusal to ordain nuns by contemporary
Buddhists. Despite what modernists, reformers, and other “atheistic” Buddhist monks
might say, when it comes to ordaining nuns - which would involve breaking the rules
o f the vinaya - they simply won’t disobey the guidelines of the law, because the law
was established by the Buddha. In this sense, the Buddha clearly, though tacitly,
functions as a SHA.
One way that nuns might hope to receive ordination would be to find a
Buddhist group that has a different account o f history - one in which there are
different rules. This is precisely what is happening in Asia. Women have begun to
seek ordination from other Buddhist groups (e.g. Mahayana) who follow a different
system of guidelines regarding rules for ordination. Mahayana Buddhists still abide
by the general rules o f all ritual systems, but in their tradition, the ordination of nuns
follows different laws. How so? They have, as you might have guessed, different
texts and traditions in which the Buddha has established different guidelines for SAR.
Thus, many women from South and Southeast Asia have turned to Mahayana
lineages in East Asia and in the United States for ordination. And, not surprisingly,
reactionaries in the Theravada tradition have responded by saying that such
ordinations are “not authentic.” (Bartholomeusz 1994)
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Keeping th« RnHrfha in Mind
The above examples suggest how our understanding of Buddhism, and of
religion by extension, might be clarified by knowing how human cognition works. If
humans simply learned religion from their theological traditions, then we would find
no gap between the “ought” and the “is” in Buddhism, or any other religion for that
matter. Yet, “on the ground” Buddhism is significantly different from “in the
canonical texts” Buddhism. Some o f the differences are harmless, such as those that
involve legendary folk tales about the impressive stature and super-human abilities of
the Buddha. Others, however, like the refusal to ordain women, are far more serious.
In addition, what’s also important for our purposes is that Buddhism does not
stand out as an anomaly in the comparative study of religion. The very same issues
that affect other religions are found in Buddhism. We find in Buddhism the
widespread postulation of SHA, the performance of rituals that adhere to cognitively
constrained rules and guidelines, and, for better or worse, contestations and
refutations o f what follows from the traditions entrenched in the system.
The latter suggests a very important, and enveloping, feature o f Buddhist life.
Buddhists are human beings and therefore employ inductive reasoning for most of
their cognitive tasks. Therefore, Buddhist theology becomes merely one type of
knowledge (learned) that influences what people “believe” and what they do.
Buddhists also draw on more basic knowledge, such as tacit theories o f the world
contained in their intuitive ontology, which they have inherited genetically, and by
living (developmentally) in this world. Thus, Buddhists are not passive recipients of
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Buddhism. They are active transformers o f i t In this sense, they are like members of
every religion and thus Buddhism is like every other religion.. .it is constantly
changing as thinking people adjust i t And Buddhism is the same as other religions
because its members share die same cognitive equipment as members o f other
religions. This means that Buddhism does not challenge our ability to compare
religions. For, as it turns out all religions, including Buddhism, have deeply
structured recurring features. They are all constrained by human cognition.
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CHAPTER SIX

THE AMBIGUITY OF AGENCY

In 1981, Avon Books published a small paperback book about religion that
sold thousands o f copies worldwide. From the volume of its sales, we might say that
Harold S. Kushner’s Why Bad Things Happen to Good People struck a chord. The
message o f the book was, according to its publisher, ‘inspirational,” as it tried to
convince its readers, primarily Christians and Jews, that the belief in God should not
be threatened by the reality o f evil and suffering in our world. In other words, fear
not, because despite the way it looks, God is in control
Kushner’s book presented for a general audience an issue that has pre
occupied theologians for centuries, namely the problem o f “theodicy.” From the
Greek theos (god) and dike (justice), theodicy is the problem o f explaining “God’s
justice” in the world. In short, it is the problem o f explaining why if God exists, so
does evil and suffering. The theological problem is such:
1. God exists
2. God created the world
3. God is entirely good
4. God is entirely powerful
yet...
Ill
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5. Evil and suffering exist
Obviously, this is problematic because:
6. If God can’t prevent evil, then God must not be entirely powerful,
or...
7. If God won’t prevent evil, then God must not be entirely good.
Therefore:
8. If God exists, he can’t be entirely good and entirely powerful
because...
9. Evil and suffering exist
As I said before, this type of problem has preoccupied theologians and
philosophers for centuries, and there are sophisticated ways in which theologians and
philosophers have tried to solve this dilemma through carefully reasoned arguments,
(e.g. Plantinga 1990; Hick 1966) However, this problem is not just a dilemma for
intellectuals. It is a problem for just about every religious person, because it concerns
the heart of what religion is all about - agency.
The distinctive feature of religion is the presumption that SHA exist The use
of the term “agent” in this definition is critical because what drives religions is the
presumption that the SHA have the power to control events in the world. Were they
not to have this power, as the problem o f theodicy suggests, the gods would not merit
much reverence. Thus, religion is a powerful force in people’s lives because the gods
are effective.
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Or are they? Upon further inquiry, die gods, at least in the minds o f religious
people, don’t actually seem to be in control o f most of the events in the world. When
asked, Christians will say, to be “theologically correct,” that God knows and controls
all. Yet, when asked questions that require them to make inferences about divine
agency, researchers find that they view God as a much more limited agent than their
ascribed theology suggests, and that the subjects themselves even reveal a strong
“inner locus o f control” even while claiming to believe in divine sovereignty (Barrett
1999; Lupfer et al. 1992,1994,1996; Spilka et a l 1983, 1985;) The latter means that
Christians, American Christians at least, believe that human beings (or other
“secular” agents) are the causes of most o f life’s events. Thus, there is a distinct
tension in Christianity, probably in all religions, between theological determinism (all
is controlled by God) and free will (human fates are controlled by human beings).
This tension results from the ambiguity o f agency. In our everyday traffic with the
world, it is not always clear who is in control of what

Mental Tricks
We have already established that religious people don’t behave the way
sociologists and anthropologists have long thought We have noted that people don’t
simply leam their religious views from theology, nor do they simply leam their
religion from culture. Were the former the case, there would be no variation in
religions at all because everyone would simply think the same thoughts (i.e. the
established theology). Were the latter entirely true, we would have no way to explain
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how variant cultural products get generated in the first place. For someone to come to
believe a religious idea, they would have to leam i t To leam it, they would have to
hear it from someone else. For someone else to know i t that person would have to
have learned it from someone else. And on and on and on.. .until we get to the person
who had the original idea in the first place. If it is possible for people to have original
ideas at all, then learning must not be entirely passive. And given the variety of ideas
that float around in any given culture, we must conclude that nearly everyone is
active in the generation o f ideas. Thus, we are back to square one.. .trying to identify
just exactly how religious ideas function in people’s lives.
With this very issue in mind, some psychologists have begun to investigate
the aspects of human cognition that relate directly to our topic at hand, namely
“causal attribution.” Obviously, much o f religious thought involves attributions about
why things happen. As Spilka and his colleagues have noted:
[S]criptures and theologies have told how the universe was created,
why humans occupy a special place in the scheme o f things, why
seasonal changes and natural disasters occur, why some people
triumph while others fail, and why everyone must occasionally
suffer and eventually die. (198S, p. 1)
The eminent anthropologist Clifford Geertz has argued similarly that religion
constructs for people a “w orldview ” and an “ethos,” which provide people with a
view o f and for the world. (Geertz 1973) Religious ideas are, according to this view,
something like explanations o f the world and its workings, which, once learned,
instruct people in how to think and a ct Religious people, then, ought to believe what
their religious traditions teach them - they ought to attribute SHA as the causes of
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world events. But, evidence suggests that this is not the case. In fact, it seems to be
rarely the case.
Try this. Stand up and look down at your feet Now lift one foot in the air and
stand on the other for two seconds. Now sit back down.
What caused you to do this? Did God? Or, did you do this by your own free
will? Most likely, your instinctual answer is that you did it on your own. Upon
reflection you might postulate that it was all a part o f “God’s plan.” If so, your
cognitive efforts would be in line with how many Christians think. There is,
according to psychologist Justin Barrett, two kinds o f thinking that religious people
employ, namely “on-line” and “off-line” thinking.
On-line thinking involves presumptions, or the kind o f rapid judgments that
people make without much thought Off-line thinking is much more reflective, and
because it is slowed-down significantly, it allows individuals to postulate, or draw on
other kinds of psychological “schema” to fulfill the cognitive task. Again, your on
line answer to what caused you to get up, look at your feet, stand on one foot, and
then sit down was most likely “In order to participate in your little game, I chose to
do i t ” Upon reflection, however, were you a religious person you might invoke a
different schema altogether.. .maybe God or the Devil made you do it (though
theologians might retort that God doesn’t get involved in such “small-scale” matters).
Furthermore, off-line thought requires that you invoke learned (e.g. from
theology or culture) schema, whereas on-line thought is much more intuitive and
therefore non-cultural. No one ever had to teach you that if you want to do something
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like stand up you have to make a choice to do it and then act on that choice. You are
hardwired to know that from birth. In this sense, we have a strong sense o f what we
might call “self-agency.” (Premack 1990; Premack and Premack 1995)
Yet, depending on how well you know the established theology o f your
religion, you might invoke a “theologically correct” idea in your schematic account
You might have learned at some point the doctrinal notion that God controls
everything. From this point you might deduce that God controls your actions, for if
(a) God controls everything, and (b) you perform an action, then (c) God must have
caused your action. This is theologically correct, but few people actually think like
that, at least not on-line.
Thus, one o f the most important tasks for psychologists is to explain how,
when, and in what contexts people attribute events to religious, i.e. SHA, causes.
People might do this some o f the time, but they clearly don’t do so all of the time.

Intuitive Metaphvsira
Attribution is a central feature of general cognition. From the time we enter
the world, we are forced to represent in our minds what happens, as well who or what
causes happenings, in such a way that we can figure out how to take advantage o f the
way the world works, for example, by making predictions about how things will
happen in the future. Let’s take a fairly straightforward example. Normal, healthy
babies know from very early on that moms and dads cause certain things to happen.
Moms and dads (ideally) provide food, change messy diapers, and so forth.
116

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Furthermore, babies know (or leam very, very quickly) that they can cause things to
happen, like cause moms and dads to give them food or change their messy diapers.
One o f the best strategies for accomplishing these goals is to cry.. .loudly.
Much of human cognition involves trying to make sense o f the world by
differentiating what sorts o f things are in the world, how those things behave, and
how these things produce events that affect our lives. The central features o f the
world then, at least for human beings, are agents because they cause most o f the
events that affect us. Thus, much o f our cognitive development involves honing our
understanding o f agency.. .and thus “causality.”
According to most cognitive scientists, human beings differentiate between at
least two, but possibly as many as four domain-specific types o f causality in the
world. (Sperber, Premack, and Premack 1995) The most basic form of causality is
physical. When a rock smashes through a glass window, the cause of the shattering is
physical - the force o f the rock's momentum and the hardness o f the rock's mass
exceeded the strength o f the glass to withstand the physical force o f the moving rock.
Explaining the actual physics o f this event is quite complicated, but human beings can
understand the event quite well (well enough) instinctively. We don’t have to leam
that hard things crash into other hard things with force.
In addition to physical causality, humans also naturally represent
psychological causality. Humans recognize that certain types o f objects, in fact very
special types of objects, have agency. Agency is predicated on, among other
properties, the capacity for self-propelledness, whereas, to move, a rock must be
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“launched” by being struck by another moving object Agents (e.g. animals and
humans), on the other hand, can move by their own volition. Agents can do this, our
cognitive equipment informs us, because they have “minds.”
There is some dispute about whether or not humans also possess domains of
biological and social causality, (see Hirschfeld and Gehnan 1994) but those debates
are less important for our task here. What matters most to us is the understanding that
human beings spend much of their time engaging the domain o f psychological
causality.. .because much o f our survival depends on how well we understand and
interact with the agents surrounding us. Among the agents we most commonly
encounter are human beings (though the case might have been different in the Upper
Paleolithic era). We can safely say, then, that our cognitive equipment predisposes us
to detect agency in the world above all else and therefore to decipher the causes of
many events in the world.
The causes o f most events seem to be self-evident, and people cause most
events (at least the ones we notice). Consider the event in which a person flips a
switch on the wall and the lights o f a room turn on. Consider when someone punches
another person in the face, and the next day person B has a “shiner.” Consider when
a person throws a ball over the backyard fence and into a creek. In all o f these cases,
the cause is easily inferred.
However, what about in other cases? Consider some very famous court cases
o f late. A woman sued the McDonald’s Corporation because when she spilled coffee
on herself, the hot beverage burned her leg. The court found McDonald’s responsible
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for the injury, and awarded the woman several million dollars in punitive damages. In
an another case, a woman killed her husband, but was found not guilty on the grounds
that she was not in her right state of mind during the lolling...she was, the court ruled,
overcome by the hormonal changes of her menstrual cycle. And more recently, many
Americans were outraged when the state o f Texas decided to execute a convicted
murderer who had been found, upon investigation, to be mentally handicapped.
The causes o f the events in question during those trials were in some sense
fairly clear. In another sense, however, they were not Was McDonald's liable for the
woman’s injury., .or, as critics argued, was it simply her mistake? Are murderers
suffering under mental problems (hormonal changes or retardation), still
“responsible” for their actions? Well, yes and no. There are, as lawyers (and
sociologists) claim, “extenuating” factors.
The implication here is that the causes o f events are not always clear.
Nonetheless, people, including judges and juries, tend to want to find someone at
fault for events. This very principle underlies most theories of justice, that responsible
parties must receive reciprocal punishment, which is most likely because humans are
predisposed to find causes everywhere. (Ridley 1997) Simply put, we tend to feel
that there are causes to events.. .even if the causes are unknown or unclear.
Cognitive scientists o f religion have argued that religion exploits this basic
human capacity. Given our predisposition to seek causes, we postulate agents. Thus it
is not a coincidence that the central feature o f religion is SHA. Stewart Guthrie put
forth one o f the earliest arguments to this effect Guthrie has argued that our capacity
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to locate agency in the world is actually “hyper-active,” which is why humans tend to
anthropomorphize and misattribute agency where it is not - but never the opposite.
(Guthrie 1993) Later, Pascal Boyer argued that religious agents are merely “tweaked”
versions of everyday agents, and Justin Barrett (along with Frank Keil) has recently
confirmed this theory with experimental data gathered in the United States and in
India. (Boyer 1994,2001; Barrett 1999; Barrett and Keil 1996). E. Thomas Lawson
and Robert N. McCauley even have shown that ritual structures are constrained by a
built-in “Action Representation System” (ARS) that is itself dependent upon the
cognitive capacity to identify agents performing actions in the world.
Thus, some psychologists have begun to conclude that religious ideas are
representations that postulate hidden causes o f events. This seems to be especially
common when the causes of events are ambiguous, a phenomenon known as the
“God in the gaps” hypothesis. (Lupfer, et al. 1996) According to this view, humans
infer SHA as causes whenever “regular” causes cannot be identified, and
experimental research seems to confirm this hypothesis.
In several experiments involving conservative Christians, psychologists asked
subjects to read a vignette describing an event and then to answer questions that
required them to infer the causes of the events in the story. The results w o e quite
interesting. For most events, subjects inferred that the human actors in the stories
were responsible for most of the events. However, in a few cases, such as those
involving unusual events like a financial windfall or acquiring a sudden terminal
illness, God, the Devil, luck, and other “supernatural” explanations were offered.
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(Lupfer et al. 1992,1994,1996; Pargament & Hahn 1986; Spilka et al. 1983,1985).
From this, researchers concluded that religious explanations were far less common,
especially for most mundane events, than natural (i.e. psychological, physical)
explanations, unless the circumstances themselves are unusual. The results, in turn,
confirm our hypothesis that religion doesn’t determine people’s worldviews. Rather
religious ideas only occasionally inform some inferences and deductions we make
about why things happen.
If religion doesn’t determine people’s worldviews, however, then what are we
to think about religion at all? Again, though religion doesn’t determine people’s
worldviews, it does not follow from this principle that religion doesn’t influence
people’s worldviews at all. What we find, actually, is that human beings are more
likely to believe a religious view if it is in-line with the accords o f everyday cognitive
concepts and inferences. In other words, while almost any theology can be
memorized, those that have what Boyer has called “inferential potential” are going to
be invoked for most cognitive tasks.

Inferential Potential

In two very influential books on the cognitive science o f religion, Pascal
Boyer has argued for a “naturalness” o f religion thesis that turns on the notion of
“counter-intuitiveness.” As we noted in Chapter Three, Boyer’s view is that religious
ideas are most likely to be transmittable (they get successfully passed on from one
person to another, from one generation to another, and even from one group or culture
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to another) when they achieve a “cognitive optimum.** Ideas that achieve a cognitive
optimum are those that are “nonnatural but leamable.” (Boyer 1994)
This theory is based on research in cognitive psychology about what sorts of
ideas come naturally to human minds. Natural in this sense is related to “innate** only
in so far as the various kinds o f tacit concepts built-in to our intuitive ontology (see
above) are not learned from culture. Rather, an intuitive ontology, and its related
capacities, is required to leam “cultural” ideas. Humans know tacitly, for example,
that natural objects, artifacts, plants, animals, and humans populate the world.
Furthermore, humans know, among many things, such facts as objects cannot move
on their own, living things (plants, animals, humans) need food and/or water to live,
and humans (and possibly higher-order animals) have “minds.” (Boyer 1994,2001)
Some ideas that humans have, however, are acquired (though not
independently o f cognition). For example, children in the United States leam that big,
gray, slow-moving, peanut-eating animals with long trunks and tails are called
“elephants.” In Thailand, children leam that these animals are called “chaang.”
Furthermore, children (in both cultures) leam ideas that are not in-line with ordinary
cognition. Such ideas are “counter-intuitive.” For example, in the modem West,
school children leam that the sun does not move around the Earth, despite the “fact”
that we see it do just that every single day o f our lives. In this sense, many people
spend their adult lives holding quite contradictory ideas simultaneously.. .that the sun
is stationary and yet it “rises” in the East and “sets” in the West each day and night.
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According to Boyer, religious ideas function in the same way. They are
counterintuitive, and so they have to be learned.
Now, consider the properties o f a religious agent In Christianity, God is
postulated as (among other traits) a grand being who has perfect knowledge and
vision, doesn’t need food or water to survive, and is physically and biologically
immortal (in this sense.. .He’s quite like the Buddha). Notice that each o f these traits
violates our intuitive expectations about what agents are like. Normal agents
postulated naturally have certain physical, biological, and psychological properties.
They are limited in space, don’t have perfect knowledge or perfect vision (which is
why we can trick them!), need food and water to live, and will eventually die (at least
a physical/biological death - see Chapter Four). The ideas that Christians have about
God are violations of those intuitive expectations. They are counterintuitive and so
must be, but can be, learned.
Thus, as humans develop and mature, they leam culturally postulated ideas,
including religious ideas, about the world and its workings. Many o f these ideas
might not resonate with our intuitive expectations. Yet, we leam them perfectly well.
But, once learned, do we forever alter our view o f how things work? Not necessarily.
Again, consider the case of the setting sun. Nearly all Americans know that
the sun doesn’t move around the Earth. Yet, nearly all treat it as if it does. Only in
situations that require them to recall learned ideas about planetary motion will they
invoke their astronomical wisdom. Likewise, religious people do not necessarily alter
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their way o f viewing the world once they’ve internalized a given theology. In some
contexts, they will invoke such thoughts. In others, they won’t
Given this process, we ought not be surprised that most Americans today are,
theologically speaking, instinctually Aiminianist (they believe in free-will) even
though the most dominant form o f Christian theology from the outset o f the founding
of this country was Calvinist (belief in deterministic divine sovereignty). One o f the
most interesting historical developments in American Christianity has been the failure
o f the Puritans to sustain their Calvinistic theology among the masses because it is not
only an instructive example of how human cognition constrains cultural possibilities,
but also of how a deep grasp o f cognition can help scholars make sense o f why
historical movements occur as they do. Let’s explore these developments o f early
American Christianity now.

Christianity in Colonial America
Though the various tribal nations that are now collectively known as the
“Native Americans” populated North America for thousands o f years before the
arrival o f the Europeans in the late 15th and early 16th centuries, most scholars in the
field date the arrival of the Puritans as the beginning o f the establishment o f
“American religion” on the continent (Williams 2001; Ahlstrohm 1972) The Puritans
were “pilgrims” who had left England in search of land on which they could build
their “New Jerusalem.” They were members o f the Church o f England, officially, but
they had also been deeply influenced by the predestinationist theology o f John
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Calvin. John Calvin constructed his theology based on the logical conclusion of the
doctrine of the sovereignty o f God. If, the logic went, God is the creator o f the world,
is active in the world, is all-knowing, and is all-powerful, then die fide o f die world
must be already determined according to His willed plan. Therefore, the salvation of
each human being, as well as the fide o f Christian societies, has already been worked
out in advance by God himself. To say the least, Puritan theology preached a radical
“external locus o f control.”
Members o f the Puritan society were inundated with this theology. Once they
established settlements in the New World (i.e. the English colonies o f North
America), the church served as the central aspect of Puritan life. Church services
were marked by lengthy sermons (some lasting all day) that were meticulously
prepared by trained clergy. In addition, socio-institutional decisions were always
made according to the dictates o f Puritan doctrine, and legal-ethical judgments
reflected their deep belief in God’s awesome power.
Yet, if cognitive theories of religion are correct, we could predict that
orthodox Calvinism would have little staying power...because it is too far removed
from ordinary cognition, which relies heavily on human agency, to have much on-line
inferential potential. In other words, a religious idea that removed agency entirely
from the human world could be learned, but would most likely not be invoked in on
line thinking because when humans are required to infer causes, they resort to default
(i.e. natural) inferences about psychological agency. Thus, Puritan doctrine would
have little chance o f successful transm ission in the long run. Is this the case?
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Evidence confirms this prediction on two accounts. First, much data collected
by historians suggests that Puritans were not strict theological determinists. They in
fact seemed to be obsessed with the effects of other sorts o f SHA and so, we might
say, were quite “superstitious.” The Puritans were not only obsessive “Jeremidians,”
that is they saw - a la the Biblical character Jeremiah - the hands o f SHA at work in
all events of misfortune and suffering. They also followed the Farmer s Almanac,
astrology, and other means o f divining events, and they greatly feared anything that
seemed to reveal the workings o f witches and other “demonic” agents (few events of
American religious history are as infamous as the 17* century witch trials in Salem,
Massachusetts). And in further display of theological incorrectness, Puritan society
was replete with rituals and other activities, like fasts, confessions, and natural
healings that were felt to be able to engender favorable outcomes in the world. (Hall
1989; Karlsen 1987; Stout 1986)
In addition to the “popular” dimensions of Puritan religion, a second bit of
evidence regarding the “instability” of determinism thesis comes from the demise of
Calvinism as a result of the “First Great Awakening” in the 1730s and 40s. The Great
Awakenings, o f which there have been at least three in American history, were
prolonged (5-10 years) periods when “revivals” o f intense on-line religion swept
through the colonial countryside. (Ward 1992; Butler 1990; McLoughlin 1978;
Bushman 1970) The original revivals, which constituted the First Great Awakening,
typically took place at gatherings o f various sorts (e.g. street-comer crowds, open
churches, tent revivals, camp meetings, etc.) in which charismatic traveling itinerant
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preachers, like “circuit riders,” like Jonathan Edwards, James Davenport, George
Whitefield and the like, brought thousands of men and women to their “First
Blessings,” or highly emotional “bom-again” conversion experiences in which folks
repented for their sins, asked for forgiveness from the Lord, and overwhelmingly.. .as
the saying went.. .“got religion.” The catalyst for these experiences was the fiery
extemporaneous preaching delivered by these men who felt “called by the Spirit” to
preach the word. Their sermons willingly sacrificed the systematic theological
tradition o f Calvinism, which we might call a “religion o f the head,” for a
theologically convoluted evangelical “religion of the heart” in order to bring people to
God. Their dramatic orations were supplemented with arousing activities like hymnsinging, spectacular personal testimonials, and in some cases full-immersion adult
baptisms.. .all o f which had as the primary goal generating emotionally charged
religious experiences among the audience. (Ward 1992; Butler 1990; Bushman 1989)
One o f the most striking features o f the First Great Awakening, at least for our
purposes, is that the Calvinistic theological message o f the Puritans began to give way
to Armmianism. Arminianism was a Protestant theology that had rivaled Calvinism
in Europe, but had been rejected in the New World by the Puritans. In contrast to the
rigid predestination of Calvinism, Arminianists preached a “cooperative theology” in
which salvation was achieved by the dual efforts of God and humans. An oft-used
Arminanist image was that humans needed to “reach up” and grab God’s outreached
graceful hand. Arminianism thus created a space for free will and thus, however
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limited, for human agency. The basic tenets o f Arminianism would eventually
become the hallmark o f American Protestantism altogether. (Williams 2001)

Copnitinn and Free Will

How do cognitive theories illuminate this series o f events? First, Stewart
Guthrie’s theory offers the beginnings o f an explanation for why the Puritans were
awestruck by the power of SHA that they believed surrounded them. As noted above,
the Puritans were Jeremidians in so far as they believed that the events o f the world,
especially misbehavior and misfortune, were proof that humans were, in the famous
words o f Jonathan Edwards, “sinners in the hands o f an angry God.” (Edwards 1957)
Boyer extends Guthrie’s point by explaining why such an idea would have been
attractive to the Puritans in the first place, namely because such an idea represents
God as an agent with perfect knowledge and awesome power (though materially
invisible).
Most importantly, however, Barrett’s theory of theological correctness allows
us to distinguish the on-line popular ideas and actions of the Puritans with the off-line
theological ideas.. .and to keep in mind that the humans are capable o f holding both.
This latter theory explains why, if the Calvinistic Puritans “believed in” divine
sovereignty, they also “believed in” witchcraft, astrology, religious conversion, and
the causal relationship between self-effort and worldly success (noted famously by
Max Weber [Weber 1976] as the “Protestant Work Ethic”). In short, Barrett’s theory
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that humans hold theologically correct ideas quite naturally provides the most
plausible explanation for why the Puritans were superstitious.
The off-line/on-line distinction further suggests that the sorts of religious
representations that are closest to on-line representations have the greatest likelihood
o f transmission. In other words, minimally counterintuitive ideas are not only easy to
leam, but they are easier to recall than maximally counterintuitive ideas, which are
cognitively burdensome. This certainly seems to be the case with the shift away from
Calvinism and toward Arminianism in early American Protestantism. Calvinism is an
inherently unstable idea because it precludes the role o f human agency.
Arminianism, in contrast, maintains the same inferential potential about superhuman
agency as Calvinism, but supplements that with representations that include the
important role of human agency (i.e. free will) in world affairs. Thus, it is more likely
that Christians will infer ideas that are in-line with Arminianist theology than with
Calvinist And, in situations where such ideas are preached, we could predict that
they would be enthusiastically received. The revival meetings o f the Great
Awakenings seem to confirm this. Not only did revival meetings attract hundreds,
sometimes thousands, o f people, the participants themselves, in the midst o f the
sermons, often plunged into neuromuscular ecstatic “exercises” that included
laughing, dancing, falling down, jerking, and even barking like a rabid dog. (Sims
1996; Brown 1992) In short, the success of the Great Awakening provides us with a
wonderful window into the workings o f the on-line religious mind.
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Thoughts and Actions
But what do people do, once they “have” religion? It seems nearly
incontrovertible that religious ideas inform religious actions, but how so is up for
debate. Cognitive scientists do seem to be clear on one point, however, that religious
representations are triggered in human mind-brains. The question at stake is whether
or not humans have to be motivated to have a religious experience and to perform
religious actions.
The sermons, songs, and shouts of the Awakening revivals clearly motivated
certain types of religious experiences. The environments o f revival meetings were
occasions of what McCauley and Lawson (and Lawson and McCauley), and Harvey
Whitehouse, have termed “high sensory pageantry.” (McCauley and Lawson 2002;
Lawson and McCauley 1990; Whitehouse 1995,2000) According to these scholars,
high sensory pageantry in ritual performance, which Whitehouse argues tends to
occur in “imagistic” modes o f religiosity, aids memory, salience, and transmission o f
representations by evoking strong emotional responses. Such experiences are
commonly induced through physical stimulation like singing, dancing, shouting,
sleep-deprivation, and numerous other arousing behaviors. However, it would also
seem to be the case that intense emotionality can be induced via communication,
because the sorts o f physiological changes that underwrite extraordinary experiences
can be stimulated verbally (e.g. intimidation, manipulation, flattery, reinforcement).
Representations communicated during the Great Awakening revival meetings did just
that. They not only achieved a cognitive optimum, but also evoked strong emotional
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responses that induced intense experiences. In the revival meetings, the physical
activity (singing, rituals, etc.) combined with the inter-subjectively communicated
representations, from preacher to audience, resulted in many emotionally charged
conversion experiences.
What follows from all of this is that effective preachers, or those whose
sermons engender a charged response, must exploit the basic processes o f human
cognition. Examination of sermons reveals that this is precisely what often happens.
A typical strategy employed by Protestant preachers during, and after, the Great
Awakening, is what we might call, to borrow a metaphor from sailing, conceptual
“tacking.” In sailing, whenever a captain seeks to sail into the wind (a seemingly
impossible task), the boat is maneuvered strategically at 45-degree angles to take
advantage o f the wind’s direction and power. Preachers employ a similar strategy by
“tacking” back and forth, providing explanations o f ordinary events in terms o f
supernatural causes. Revivalist preachers engaged their audience in a complex
cognitive “dialectic,” if you will, that involved (a) diagnostic reasoning, in which
general causes are inferred “backwards” from particular events, and (b) causal
reasoning, in which future events are inferred probabilistically from the represented
characteristics o f the postulated causative agent (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky
1982) And religious conceptual tacking not only involves the explanation o f
mundane events in terms of supernatural causes (i.e. superhuman agents), it also
involves inferring about potential events from what is presumed about the causer.
Misfortunes are caused by the Devil. Illnesses result from being possessed. Financial
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windfalls are a gift from God. And if you don’t pray and obey divine mandates, your
future will be dire. Such inductive reasoning is quite natural, and because religious
representations are salient, we should not be surprised that savvy preachers,
consciously or unconsciously, tapped into this process. It’s very effective.

Ritual Predictions
The final dimension of a robust cognitive account of the dynamics o f
American Protestantism should involve considerations of the psychological
constraints on ritual actions, such as those that Lawson and McCauley (1990) (and
McCauley and Lawson 2002) have described. According to their ritual form
hypothesis, the actions performed in any given ritual system conform to cognitive
constraints about representations of action. Thus, religious systems must balance the
Special Agent Rituals (recall: those rituals in which humans are recipients o f actions
from the gods [often via priests]) and Special Patient Rituals (recall: those in which
gods are the recipients o f actions from humans). This theory allows us to predict that
if a religious ritual system becomes unbalanced, then significant changes related to
the structural form o f those rituals will result This seems to be exactly what
happened in early American Protestantism.
The central rituals of Protestantism have always been communion and
baptism. In Puritan communities, however, the latter took on an additional, and very
important role that we might call a “civic regulator.” As we have noted, the Puritans
ascribed to predestination, or the doctrine o f the “limited atonement” and its
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corresponding notion o f “visible saints.” This meant that only those whom God had
pre-elected to be saved were fit to be baptized. After all, what would be the use in
baptizing others?
However, die non-elect (non-saints) were also required to attend church,
participate in societal activities, and so forth for the purposes of engendering the
Kingdom of God on Earth (which required keeping the Devil in check). As it turned
out, only about one in five New Englanders were considered to be members o f the
elect (Williams 2001) This principle of baptizing only the elect, and thus providing
full membership/citizenship, became a problem in the successive generations o f
Puritan families whose children and grandchildren didn’t follow the predicted pattern
o f experiencing a conversion event. To address this, the Puritan leaders created what
became known as the “Half-Way Covenant,” which allowed individuals with
ambiguous statuses to be baptized “half-way” in hopes that some day they would
come to realize, fully, their elect (or non-elect, as the case may be) statuses.
The consequence o f this decision was that baptism lost its importance. Its role
in the church was “deflated,” to use the language o f McCauley and Lawson, and
became less important than the taking of the Eucharist in the performance of
communion. As McCauley and Lawson’s theory would predict, during the Great
Awakenings many Congregationalists (i.e. Puritans) and Presbyterians converted to
the Baptist denomination whose central feature was “believer-baptism,” a ritual with
high sensory pageantry and correspondingly high levels o f emotionality. This
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suggests that ritual form played a role in the dynamics o f the Great Awakenings.
(McCloughlin 1971; Payne 1998)

The Big Picture
Rituals and other religious activities, as noted before, seem to follow from
religious concepts. Yet, the religious concepts do not determine, per se, what follows.
Rather, it appears that basic human cognition drives thoughts and actions at both the
individual and the cultural levels. In the case o f early American Protestantism, the
Calvinism of the Puritans was short lived because Calvinist theology, while leamable,
is too counterintuitive to be maintained by anyone performing on-line reasoning
tasks. Thus, we should not be surprised to find, as historians continue to do, that the
Puritans themselves were prone to theological incorrectness. Nor should we be
surprised that Arminianism came to be the dominant theology of the American
religious “psyche,” if we could make such a claim.
The latter point is quite illuminating because it suggests that religious ideas
with maximum inferential potential can even spread across diverse populations, such
as in the United States where people have diverse theological commitments. For
example, such ideas as “cooperative theology” (belief in both divine sovereignty and
free will), are very attractive to human beings because they exploit very basic
“natural” cognitive processes.
Thus, we might predict that religious ideas which postulate the existence o f
SHA will always have an internal conceptual tension between the powers o f the gods
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and the powers o f people that will play out in various ways in the daily lives o f group
members. We find this to be true in America today. There are only a few remaining
orthodox Calvinists in the United States today, and they reveal an inner locus o f
control, (see above) Yet conservative evangelicals today do not deny the absolute
sovereignty o f God. Recently, after the attacks o f September 11, Jerry Falwell was
quoted as saying - in a very Jeremidian m anner- that the attacks were caused by the
moral lapse o f American society. His “evidence” was the widespread existence of
“sins” like homosexuality, feminism, and the powerful lobby of the AC.L.U.
The tension between divine sovereignty and free will, which has preoccupied
the minds o f many for centuries, is actually a quite natural, arguably inevitable,
tension that results from the ways in which the mind works. Since religious reasoning
is constrained by human cognition, and human cognition is essentially the same
across cultures, we could further predict that this tension recurs across cultures.
Preliminary ethnographic and experimental evidence confirms this. (Barrett 1996;
Boyer 2001). Regardless of theology, human beings everywhere seem to be
enthralled in the grips o f the ambiguity o f agency. Buddhists waver on whether they
can achieve nirvana on their own, with the help o f SHA, or transcend the net o f

karma at all. Muslims simultaneously say that Allah wills everything that happens in
the world, but struggle to bring about his divine will, however imagined, in the world.
(e.g.jihad) And, Christians, like religious people everywhere, labor to decipher how
best to live the good lif e - a struggle that results in the oscillation between “doing”
God’s will and “giving in” to i t Such is the way o f religious reasoning.
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CHAPTER SEVEN

LIKELIHOODS AND LUCK

Armando Benitez has been betting on horses for over 40 years. According to
his own testimony, he has tried every trick in the book to win. The best chances for
winning, however, seem to contradict everything you might imagine about how
anyone should b e t Instead o f using “scientific” methods like basing bets on a horse's
past performances, on insider knowledge, on track conditions, etc., he simply takes a
complete novice to the track and asks that person to choose a horse. In a surprisingly
high number o f cases, the novice picks correctly. What is the explanation?
“Beginner’s luck” seems to work at the track. (Bechtel and Stains 1997)
Setting aside momentarily the question o f whether or not the novice’s picks
really are lucky, what is interesting about the story is that it doesn’t sound completely
absurd. I would be willing to bet (pun intended) that nearly every person has
experienced some unlikely event that can only be explained as resulting from luck.
How else can we explain individuals who win the lottery or win thousands o f dollars
on a slot machine in a casino, or randomly find a $100 bill lying in die street? How
can we explain the “good” fortune of those people who stayed home from work in the
World Trade Center on September 11, or those who for some reason or another
missed their scheduled flights on the hijacked planes that same fateful morning? How
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can we explain even minor incidents like getting caught in traffic while late for an
important meeting, or having your computer crash just before your dissertation is
due? All o f these events, whatever the “ultimate” or “real” cause, could be attributed
to luck.
Here are a few examples of widespread luck beliefs. It is good luck to find
your initials in a spider web. If your birth date, when added together, can be divided
by seven (e.g. 02/09/73 -> 2 + 9 + 73 = 84), you’ll be lucky all o f your life. Telling an
entertainer to “break a leg” sends them good luck. Shooting stars are a sign o f good
luck. You’ll be lucky if you accidentally wear clothing on the wrong side-out all day
long; if a strange dog follows you; if a swallow builds a nest on your house; if a frog
enters your home; if you see three butterflies together, or if you throw salt over your
shoulder. In contrast, it is bad luck to tell an entertainer “good luck.” The number
thirteen is unlucky, which is why you’d be hard pressed to find a hotel that has a
thirteenth floor. It is bad luck to walk under a ladder; to cross the path o f a black cat;
to not wear your lucky charm to an exam, or not perform the usual ritual in
preparation for a big game. (Bechtel and Stains 1997; Shenner 1997; Vyse 1997;
Singer and Singer 1995; Radford and Radford 1969; Seligman 1968)
The list o f “luck beliefs” is extensive. Bechtel and Stains’ 1997 book is 374
pages long and averages about one luck belief per page. Radford and Radford’s

Encyclopedia o fSuperstitions is 264 pages long. What’s more, both books are based
mostly on luck beliefs found in Western cultures alone, so don’t include the
thousands o f luck-beliefs we could find throughout the rest of the world, even though
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the belief in luck is not a “Western” invention, as some cultural relativists might like
to assert Neither is it a “modem” (nor a “pre-modem,” if you prefer) phenomenon.
We find examples o f the belief in luck everywhere, and all throughout history.
In the First century A.D., Ovid is said to have proclaimed, “Luck affects everything.
Let your hook always be cast in the stream. When you least expect i t there will be
fish.” The Christian patriarch S t Augustine said, “The force o f chance is diffused
throughout the whole order of things.” In Japan, daruma dolls, which are stylized
replicas o f a sixth-century Buddhist monk, are widely possessed as good-luck charms.
Chinese calendars are created around “lucky” and “unlucky” days and years. So is the
zodiac. In ancient Egypt the hieroglyphic sign for the word “nefer” was used to
represent goodness, beauty, happiness, youth, and good luck. (Bechtel and
Stains1997)
Furthermore, beliefs in luck are related to actions designed to improve one’s
luck. And here, in the realm of luck rituals (if we can call them such), the list truly
seems endless. Consider just these examples. Throughout the Asian world, Buddhists
purchase amulets to wear around their necks, to hang in their cars, homes, and
businesses in hopes of avoiding bad luck and attracting good luck, (see, for example,
Swearer 1995; Earhart 1993, Spiro 1970; Tambiah 1984) In the Western world,
people do the same. Catholic lay disciples of S t Jude in the United States wear
amulets to protect than from misfortune and to help them deal with “hopeless”
causes. (Orsi 1996) In Africa, both the Zulu and the Yoruba have religious specialists
who strive, through ritual efforts, to ward off misfortune and mishap for the group.
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(Lawson 1984) Professional athletes perform a host o f seemingly arbitrary actions
designed to bring about good luck. Michael Jordan wore his college basketball shorts
under his professional uniform. Hank Aaron wore the same shower shoes for his
entire career. Jimmy Connors tucked a note from his grandma in his socks during
matches. Wade Boggs ate chicken before every baseball game he played, as did
Jackie Joyner-Kersee before track meets. (Bechtel and Stains 1997; Vyse 1997)
Again, the list o f luck beliefs and practices is seemingly endless. Any cursory
glance around the world reveals the widespread existence of such beliefs. Yet, despite
this fact, little scholarly attention has been paid to i t For some reason, few people
investigate this phenomenon, and most dismiss is it as little more than superstition.
However, the widespread belief in luck demands our attention not just because it is
ubiquitous, but also because it reveals the complex workings o f the human mind. It
should be uncontroversial by now that people must use the brains they have got to
think and act, including thinking and acting religiously, and the brains they have work
in specific ways. Given the ubiquitous belief in luck, we can safely conclude that one
way in which our brains operate is to reason inductively, especially about causality,
since believing in luck involves inductive inferences about the “causes” (however
ambiguous) o f unlikely but personally important events. In this sense, the belief in
luck differs from religious belief only by degree, not essence, because both involve
the presumption of agency at work in the world. The only difference, and it is a
relatively minor difference, is that the agents o f religious traditions are less
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ambiguously represented than the “agents” o f luck. This is why, in some cases, luck
gets personified, (e.g. “lukshmi,” “lady luck,” “fortuna”)

Analw in p I.uck

The concept o f luck is actually quite complex and thus should not be
dismissed as superstition or sloppy thinking In a basic sense, luck is synonymous
with chance. When individuals presume the workings o f luck in their lives, though,
they often “spin” the effects o f luck to be positive or negative, as in one having good
luck or bad luck. Furthermore, although the presumption o f luck (or chance) implies
that events are beyond human control, much o f the preoccupation with luck involves
performing actions that are hoped to influence (namely improve) luck. The latter
suggests just the opposite o f the luck.. .that its forces are not beyond our control.
Now, mix in this variable - luck completely contradicts the theologies of Christianity
and Buddhism (and most likely o f all religions, though we’ll limit our study here to
these two traditions). Obviously, something quite strange is going on.
Theologies are constructed deductively. Theologians begin with the
foundational premises o f the faith, such as God exists, God is good, God is powerful,
etc., and then deduce from those premises conclusions to questions that concern them.
According to the conventional view o f religion (not to mention the view assumed by
Geertzian cultural scholars o f religion - see Chapter Two), the followers of a religion
supposedly leam the culturally-specific/domain-general theological doctrines o f a
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religion and then, once learned, the theology determines how one thinks (or ought to
think). However, the widespread belief in luck problematizes this hypothesis.
Since religion involves interacting with postulated (or presumed) agents, and
agents control the events o f the world, everything, it would seem deductively, is
controlled. Hence, as we commonly hear people say, everything happens “for a
reason.” Thus, luck should be what philosophers call a non sequitur. Luck beliefs
should not follow from accepted theological beliefs, regardless o f tradition. Yet, as
with what we saw in Chapter Five, this is not the case. Thus, we should not be
surprised, given what we know about the ambiguity o f agency, that individuals in
South Asia and in America don’t necessarily ascribe complete control to the
postulated agents of Buddhism and Christianity. Let’s consider Buddhist theology
and Christian theology now, so that we might understand why not

Theology
Buddhist theology, like Christian theology, is quite complex (fortunately for
our purposes, we can limit our attention to Buddhist views about causality, since luck
beliefs turn on causal reasoning). The central feature o f Buddhist theology regarding
causality is the doctrine o f karma. Karma means “action and the appropriate result o f
action”; it is a basic law o f cause and effect that regulates the workings of the world,
i.e. one reaps what one sows. (Humphreys 1984) Thus, there is no such thing as
theodicy in Buddhism because there is no “innocent” suffering-all events that one
experiences in life are the result o f one’s actions.
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In Buddhist terms, any event that a person experiences is the consequence of
previous action(s). If a person seems to have good hick, it is because they have
accumulated great karmic “merit” (Sanskrit puma karma), for example by thinking
good thoughts and doing good deeds. In contrast, those people who have bad luck are
believed to be reaping the effects of papa karma, or dem erit This notion is captured
by the popular Thai Buddhist saying, thaam dii, dai dxi; thaam chua, dai chua (“Do
good, get good; Do evil, get evil”).
It takes little cognitive effort to infer, on-line, the Buddhist conception o f

karma (note also that the “golden rule” recurs across traditions). However, Buddhist
theology, upon further reflection, gets much more complicated. Consider the fact that
because humans live in groups, all actions have effects on other people. This creates a
complex “web” o f karmic interaction in which the actions o f each person affect,
potentially, many different people. Thus, how do we know who or what has caused
what? How do we locate, in Buddhist terms, the agent that caused the event, if all
agents’ actions are collectively inter-connected? Furthermore, what about the
complex notion that actions follow from a person’s intentions, while a person’s
intentions result from previous actions? In other words, if all events are caused by
previous actions, one’s own or o f others, where is the actual (i.e. “first”) cause?
Buddhist theology, as it turns out, seems to be somewhat incoherent because it rejects
causality altogether while simultaneously recognizing that events are the outcomes of
actions. (Kalupahana 1975) It is no wonder that on-line, Buddhists simplify their
causal inferences by appeals, however theologically incorrect, to luck.
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What about Christian theology? Essentially, the same goes. There is a popular
notion in Christian cultures, one that is quite similar to the notion o f karma, namely
“what goes around comes around.” As is the case with Buddhism, however, Christian
theology is not so simple. Consider again die issue that was raised in Chapter 5
concerning divine sovereignty. Though Christianity, not to mention Judaism and
Islam, turns on the notion of divine agents, most Christians do not imagine that God
controls every event in the world. In illuminating studies by Lupfer et al. and Spilka
et al., luck was attributed as the cause o f events, both non-life-altering and lifealtering (e.g. financial windfall and terminal illness) in some cases more so than
God.. .even by very conservative Christians. (Lupfer et al. 1992,1994,1996; Spilka
et al. 1983,1985) So why don’t people believe that God is in control, even when they
“should?” Again, the answer is that this theological postulation is cognitively
burdensome. Luck attributions are much more efficient

Cognitive Efficiency

Why are luck attributions so much more efficient than theologically correct
postulations? One answer already provided is that theologies are produced
deductively, but the mind tends to think inductively. The reason for this is three-fold.
First inductive reasoning is much foster than deductive reasoning. Second, deductive
reasoning is too restrictive. Third, inductive reasoning does more work than deductive
reasoning.
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As we have noted, deductive reasoning involves deducing a conclusion from a
set o f premises according to a number o f rules o f inference. The rules o f inference
constrain the ways in which conclusions can result; they are rules o f thought. A
typical example o f a deductive argument is a “syllogism,” such as the following:
All jocks are dumb.
Jason Slone is a jock.
Therefore, Jason Slone is dumb.
What’s important about deductive arguments is that the truth of the conclusion is
guaranteed if the premises are true and the logical deduction follows the established
rules o f inference. In other words, if the premise(s) is true, and the rules o f inference
are followed properly, then the conclusion will be true.
There are, unfortunately, significant problems with deductive thought that
prevent this method of analysis from being widely used (or even preferred). For one,
the need for the premise to be true weakens the possibilities o f the conclusion being
true. What if not all jocks are dumb? Might there be one smart jock somewhere in the
world? If so, then the conclusion of this syllogism is false (even though by the rules
o f inference it is valid). (Solomon 1990)
Furthermore, consider how long it has taken us to deduce a conclusion that
informs us about the mental prowess o f Jason Slone. We not only had to consciously
recall and invoke prior knowledge, in this case about jocks being dumb, we also had
to deduce conclusions “downward” via successive stages of thought Imagine if we
had to do this with every idea we ever generated. We would spend most of our time
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processing data like mathematical calculators - although performing functions at a
much, much slower rate.
Second, deductive reasoning is quite restrictive. What i£ after all that timeconsuming effort it takes to deduce conclusions from premises, the premises are
shown to be wrong? To construct a different answer would require a lengthy trek
through another deductive process, and there would be no guarantee that that answer
would be correct either. Here’s an example.
All women are good cooks.
My wife is a woman.
Therefore, my wife is a good cook.
What if it turns out that all women are not good cooks? We might try this.
All women from Minnesota are good cooks.
My wife is a woman from Minnesota.
My wife is a good cook.
What if my wife is not a good cook? We might try this.
All women from Minnesota, except my wife, are good cooks.
But, now we have an incoherent premise. If but one woman from Minnesota is not a
good cook, then the premise cannot include the pretense “all.” And if a premise
cannot be inclusive, it turns out to be very weak indeed.
The final problem is related to the last statement Deductive reasoning
involves starting from general, ideally universal, premises and deducing from those
premises a conclusion to a specific problem. If the problem is, say, that my wife is a
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bad cook, I would have a seemingly infinite number o f premises from which to begin
my deductive line o f thought “All married women are bad cooks.” “All adults that
were adopted as children are bad cooks.” “All college graduates are bad cooks.” “All
fans of reality television shows are bad cooks.”
As noted before, most cognitive tasks require us to make rapid judgments
about what’s going on in our world, so that we might react appropriately to our given
situations. Imagine if we had to use theologically constrained deductive reasoning.
Our thinking might go something like this. “God is the creator o f all life. Humans are
part of life. My wife is a human. All humans must eat My wife must eat All humans
eat cooked food. My wife eats cooked food. All cooked food must be prepared by
other humans....” You can see where this is going. This kind of thinking takes up too
much time for our everyday traffic with the world, it is too restrictive, and it only
deals with the event covered by the logical conclusion. Simply p u t most people don’t
think this way.
On-line, inductive thought is much more efficient (though maybe not
“better”). Inductive thoughts are lightning-fast and they cover a lot o f territory in a
very short amount o f time. We then remember what’s important for later use, and we
can make predictions about what the future holds in store so that we’re ready to act
when necessary. This cognitive capacity is quite effective for survival. (Barkow,
Cosmides, & Tooby 1992)
Cognitive tasks are often like little (or big) problems to be solved with
explanations. If the problem to solve is explaining why my wife is a bad cook (she’s
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not, it’s just a hypothetical case), then I can do so very quickly by inferring an answer
that, if true, would explain the puzzle. In this way, inductive reasoning starts with a
conclusion and thus skips all the steps required by deductive logic. For example,
maybe my wife is a bad cook because she never learned how to do it properly. This
inductive answer to the problem is plausible and if true solves die problem. If it’s not
true, we can quickly discard the hypothesis and generate a new one. If she had in fact
learned how to cook well, maybe she can’t cook well because she is under a lot o f
stress at work and so is distracted at home. Or, maybe she is trying to make me loose
weight and so is purposely cooking poorly tasting food. Or, maybe I have bought
cheap, bad-tasting groceries for her to cook with. This list, too, is infinite in its
possibilities, but more easily perused for answers (no steps required).
What is striking about this way o f thinking is that so much o f what is involved
in generating inductive ideas is only tacitly known. Inductive reasoning takes for
granted a whole host o f assumptions that are necessary for the inductive
generalization to be constructed at all. Just thmk o f what is assumed in the above
inferences. In terms o f ontology, we know, without having to consciously think about
it, that my wife is a human and thus a psychological agent Moreover, that assumption
requires us to infer that she intends to produce a cooked meal that tastes good (or bad,
as the case may be). Furthermore, we assume that my wife is the primary cause o f the
food tasting badly. Then, we search for causes o f that cause. Intuitively, we assume
not only that there is a cause, but also that we can detect it (wherever “it” may be).
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This type o f causal reasoning is central to our basic cognition. Humans need
to know why things happen, not just to figure out how to solve the problem o f having
to eat bad food, but to survive in general. And the belief in luck, and the susceptibility
to religious ideas, are the by-product o f this cognitive capacity to infer causes of
events in the world.

Events
Happenings simply occur, events are caused. As we have already noted,
causality is a central feature of cognition, and as such has become an important area
of research in the past few decades. What scientists have discovered is that causality
is inferred from domain specific tacit knowledge about what kinds o f things are in the
world and how those things work. An important piece o f the puzzle, though, is that
human conceptualization of causality changes over time as our cognitive capacities
develop.
Early in life, human beings are deterministic in their thinking. Young children
seem to have very clear ideas about how things in the world ought to work. This is
revealed by studies in which infants and young children are shown events things
happen that aren’t supposed to. For example, children are quite surprised to see a ball
go through a wall, (see Spelke, Phillips, & Woodward 1995) Given their intuitive
physics, they know that this kind o f event isn’t supposed to happen.
Sometime around the age o f six or seven, however, children begin to switch
from a deterministic view of the world to a probabilistic one. For some reason having
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to do with a complex interaction o f natural capacities and cultural experiences,
children begin to infer outcomes o f events from based on a tacit knowledge of
probability (though grounded in intuitive ontology). It is at this age, according to
Piaget and Inhelder, that children begin to develop, and hone, an understanding of
chance. At this stage of development, children begin to think that event-outcomes are
not a matter o f either-or, but more-or-less likely to occur. Prior to this stage of
development, children believe that every event outcome has a cause, even if the cause
is hidden. Central to our ability to conceptualize probability is the capacity to
represent the frequency of occurrences, and frequency concepts reveal a sense of
expectation about how the world is generally supposed to work. The primary
difference between children under and over the age o f six is that in the former group,
event-outcomes must happen in a certain way, whereas in the latter, children seem to
think that event outcomes will most likely, but not necessarily, happen in a certain
way. (Piaget and Inhelder 1976)
Piaget and Inhelder’s research suggests that humans regularly perform a kind
o f “informal calculus o f probability.” (Vyse 1997, p. 95) We are constantly
constructing probabilistic theories about why things happen as well as what kinds of
things will happen. In this sense, probabilistic inferences both explain and predict.
Now, were the world not to operate in recognizable patterns (either real or imagined),
we would have great difficulty in making sense of why things happen, and in turn
great difficulty in making and acting on predictions about how things are reasonably
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going to happen. Yet, intuitive probability is not exactly like scientific probability,
and so we ought to consider die difference.

Probability
Scientific probability turns on fairly precise mathematical formulae that can
be tested for confirmation or disconfirmation. The goal is not perfect prediction per

se, but rather to arrive at the odds, or probability, that a particular outcome will occur.
One of the most famous experiments in statistics that reveals the phenomena of
randomness and variability is the flipping o f coins. In this experiment, researchers flip
one or two fair, two-sided coins. There are four possible outcomes when two coins
are flipped: HH (Heads/Heads), TT (Tails/Tails), HT (Heads/Tails), and TH
(Tails/Heads). Since HH is only one o f four possible outcomes, the probability that a
flip of the coins will result in HH is 1:4 or 25%. This also goes for TT. However,
since there are two variations o f the same result for a non-same-side up, either TH or
HT produces the same result, so that the possible outcomes are two o f four.
Therefore, the probability that a flip o f the coins will render a non-same sided result is
2:4 or 50%. Thus, we can say that there is twice as much o f a chance that two flips
will result in a non-same sided result (TH or HT) than a same-sided result (TT or HH)
because probability is the number o f desired outcomes divided by the number of
possible outcomes.
There are no guarantees o f any particular outcome in this experiment There
are only probabilities that the results will show up in patterns. In the classical
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experiment that shows the reliability o f this theory, subjects flip two coins, but only
once or twice. In just a few flips o f die coins, there does not appear to be any
recognizable pattern. The results are random. However, when these same people flip
the coins 100 times, a pattern emerges. Give or take a few variances, most results are
around 25 TTs, 25 HHs, and 50 TH/HTs. For probability theorists, this shows that if
something is done once, anything can happen. However, if something is done over
and over, depending on its structural limitations, a pattern will become visible (note
that this is why this method is an effective way to determine the beginnings o f
sporting matches and games—since the results guarantee no outcomes for one side or
the other, it is considered to be fair).
Importantly, each flip of the coins in the above experiment is completely
independent In other words, what happens on one flip has no influence on what will
result in the next flip., .even though we “sec” a pattern when many flips are involved.
Despite this fact, human beings tend to believe that the consecutive flips o f the coin
are related in some way or another. For example, when presented with two possible
sequences o f flip results, research subjects have shown a preference for the likelihood
o f a random sequence. If asked to infer which sequence is more likely to result from
random flips o f coins, subjects prefer a sequence like TH, HT, TT, TH, HT, HH over
something like HH, HH, HH, HH, HH, HH. Though the possibility of either sequence
occurring is exactly the same, human beings seem to think, intuitively, that the latter
is less likely to happen. Why? The answer is that because the latter sequence does not
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appear to be random at all, people infer that there must be hidden forces at work
causing the sequence to occur as such. (Vyse 1997)
In a similar experiment involving inferences about likelihood, subjects were
shown an outcome sequence that appeared to be systematically random (and thus not
really random at all). Subjects had difficulty accepting that random flips o f a single
coin could produce effects like H, T, H, T, H, T, H, T or H, H, T, T, H, H, T, T.
These results seem to violate our expectations about how randomness ought to occur.
(Vyse 1997, p. 100)
Having deeply rooted - and non-culturally learned - expectations about how
the world ought to work leads to other interesting psychological effects that bear on
our belief in luck. Two o f the most common cognitive mistakes that humans make
collectively constitute the “gambler's fallacy,” which is based on the beliefs that (a)
forces outside wholly mechanical processes can influence an outcome, and that (b)
positive and negative results ought to average out over a period o f time (also known
as the “law o f averages”). In the first case, we find that human beings believe that
they can influence the outcome o f an entirely mechanical and random process, for
example by performing superstitious actions. This misconception is known as the
gambler’s fallacy for good reason. Gamblers are notoriously prone to performing
rituals and other actions that they believe will influence the outcome o f a game of
chance. Those who play games like roulette or craps might chant an incantation
before their turn (e.g. X om e on sevens.. .Daddy needs a new pair o f shoes!!!”).
While in some sense, humans “know” that the wheel is just a set o f mechanical
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devices and thus that the results o f such games are random, anyone who has ever
gambled in a game o f chance knows also how natural it feels to try to influence the
outcome, often by “talking” to the game as if it had some ldnd of psychological
agency.
The second aspect o f the gambler’s fallacy, which is widespread among
people whose livelihoods (and lives in some cases) depend on variables outside o f
their control, like athletes, fishermen, and stock traders, is the belief in the law o f
averages. Informally, this is known as someone or something being “due.” In this
case, in games, sporting matches, and other activities in which forces significantly or
entirely beyond one’s control determine outcomes, participants come to believe that a
string o f bad luck will be countered by a string o f good luck. For example, athletes
believe that when they go into “slumps,” all they need is one good “break” to “open
the floodgates” o f good luck. And in contrast, athletes are prone to the belief in
having a “hot hand,” and will perform arbitrary actions that they believe will make
the string o f good luck continue (e.g. Wade Boggs eating chicken on every game day
because he had good luck in one game early in his career after having eaten chicken).
(Gilovich, Vallone, and Tversky 19S5)
On the other hand, gamblers believe that a string o f losses at a game o f chance
increases the sense that a person is about to win, despite the fact that (as was shown in
the coin-flipping example) each successive try in the game occurs independently.
Thus, one could quite possibly lose every single time forever, though we might be
hard pressed to believe this statistical probability. (R. Falk 1981,1989; Lopes & Oden
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1987; Timberlake & Lucas, 198S; Blackmore 1985; Killeen 1977; Becker 1975;
Langer & Roth 1975; Oldman 1974; Cohen 1960)
More generally, the gambler’s fallacy is the belief that things “even out” in the
world - a presumption that is at the heart of religious ideas. From this fact, we might
conclude that the ideas embedded in these two theological traditions don’t cause
people to think that things even out in life, but rather, because human beings
intuitively presume, because o f their cognitive biases, that things even out, religious
ideas like Buddhism and Christianity are successfully transmitted because they
exploit this much more basic notion. (Boyer 2001)
In addition to the varieties o f cognitive inferences we make regarding
randomness and variability, humans also seem prone to spotting coincidences and to
representing them as fateful events. Despite the mechanical randomness o f many of
life’s events, humans tend to “link” events together in ways that make their
relationship meaningful. Consider the fact that one of the best selling books of all
time was James Redfield’s (1993) The Celestine Prophecy. Its primary “thesis” (it
was fiction) was that life moves in sequences of important events that link you with
your destiny. Redfield asked readers to reflect upon the most important events in their
lives.. .namely those that have led them to where they are today. Why did you pick
the college you attended? Why did you meet the person you ended up marrying?
Why did you decide not to go to work on September 11? Etc. According to Redfield,
such events are not “coincidences” at all, but are in fact part o f your destiny.
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Thousands of readers, we can assume from the book's popularity, resonated with this
idea.
The overwhelming popularity of this book supports anecdotal and
experimental research that suggests that humans imbue things and events with
“purposes” Psychologist Deb Kelemen has called this tendency, “promiscuous
teleology,” and it is a feature not just o f children’s' thoughts, but adults’ as well.
(Kelemen 1999a, 1999b, 1999c, 1999d)
Making inferential judgments like this is based on biased preconceptions
about why events occur, and much o f this bias is based in intuitions about the
likelihood of events occurring. One very interesting example o f this was produced by
cognitive psychologists who asked a classroom o f college students about the
likelihood of two people in the same class having the same birthday. As they
predicted, most students were convinced that the likelihood was very low, and
therefore if two students did share the same birthday, it would be a coincidence. As it
turns out, the probability is actually higher than S0% for classes with at least 23
students. This example, when tested in classrooms, has proven to shock students on
numerous occasions (and as such has become a favorite tool o f professors o f
mathematics and statistics) because it violates our expectations about the likelihood
o f the event occurring. (Paulos 1988)
Furthermore, the element o f surprise that underlies coincidence seems to lead
people to infer that a hidden cause must be at play in such an event This is because
coincidences seem to challenge our intuitions about how the world ought to work. It
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also reveals that human beings, when they infer the causes o f events (including the
likelihood of their occurrence), employ selective remembering, which enhances die
feeling of the specialness o f coincidental events. (Vyse 1997) Consider again the case
o f the coincidence o f shared birth dates. What’s also striking about this case is that in
a class of 23 students or more, subjects are shocked to leam that two people have the
same birthday. What gets overlooked, however, is that at least 21 students did not
share the same birth date. This suggests that we tend to focus on singular events that
are seemingly congruent, and ignore the overwhelming majority o f events that are
not. This phenomenon is further evident in the notion that humans live in a “small
world,” whenever they meet another person with whom they have some - however
remote - connection.

Heuristics and Biases
What most of this suggests is that a good portion o f human thought is based
not on what’s learned from culture perse, but rather on what one infers. Inference
requires various kinds o f postulations and presumptions that are based on tacit
assumptions about the world and its workings as much as it does about invoking
culturally learned “worldviews,” as cultural determinists would maintain, (see
Chapter Two) Humans employ heuristics as a short cut to make sense of their world,
and the use of heuristics reveals that the mind biases reality in certain ways. We
might justifiably count the belief in luck, and the tendency to believe one can
influence luck, as such a case.
156

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

But what is most striking about this phenomenon is not that such thinking
exists, but why it persists, especially in our modem (i.e. scientific) world. With
citizens of both the United States and countries o f South Asia (though to a lesser
degree) being inundated from early on with scientific ideas about how the world
works, why do people still remain “superstitious”? As is the case with die supposed
influence of religion (i.e. theology), psychologists are beginning to show conclusively
that scientific ideas can also have little effect on human beings’ on-line thinking.
Again, consider the case o f the “setting” sun in Chapter Three. Despite the fact that
we know the sun does not move around the Earth, we still act as if it does.
One of the reasons that we are still inclined to think inductively, and therefore
to misconceive of the “reasons” for why things happen in the ways they do, is that we
have been designed by natural selection to perceive and control our environment in
ways that allow us to survive. Obviously, in order to control what’s around us, we
need to have a fairly solid grasp of what’s happening. However, most of our
“theories” about what is going on in our world must be constructed from incomplete
or under-specified data. When we hear a rustling sound in the woods, we don’t have
all o f the data we need to know what’s happening.. .but we know enough to know that
we ought to be on high alert. We presume that what is in the woods is some kind o f
psychological agent. We also presume that the agent has intentions, such as possibly
wanting to eat me. We also presume that the likelihood o f that something eating me
decreases significantly if I leave the area immediately. Notice that all o f these
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presumptions are interrelated and inferred and that we don't have to calculate this
information deductively. Rather we do it instantly, inductively, and quite naturally.
The inferential process described in die above example shows just how
important control is for our survival Gaining control o f a situation requires engaging
in a very complicated mental process with a variety o f cognitive tasks, and doing so
rapidly. This process turns out to be employed for most situations in our daily lives.
Thus, when humans encounter circumstances in which they appear to have no control,
we ought not be surprised that they will still tend to act if they do, or they will try to
figure out a way to gain control.. .whether real or imagined.

The Illusion of Control
A good example o f the illusion of control was already given in the gambler’s
fallacy. Much o f the ritual behavior that is believed to improve luck is related to the
presumption that actions we perform can influence the outcomes of otherwise
mechanical processes. (Malinowski 1948) Consider the activities people perform
while on airplanes, where their fates are almost entirely out o f their control and in die
hands o f pilots and the mechanical workings o f the plane. Consider the rituals that
athletes perform in preparation for and during competition. Consider the behavior o f
gamblers, stock traders, sailors, fishermen, and other folks whose livelihoods depend
on processes that are largely beyond human control (consider individuals and their
families who are confronted with the possibility o f illness and mortality). All o f these
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people are prone to believe in the forces o f luck, and to perform rituals in hopes of
receiving some good luck.
But, you might protest, there are cases in which luck seems to actually occur.
You may, in fact, be able to prove that in-flight rituals work. The proof is in the
pudding.. .not one single plane you’ve been on has crashed since you’ve begun to tap
your forehead four times successively or perform some other arbitrary action.
Furthermore, maybe you’ve won the lottery by playing your lucky numbers, or you
know someone who has. Or, maybe you’ve had die hot hand in sports. Maybe you
think that that “getting hot” resulted from not washing your uniform (including your
undergarments). Maybe you know someone who is just plain lucky or someone else
who is just plain unlucky. Isn’t this enough proof that luck exists and that luck rituals
work?
This argument is one o f the most powerful for folks who believe, or want to
believe, in luck. Yet, it is a fallacy. According to the principles of science, for a
hypothesis to count as a theory, it must have as a property the potential to be
disconfirmed. Such theories about the proof o f hick are “unfalsifiable” beliefs (not
theories), because evidence counts only for the belief never against i t In such cases,
if evidence seems to disconfirm the hypothesis, that piece o f evidence (or its
accompanying theory) is simply discarded.
The tendency to evaluate evidence selectively reveals what psychologists call
“confirmation bias,” which itself is based on a correlation illusion. (Vyse 1997)
Confirmation bias is exactly what it sounds like, the bias to see what one is looking
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for, or to selectively identify bits o f evidence that seem only to confirm what one
believes (or hopes). A good example of this phenomenon is the case o f astrology, in
which a person who believes in horoscopes “sees” proof o f their verity all around.
Skeptics, in contrast, don’t see any proof anywhere.
Confirmation bias is in turn based on the illusion o f correlation, in which an
event is correlated with a postulated cause. For instance, athletes might believe that
their pre-game ritual is the cause o f positive outcomes o f contests. Gamblers might
believe that their incantations are the cause o f their winning. In these cases,
correlations are confused with causes. And correlation illusions fuel luck beliefs and
luck rituals because they allow humans to identify some cause, most likely a
controllable cause, to an event.

Summary
People presume that luck exists because their brains work in such a way that
they are prone to such representations. The belief in luck results from a complex
interaction o f cognitive strategies, such as the employment o f heuristics and biases,
that people use in their everyday engagement with the world. In order to act in a
complex world, humans have to have some sense o f the way in which things work,
namely what kinds of things cause what kinds o f events. That kind of knowledge is,
for humans, probabilistic (at least after the age o f six or seven). Thus, we maintain in
our daily lives deeply seated expectations about what is likely to occur and what is
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not However, we know from experience, that sometimes things don’t happen the way
we expect Some events are unlikely, but happen nevertheless.
Furthermore, we know that events have important impacts on our lives (which
is why we are so concerned with making sense o f the world). We know that life is full
o f “ups and downs.” In such a world, we strive to gain as much control as possible
over event outcomes, even in cases where our actual ability to control events is
significantly low (or entirely impossible). The desire to do so is nonetheless still
there, and it surfaces in the notion that unlikely events, which have affect us
positively or negatively, have the hidden (and ambiguous) “cause” o f luck. Once a
cause is postulated, we naturally feel that we can influence that cause, because of our
natural biases about agents, agency, and the likelihood of events occurring. Thus, we
ought not be surprised to find the belief in luck all throughout the world. It is, like
other forms o f theological incorrectness, a natural by-product of human cognition.
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CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

The cognitive revolution has changed what we once thought about religion.
We now know that cultural theories o f religion are impoverished by a lack of
understanding o f how the m ind works, and thus of why humans think what they think
and do what they do. Most cultural theories o f religion assume that the mind is a
blank slate that learns what to think from culture. Not only is this inaccurate, it is also
illogical. One o f the most striking examples o f why this cannot be the case is the
widespread existence of theological incorrectness. Were humans merely cultural
sponges we would find that each culture would be autonomous, confined, and
homogenous. Every member o f a given culture would think exactly the same thing.
This theory, to say the least, doesn’t fit the evidence.
The only way to explain why people believe what they “shouldn’t,” is that
people have active minds that are continuously engaged in both the construction of
novel thoughts and in the transformation o f culturally transmitted ideas. In contrast,
the cultural model o f religion, not to mention conventional wisdom, implies that
religious people deduce their thoughts from the premises o f given theological,
cultural, or scientific premises. In reality, however, people spend most o f their time
thinking inductively, and so use on-line cognitive strategies that employ tacit, non162
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cultural, knowledge about the world and its workings. Therefore die key to
understanding (lived) religion is identifying the aspects o f cognition that constrain
religious behavior.
Three very important aspects o f cognition that constrain religion are intuitive
ontology (what kinds o f things are in the world), intuitive metaphysics (how do those
things work), and intuitive probability (bow are those things likely to work). These
basic cognitive capacities not only allow us to perform important functions required
for survival, like analysis and prediction o f environmental activity, they also produce
postulations and presumptions that might be, upon reflection, systematically
incoherent In this sense, theological incorrectness is a natural by-product o f the
cognitive tools we have. So, what are the implications of this for our understanding,
study and teaching o f comparative religion?
First, theological incorrectness is, in most cases, not only natural but also
harmless. If a person is playing golf and attributes a high (i.e. bad) score to bad luck,
so what? If an airline passenger feels more secure by saying a prayer, so what? If a
sailor or an athlete gets prepared by performing seemingly arbitrary rituals, so what?
These cases seem to be personally and socially nontoxic. Furthermore, this enables us
to understand that theological incorrectness is not merely a sign of sloppy thinking, as
one might assume. Rather, theological incorrectness is a by-product o f capacity (i.e.
how we are constrained by cognition), not effort.
But are all cases of theological incorrectness harmless? Consider the fact that
Nancy Reagan, a Christian, often consulted the stars for advice on her husband’s
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presidential policies. What if the stars had told her to drop a nuclear bomb on the
U.S.S.R. and her husband, also a practicing Christian, had followed that advice? Or
consider a gambler who, feeling “due,” bets his or her life savings on a horse (picked
by a novice). Think o f a religious family that refuses treatment for an ill child on the
grounds that incantations will be efficacious (though Christian Science might be an
exceptional case here). These cases don’t seem to be so harmless.
So we have a potential problem. If one thing has become certain from this
jaunt through cognition, it is that theological incorrectness is tenacious - the mind
seems to think what it wants to, no matter what we teach it No matter how many
times we point out that the sun does not revolve around the Earth, folks will just go
on believing that they saw the sun set and rise. No matter how many times we point
out that the probability of two classmates sharing a birth date is better than 50%,
people will still be surprised when it happens. And, no matter how much we teach
people that God or karma is in charge o f everything, they are going to go on believing
that they have an inner (or internal) locus o f control.
One o f the most important pillars o f cognitive science that we would do well
to keep in mind is that humans are products o f evolution. This means, in short, that
what we think and do are largely constrained by our genetic endowments. This means
that we are governed by our design because, over time, the benefits o f our cognitive
capacities have outweighed their costs. Thus, regardless of what we seem to teach
people, by and large human populations will follow patters o f behavior that are the
result of cognitive predispositions. Even the “highest” form o f human achievement,
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virtue, seems to be the product o f evolution. As part o f our human cognition, we are
bom with an instinct toward reciprocity. Instead of religion causing us to be good, i.e.
to cooperate, religions actually exploit this apparently innate tendency. Religions
preach ethics because people are prone to “ethical” behavior, not the other way
around. (Ridley 1997; Dawkins 1989)
We might say, therefore, that religion is not a cause o f behavior per se. It does
not determine how we think or act Yet neither does it prevent us from thinking or
acting in ways that we “shouldn’t ” Being a Muslim doesn’t cause people not to
commit acts o f murder. Being a Christian does not cause people not to be
superstitious. Being a Buddhist does not cause people not to pollute the environment
Being religious is merely one part of that complex puzzle that is human behavior and
the dichotomy between nature and nurture, or determinism and free-will, is largely illformed. It is a false dichotomy because we have, to use Daniel Dermet’s phrase,
“elbow room” to act (Dennett 1984)
In light o f the fact that religion is a natural by-product o f cognition, which is
itself part o f the equipment with which humans are endowed as a result of the
processes o f natural selection, the study o f comparative religion should include three
components. First, substantive studies of religion ought to include not just theology
but also ethnography and psychology. We need data that includes not just die ideal
and the empirical, but also the experimental. Second, our theories about religious
behavior must be informed by the cognitive and biological sciences. Human behavior
has proven over and over again to be susceptible to scientific methods of inquiry,
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especially given the advances made in methods of evaluation by philosophers of
science, and religious behavior is no exception. While religion constitutes an object o f
study in its own right, it is not, as scholars once claimed, sui generis. Finally, at die
upper levels of analysis (e.g. in advanced undergraduate and graduate courses),
metatheory must be informed by an up-to-date epistemology and philosophy of
science. The study o f religion must become more scientific, not less so, if it is to be
comparative. This will require that students o f religion become more comfortable
with the function, generation, and evaluation o f explanatory theories. Philosophers o f
science have shown that a reductionism in the social sciences is actually quite
different than religion scholars often imagine. Reductionism is not only possible, but
also quite fruitful. And, most importantly, reductionist theories have little effect on
the richness of human experiences. Science does not “dehumanize” human
experiences, (see Wilson 1998; Damasio 1994; Rosenberg 1997). Thus, combined,
these three qualities would help to make the discipline o f comparative religion a
legitimate scientific enterprise suitable for the modem secular university.
Finally, a comparative study o f religion informed by the cognitive sciences
would enhance our pedagogical effectiveness. For one, defining religion
prototypically allows for a truly comparative enterprise. Students will be empowered
to draw inferences about the phenomenon o f religion from their own background
experiences if they understand how another system is more-or-less like the system
they know best. Second, substantive data from theology, ethnography, and
psychology could be combined to enrich the student’s awareness o f the various
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features o f a religious tradition, and again, allow them to invoke personal knowledge.
And finally, theoretical arguments about the cross-culturally recurrent patterns o f
religious thought and action are made possible when human beings are taken as a
universal. Students are naturally aware of the differences between religious systems.
What is needed, in contrast, is a way for them to understand what the similarities
between religions are as well as why those similarities recur across cultures and time.
In this way, students can engage the study of religion as they would the study of
matter, cells, mind, politics, or any other object of scientific inquiry.
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